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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the complex issue of what action could be taken by the EU to improve 
OHS standards across the Member States (MS). More specifically: what can be done at the EU 
level? Why should action be taken and under what conditions?  To address these questions, the 
thesis is structured around two main focal points:  in order to think about what could be done 
to develop EU OHS standards, it is first necessary to assess what has been done in the past.  
In the first chapter, a socio-legal perspective is adopted to chart the evolution to date of OHS 
law within the EU. Relevant primary sources are analysed, including all EU OHS directives, 
and a review of the secondary literature is complemented by a series of semi-structured 
interviews with stakeholders who participated in the drafting or negotiation of the main 
Framework Directive 89/391/EEC. In order to assess the impact of EU OHS standards within 
the MS, a comparison is then drawn between French and UK OHS law, with a focus in each 
case on the changes that were made to national law in response to developments in EU law. In 
the second part of the thesis, the enquiry turns to consider how the EU institutions might act to 
improve OHS standards. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is analysed 
in a detailed, schematic manner and the nature and activities of Labour Inspectorates is 
considered, both within MS and at the EU level, with a critical review here of the role and 
function of the recently created European Labour Authority.  
Given the current political stalemate in the EU in respect of social policy, the main conclusion 
of the thesis is that the most viable route towards the improvement of workers’ health and safety 
lies not with new legislation but with the improved application and enforcement of the existing 
body of EU OHS standards. This could be effected through (i) European-level coordination of 
the way LIs enforce existing standards at the national level, and (ii) a programme of strategic 
litigation before the CJEU to cover existing gaps and develop ‘new’ rights; for example, the 
right to reasonable accommodation in the workplace for injured or unwell workers.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) is shaped by the dynamic of the European social model that 
aims to protect workers’ rights, and by the dynamic of the single market with the freedom of 
movement of goods, capital, services, and labour. There are two central dimensions to the 
challenges of developing European social policy: first, the relation between liberalised market 
freedoms and social protection, and second, the distribution of regulatory competencies 
between the supranational and the national levels.1 In the first years of the EU, decision-making 
in respect of social policy was shaped by a belief that standards would improve ‘automatically’ 
as a result of the removal of barriers to trade and mobility and consequent economic growth. 
This was easier for sovereign countries to agree upon than a programme of positive integration 
through the establishment of common institutions.2 Negative integration in the EU and its 
internal market has since exposed national social policies to high pressure and competition, 
using the mobility of the capital as a threat.3 This problem relates to the concept of social 
dumping that has always figured prominently in the literature on European integration.4 
Occupational health and safety (OHS) constitutes an exception to negative integration and is 
the only social field where there has been positive action by the EU early on. However, the 
OHS field is still impacted by social dumping; a limited understanding of European 
requirements can lead to a prioritization of cost-cutting over health and safety which can impact 
on the price of products and services. This approach can distort the market on the account of 
variable health and safety costs.5  
 
 
1 Eichhorst, W., 1998. European social policy between national and supranational regulation: Posted workers in 
the framework of liberalized services provision (No. 98/6). Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.p.7  
2 See Scharpf, F., 1998. Negative and positive integration in the political economy of European welfare states. 
In The Future of European Welfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. pp. 157-177 
3 Eichhorst, W., 1998. European social policy between national and supranational regulation: Posted workers in 
the framework of liberalized services provision (No. 98/6). Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.p.11 
4 The phenomenon of social dumping can have two illustrations: one is company in search of lower labour costs, 
the second is a competitive disinflation to hold down social expenditure and labour regulations to stay 
competitive – See Ericksno, C.L. and Kuruvilla, S., 1994. Labor costs and the social dumping debate in the 
European Union. ILR Review, 48(1), pp.28-47. 
5 Wright, F.B., 1992. The Development of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in the European 
Communities. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 8(1), p.33; Neal, 
A.C., 1998. Regulating health and safety at work: Developing European Union Policy for the 
Millennium. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 14(3), p..218 
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The risk of a limited understanding of the EU’s OHS standards is real, not only due to 
new risks (e.g., « technostress »)6 for which new directives should be adopted, but also due to 
the cutting of resources at the national level, which weakens the labour inspectorates’ capacity 
to enforce EU OHS standards. Therefore, the question of whether the EU should take action 
regarding OHS, and to what extent, is part of the current debate.7 
The existing body of EU OHS standards is contained in more than 30 directives, most 
of them based on the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, which covers all workers in the EU 
regardless of sector. This body of law has led to major improvements in workers’ health and 
safety by creating OHS standards, which can be of two types - either a specification standard 
or a performance standard.8 A specification standard is a ‘self-explanatory’ standard which 
requires little interpretation by the duty-holder, e.g. employers. For example, one of the first 
EU OHS Directives explicitly provides that “the value corresponding to the alarm threshold 
shall not exceed (…) 15 parts per million for mean values measured over a period of one 
hour”.9 OHS specification standards have been well developed from 1977 to 1989. With the 
adoption of the Framework-Directive 89/391/EEC, the focus shifted towards performance 
standards which specify the outcome of the OHS improvement but leave the concrete measures 
at the discretion of the duty-holder. One example could be the employers’ duty to “take 
measures necessary for the safety and health protection of workers, including prevention of 
occupational risks and provision of information and training, as well as provision of the 
necessary organization and means”.10 Here, the broad and general EU OHS standard is the 
protection of workers’ health and safety. The Directive specifies that it will be through 
preventive measures but does not detail what these measures should be. Most of EU OHS 
standards created by the currently applicable OHS Directives are performance standards. 
 
 
6 Popma, J., 2013. The Janus face of the 'New ways of Work': Rise, risks and regulation of nomadic work. Working 
Paper ETUI, p.10  
7 See Vogel, L., One swallow doesn’t make a summer—European occupational health policy at a 
crossroads. Social policy in the European Union: State of play 2018, pp.135-152; Regulations, W.T., 2013. Will 
Europe still fly the flag for workers’ safety? LABOUR RESEARCH. pp.17-18 
8 Gunningham, N., 1996. From compliance to best practice in OHS: The role of specification, performance, and 
systems-based standards. Australian Journal of Labour Law, 9(3), p.222 
9 Article 6.2. Directive 78/610/EEC of 29 June 1978 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States on the protection of the health of workers exposed to vinyl chloride 
monomer 
10 Article 6.1. of the Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work.  
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However, this large legal framework often comes under attack, both at that national and 
EU level, on the basis of the claim that it overprotects the workers and limits competition. The 
most recent example of an EU-level attack was the REFIT programme, intended to simplify 
EU law by removing unnecessary burdens and adapting existing legislation without 
compromising on policy objectives.11 This assumption was wrong as various reports and studies 
prove that developing OHS contributes to competition.12 
Beyond its economic aspects, OHS has a significant human element, and work is, 
unfortunately, still dangerous. It is undeniable that there has been an improvement of the 
working conditions and a considerable decrease in fatal accidents, but there is still a high 
number of occupational diseases due to musculoskeletal disorders and psychosocial risks being 
reported. The recent French court case on the management practices of France Telecom, which 
pushed 69 workers to commit suicide between 2008 and 2011, is a striking example of the 
connection between economic pressure for competitiveness and the psychosocial risk and direct 
impact on workers’ lives.13 Therefore, there is a pressing need to improve the OHS legal 
framework to ensure the health and safety of workers in the future. 
Even assuming that the EU ought to take new steps to improve OHS in the Member 
States (MS), the question arises of the appropriate nature of such steps. This is often debated, 
especially because the social field is deeply rooted at the national level; it might even be 
qualified as part of the identity of the MS.14 In this doctoral study, I attempt to address the 
complexity issue of how the OHS legal framework might be improved in the EU. One of the 
essential questions is which European institutions might be the right actors to do it. What can 
be done at the EU level? Why should action be taken and under what conditions? To answer 
these questions, it is first necessary to understand the existing legal framework and the 
rationales and circumstances that shaped its evolution. Both its construction and its impact must 
 
 
11https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-
law-simpler-and-less-costly_en 
12 European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2007): Facts 76/EN National economics and occupational 
safety and health. Bilbao, Spain: European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, ISSN 1681-2123; European 
Agency for Safety and Health at work (2007): Facts 77/E? The business benefits of good occupational safety and 
health, Bilbao, Spain, ISSN 1681-2123 
13 See Chabrak, N., Craig, R. and Daidj, N., 2016. Financialization and the employee suicide crisis at France 
Telecom. Journal of Business Ethics, 139(3), pp.501-515; Alemanno, S.P. and Cabedoche, B., 2011. Suicide as 
the Ultimate Response to the Effects of Globalisation? France Télécom, Psychosocial Risks, and Communicational 
Implementation of the Global Workplace. Intercultural Communication Studies, 20(2), pp.24-40 
14 Streeck, W., 1995. Neo‐voluntarism: A new European social policy regime? European Law Journal, 1(1), 
pp.39-40 
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be assessed and we must ask what can we achieve in terms of national convergence with an EU 
action. Addressing the construction and impact of the legal framework, in addition to the study 
of the existing provisions, will allow us to predict what can we expect from the EU in terms of 
OHS standards and under what conditions. 
Additionally, improvement of OHS standards might not necessarily come from the 
creation of new norms or directives; it could also come from implementing and enforcing what 
already exists in new or different ways. In that respect, complementary issues have to be 
addressed, such as the question of whether we enforce or apply EU OHS standards at the EU 
level. If yes, how and to what extent? What is the impact of EU enforcement and application at 
the national level? These questions raise the more general question of the share of competences 
between the national and the European level in the social policy field. What can or should be 
delegated from the national to the EU level in order to improve OHS standards across the EU? 
With these questions addressed, it will be possible to understand the current situation 
and possible ways to proceed (e.g., adopting a new OHS directive at the national or European 
level by agencies, labour inspectorates, or courts). On this basis, it might be possible to adjust 
future OHS strategies by making the best out of the current situation. This analysis may also 
provide support for a reform of the institutional Treaties regarding the share of social 
competencies between the national and European level or a rethinking of the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. At a time of increasing Euroscepticism, it is fundamental to 
highlight the necessary complementarity between the European and the national levels to 
improve social policy, with the health and safety of workers as a central concern. Economic 
integration in the EU creates new risks for the workers; however, action by the EU without 
enforcement at the national level would be as useless as an isolated strategy at the national 
level. 
The thesis is structured around two main focal points:  in order to think about what could 
be done to develop EU OHS standards in the EU, it is first necessary to assess what has been 
done.  In the second chapter, the existing EU OHS legal framework is contextualised amongst 
broader OHS policies at the EU level. Its evolution over time, starting with the foundation of 
the European Economic Community in 1957, will also be discussed. A socio-legal perspective 
is central in this historical approach in order to understand the overall evolution as well as the 
reasoning behind some decisions (e.g., previous literature recognises the Framework Directive, 
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89/391/EEC, as a turning point in the EU OHS approach. Why did the EU decide to operate 
such a change in its approach in 1989?). The core of this study is based on a close analysis of 
primary sources related to the OHS field, including Council Decisions and Resolutions, 
Commission’s Recommendations, Social Action Programmes, and Community programmes 
concerning safety, hygiene, and health at work between 1957 and 2018. This study is also based 
on the European Treaties, and how they impacted the evolution of OHS, especially the Single 
European Act 1986. All EU OHS directives have been examined, and an in-depth analysis of 
the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, has been conducted. To understand the challenges 
raised by the adoption of this directive, all the available archives relating to this have been 
investigated (e.g., the different drafts submitted by the European Parliament and the 
Commission). The understanding of the overall transformation of EU OHS has been 
strengthened by a review of secondary sources (mainly academic literature). 
Based on the findings of these preliminary investigations, interviews were designed to 
target the existing gaps in the literature highlighted during the first phase of the study. The 
thesis then draws empirically on three interviews conducted with stakeholders who were part 
of or witnessed the EU OHS decision-making process at the end of the 1980s: Alexandre Berlin, 
who was a civil servant for the Commission in the Director Generals (DG) V tasked with 
developing EU OHS policies between 1970 and 2004, Marc Sapir, the first director of the 
Bureau Technique Syndical, and Jean Lapeyre, the secretary general of the European Trade 
Union Congress at the end of the 1980s. Due to their crucial positions within the European 
bodies at the end of the 1980s, these qualitative interviews provide original, empirical data that 
allow for a better understanding of the political rationales leading to the development of the EU 
OHS legal framework. 
The third and fourth chapters investigate the impact of the existing framework using a 
comparative methodology by focusing on one of the turning points: the implementation of the 
Directive 89/391/EEC. The implementation of the directive in two MS (i.e., France and the 
UK) is compared as well as its impact through an analysis of OHS legal framework at the 
national level before the implementation and the way it in which it was implemented and 
subsequently integrated. 
Only a wide historical lens — 1970 to 2019 — can capture the overall effect of the EU 
action at the national level. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the national dynamics to see if 
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these conflicted at all with the EU approach. Thus, in addition to the historical methodology, a 
socio-legal approach is used to compare the impact of the Framework Directive in France and 
the United Kingdom (UK). The selection of these two countries is based on various factors. 
First, these countries illustrate two of the main “parent legal families” constituting the EU: the 
Anglo-Saxon system based on the common law tradition and a Latin system belonging to the 
civil law tradition.15 These countries have also been selected due to their relationship with the 
EU: France has always appeared to encourage European integration, while the UK has 
expressed more reticence (as illustrated by the Brexit vote). Moreover, their industrial relations 
(IR) are deeply divergent: the French system is strongly institutionalised and regulated by the 
state, while the UK IR were built upon the idea of collective laissez-faire, which then shifted 
towards more deregulation. Because of these differences, a comparison between the two 
countries promises to reveal whether the implementation of EU OHS Directives created a 
phenomenon of convergence among MS. To supplement the existing literature, five semi-
structured interviews were conducted: Jean Lapeyre, a worker representative of the 
Confédération Française Du Travail (CFDT)16 in France during the 1970s, Jean Auroux, 
minister of labour in France from 1981 to 1984, Patrick Kinnersly, a UK journalist and involved 
in the workers’ rights and author of a pamphlet about the Robens Report, and Phil James and 
David Walters, experts on the socio-legal development of OHS in the UK for more than 30 
years. These testimonies supplement the existing literature in valuable respects. 
The fifth and the sixth chapters explore how EU OHS standards could be improved by 
focusing on new applications and better enforcement of existing law through two main 
channels: the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the labour inspectorates (LIs). 
The CJEU has a fundamental role in the application of EU OHS standards, considering that its 
decisions are legally binding and applicable in all the MS. Its broad impact and competences 
designate the CJEU as an institution that has the potential to influence the way EU OHS 
standards are applied. Chapter 5 constructs a hypothesis regarding the role that the CJEU might 
play in the development of a new understanding of the EU OHS legal framework. The main 
hypothesis concerns its potential role in developing a right to adapt the workstation in return-
to-work situations for injured or unwell workers excluded by disability protection. The first part 
 
 
15 Rambaud, T., 2014. Introduction au droit comparé: Les grandes traditions juridiques dans le monde. Puf. pp.43-
52. 
16 French Democratic Confederation of Labour  
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of Chapter 5 is based on a qualitative analysis of OHS jurisprudence of the court that examines 
all the judgements held by the CJEU that relate to one of EU OHS directives between 1957 and 
2017. A more detailed review of the jurisprudence around the concept of disability at work is 
also provided.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the second potential channel to improve the enforcement of EU 
OHS standards by investigating how the EU could strengthen the LI at the national level and 
what should be done at the EU level. The enforcement of OHS legislations by the LIs falls 
under the national competencies of the MS. Therefore, the first part of the chapter highlights 
the main differences at the national level that constitute a challenge to the coordinated 
enforcement of EU standards. The main material investigated was reports authored by the 
European Public Service Union (EPSU) and COWI.  It also addresses common obstacles that 
the national LIs face, especially in the context of a European labour market. The second part of 
Chapter 6 presents a critical assessment of the future role of the European Labour Authority 
and whether it could contribute to the more harmonious enforcement of EU OHS standards at 
the national level. 
The interviews undertaken during the course of the research provided valuable 
indication regarding the political context within which legal and policy decisions were made. 
My intention while conducting these interviews was (i) to discuss the ‘incoherency’ or the 
‘missing’ elements identified during the examination of the primary sources which might 
contribute the ‘full picture’ of the development of OHS legal frameworks in the EU, UK and 
France, (ii) to identify the personal experiences and approach of those who helped draft, 
negotiate and comment on the legislation. The aim of these interviews was to collect personal 
testimonies and memories regarding official and legal events, such as the adoption of European 
directives or national pieces of legislation.  
The high positions and extensive knowledge necessary to be able to contribute or to 
influence the development of OHS legal acts in the EU, UK and France made recruitment to 
the interviews difficult. For example, some people who have worked for the Commission or the 
European Institutions, or in the Governments may still be subject to confidentiality agreements 
even after they have retired. Nonetheless, I have identified and contacted a small number of 
stakeholders during the examination of the primary sources and secondary literature. After a 
first contact had been made, identification of additional participants proceeded according to a 
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‘snowball’ logic. However, due to professional circumstances (e.g., Confidentiality 
agreements) or personal beliefs (e.g. refusal to sign the consent agreement, refusal to participate 
due to lack of time and/or resources) exchanges that I had with six people do not fall within the 
scope of the ethical approval of this study and could not be used as official sources for this 
thesis. In order to respect the wish of anonymity of these people, and to respect the trust that I 
have established with them, no further details will be provided regarding their identities, or 
current or past positions. Eventually, I succeeded in interviewing seven individuals. These 
participants represent a small, unrepresentative sample for each legal system examined in this 
doctoral study: the EU, France and UK.  
Once agreement was reached with the participant concerning their intentions to 
contribute to the research and the day of the interview, I prepared a list of questions 
corresponding to the time and the legal system relevant for their personal experience. Shortly 
before the interview, I sent them by email the information sheet,17 the consent form18 and the 
questions. Whenever it was possible, I met in person with the participant to conduct the 
interview, otherwise the interview was conducted by phone or via videoconferencing. The 
length of each interview was decided by the participants, and they ranged from 40 minutes to 
almost 2 hours. All the interviews were audio-recorded with the consent of the participant. 
Based on these audio recordings, the interviews were transcribed, and the transcriptions sent to 
the participants who then had an opportunity to amend them. The transcripts are now stored in 
a University of Glasgow databased.19 The conditions of storage and of access for future re-use 
have been detailed in the ethical approval granted from the College of Social Sciences Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Glasgow.20 
Regarding the analysis of the interviews, I have gathered and questioned the participants 
on their visions of past events. It means that their statements represent their individual and 
personal experience. Therefore, their statements and opinions cannot and should not be 
generalised. Additionally, I acknowledge that the sample achieved is small and that all 
interviewees have a similar perspective, i.e. they are broadly sympathetic to the interests of 
workers. I am fully aware of this imbalance of perspectives among the social partners and I did 
 
 
17 Both in French and in English; see Appendices n°3 and n°4 
18 Both in French and in English; see Appendices n°1 and n°2 
19 Restrict Access with the DOI: 10.5525/gla.researchdata.891 
20 Application No: 400 160 108 
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my best to take it into consideration during the analysis of the empirical data. However, despite 
this conscious effort, this imbalance and the number of participants might limit the overall value 
of the data; in the event of further studies focusing on personal perspectives on the evolution of 
the OSH legal framework in the EU and MS, this should be addressed.  Also, all the participants 
were in their seventies or eighties, and memory might have been an issue for some of them, 
especially regarding events which happened 30 to 40 years ago. I have, therefore, taken into 
careful consideration the reliability of my participants.  
The results of my investigation into the evolution and understanding of the EU OHS 
legal framework are presented in the first part of the thesis. What emerges is the consistent role 
of the Commission as a coordinator of the MS, whose aim was to find a consensus and 
compromise accepted by all the MS no matter what the institutional changes involved. As a 
result of the adoption of legal norms at the European level, there was a phenomenon of 
theoretical convergence with the adoption of broad and general OHS principles; however, 
applications of these concepts diverged depending on the legal tradition and the political context 
at the national level. 
As I explain in Chapter 2, the concepts of consensus and compromise shaped OHS 
decision-making in the EU. The ways in which these concepts are applied and in what 
institutional and political contexts have changed over time. The current study analyses three 
distinct periods: the early development of OHS in the European Community from 1957 to 1985, 
the turning point of the Delors Commission in 1985 and the adoption of the Single European 
Act and the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, and the adoption and evolution of OHS 
principles in 1989 under commissions with different economic agendas. 
At first, the development of OHS rules was seen as necessary to balance the collateral 
damage of economic construction. From 1957 to 1985, the degree of commitment to and 
framing of OHS varied considerably depending on the personality and ambitions of the 
President of the Commission. However, even ambitious commissions, such as the Jenkins and 
Thorn Commissions, reached institutional limits when they tried to develop a set of OHS 
directives determining limits to exposure to toxic products at the workplace. Indeed, until 1985, 
unanimity was required to adopt new OHS directives. The Delors Commission was a turning 
point in the EU, with the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) 1986 and the aim of 
establishing the single European market. The SEA introduced Art. 118A, requiring only the 
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qualified majority to vote the adoption of new OHS directives. In theory, this new provision 
could have made the concepts of consensus and compromise less relevant; however, the 
interviews conducted for the current study, combined with a review of the literature on the 
qualified majority vote, show the importance of the informal dynamics behind the decision-
making behaviours in the OHS field. 
Therefore, in chapter 2, I argue that despite the significant institutional change of the 
Article 118A with the SEA, the former dynamic of consensus and compromise that was 
applicable under the unanimity rules still existed but in an informal manner. The adoption of 
the Framework Directive and its individual directives (also called ‘daughter directives’) was 
also due to a specific circumstance: the establishment of the single market. These directives 
were necessary to ensure the functioning of the market. I illustrate this argument by underlining 
that even if certain aspects of Directive 89/391/EEC embodied real change compared to the 
previous generation of OHS directives, the quantitative approach and the idea of consensus and 
compromise were visible during the discussions that led to its adoption. The general phrasing 
of the rights and obligations embodied in Directive 89/391/EEC was a turning point compared 
to the narrow obligation regarding the maximal value of exposition to chemicals, e.g. Directive 
80/1107/EC. However, the Commission continued to insist upon the importance of reaching a 
consensus accepted by everyone even if it meant less clarity. 
In the last part of Chapter 2, I argue that these concepts of compromise and consensus, 
which were at the heart of the decision-making process at the time of the adoption of most of 
EU OHS Directives, are no longer appropriate in the current setting. In the past, compromise 
and consensus were possible because the positions of the various stakeholders had relatively 
the same importance. Trade unions have been significantly weakened over the past two decades, 
which means that compromise and consensus are not possible (or only at the costs of the TUs’ 
claims). Additionally, the EU considerably expanded during the 1990s. At the end of the 1980s, 
a common position between MS was possible because most of the MS had a common idea of 
the role of the EU. This is no longer the case, particularly in the field of social law. It is now 
more complicated to find commonality and agreement to move forward. This chapter 
emphasises the importance of the context at the moment when most of the EU OHS legal 
framework was adopted. It shows that the current context might not be favourable for the 
adoption of new OHS directives. Therefore, the focus of the rest of the thesis is on the existing 
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legal framework, its impact at the national level, and the various ways it can be enforced and 
applied. 
As is shown in the comparative study presented in Chapters 3 and 4, the implementation 
of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC prompted reforms at the national level even in MS 
with well-developed OHS legal frameworks, e.g., France and the UK. Both MS had to amend 
their national legislations to implement EU OHS principles. Interestingly, France and the UK 
changed parts of their legislation on which they had previously diverged. This proves that EU 
activity in the field of OHS initiated a theoretical convergence with the adoption of common 
principles and concepts. However, this comparative study highlights also the importance of the 
national political context and the existing IR as factors that influenced the way the Directive 
89/391/EEC was implemented and integrated at the national level. In the UK, for example, IR 
were initially characterised by the notion of voluntarism or collective laissez-faire. 
Additionally, when the directive was implemented, the Conservatives were at the head of the 
government and were opposed to any regulatory dynamic, especially in the social field and 
influenced by the EU. Implementation of Directive 89/391/EEC was consequently minimal.  
On the other side, in France, the IR were mostly regulated and centralised. Moreover, 
between 1981 and 1995, the Socialist Party was at the head of the government, and it was in 
favour of the political and social development of the EU. As a result, the implementation of 
Directive 89/391/EEC was not only an opportunity to reform the French OHS legal framework 
but also to clarify it in order to align with EU concepts while respecting national legal traditions. 
These examples also illustrate the general idea that action taken at EU level can have an impact 
at the national level only if the national governments and relevant authorities relay it. The EU 
OHS principles can lose their consistency and potential if they are not applied and enforced 
coherently among the MS, leading to deep practical divergences as is currently the case. 
 The second half of the thesis focuses on how to improve the EU OHS legal framework 
through an extensive, novel application of existing OHS principles before the CJEU (Chapter 
5), and better enforcement of EU OHS standards by the LIs (Chapter 6). 
In Chapter 5, I explore whether or not, in the context of legal paralysis at the EU level, 
litigation before the CJEU has the potential to improve workers’ OHS. The chapter is structured 
in two parts: the first section provides an overview of what has been done in terms of strategic 
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litigation before the CJEU in the field of OHS in the form of both infringement proceedings 
and preliminary rulings. Analysis of all the Court decisions that rely on one OHS directive 
confirms the politicised behaviour of the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings and 
shift towards a decentralised channel to enforce EU OHS standards with an argument based on 
individual rights for the workers.21 It stresses that the infringement proceeding channel might 
not lead to major improvements in the current political context. In the meantime, it shows the 
potential for developing a litigation strategy via preliminary rulings. Indeed, the CJEU has 
positively influenced and extended workers’ rights regarding working time and protections for 
pregnant workers. However, the claims that seem to be suitable for action before the CJEU are 
the claims based on individual rights. Individual rights are rare in the OHS legal framework, 
which has a reflexive nature aimed at changing procedures and encouraging self-regulation. 
Nevertheless, one aspect of OHS might benefit from a CJEU ruling. Therefore, the second part 
of chapter 5 explores, from a more hypothetical perspective, the kind of arguments that might 
be developed before the CJEU to expand the scope of current OHS directives to include the 
situation of injured or unwell workers returning to work after sick leave that was taken for 
occupational reasons. 
Currently, there is a right to a reasonable accommodation in the workplace, but this is 
strictly limited to disabled workers. The concept of disability does not cover injured or unwell 
workers who cannot work at their full potential but are not (yet) disabled; their protection varies 
considerably depending on the MS. Therefore, I argue that it might be possible to advocate for 
an expansive application of Article 6.d of Directive 89/391/EEC based on the idea that the 
employer’s obligation of prevention is not limited to the situations prior to a workplace accident 
or occupational disease. In the occurrence of a workplace accident or occupational disease, this 
obligation continues, and the employer has an obligation to adapt the workstation to prevent 
aggravation of the impairment (which can lead to long-term disability for the worker). The 
phrasing of this right to adaptable workplaces would be inspired by the existing framework.22 
It would be restricted to cases where impairment is due to a fault by the employers; considering 
the national differences in terms of employers’ liability in OHS, the application of this right 
will be different depending on the MS. The possibility of defending this argument before the 
 
 
21 A total of one 161 cases have been collected, and then classified according to: the year of the decision, the type 
of action before the CJEU (i.e., Infringement proceeding or preliminary ruling), the Member States involved, and 
the OHS Directive’s topic 
22 See Art. 5 Directive 2007/78/EC and Art. 5.1. Directive 92/85/EEC 
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CJEU might also be restricted due to limited resources of the parties involved and the constraint 
of admissibility to go to the CJEU. Nevertheless, such argumentation can open a debate on the 
general idea of filling legal gaps by developing an innovative understanding of the existing 
legal framework. 
 In Chapter 6, I examine whether it would be possible to improve EU OHS standards 
through better enforcement by the LIs. According to the Treaties, LIs are bound to ensure that 
common EU social standards are respected.23 At the same time, labour regulation has 
historically been a matter of domestic law and control.24 It is assumed that the EU will not 
interfere, and that enforcement will remain a national matter.25 LIs enforce EU OHS standards 
with their differences but also similarities. The differences regarding enforcement revolve 
around the central concept of sanctions and can be organised in three sub-categories: the nature 
of the sanctions, the proportionality of the sanction, and the balance between legally and non-
legally binding sanctions or way of enforcement. The analysis of the common obstacles 
revolves around the idea of “lacking”: lack of human and material resources and lack of support 
and cooperation that led to non-enforcement at the national level made worse due to the 
common market. These observations underline the existence of common dysfunction at the 
national level and raise the potential need for European action to provide support for the lack 
of assistance and resources — especially with respect to cross-border employment. Thus, the 
second part of Chapter 6 focuses on the EU level and which bodies and agencies have an impact 
on the enforcement of EU OHS standards. 
A close examination of the Senior Labour Inspectorates Committee (SLIC) shows a 
paradox between the awareness of the national need for European action and the Commission 
agenda, delegating enforcement to the national level. Overall, the study of the four main 
European actors26 not only underlines their support and advisory role to the Commission but 
also their lack of independent executive power. For this reason, the final part of the chapter 
contains an assessment of the European Labour Authority (ELA), which has been presented as 
 
 
23 Art. 4.3 TFEU 
24 Kolben, K., 2011. Transnational labor regulation and the limits of governance. Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law, 12(2), p.407 
25 Hartlapp, M., 2014. Enforcing social Europe through labour inspectorates: Changes in capacity and cooperation 
across Europe. West European Politics, 37(4), p.809 
26 i.e., The Senior Labour Inspectors Committee (SLIC), the Advisory Committee for Safety and Health at work 
(ACSH), the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and the European 
Agency for Safety and Health at Work  
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an independent authority in charge of enforcing the rules on workers mobility (one of the 
problems facing the national LIs).  
An examination of the three scenarios suggested in the impact assessment published by 
the Commission for the establishment of the ELA shows that this authority is an illustration of 
the current limitation in terms of improvement of EU OHS standards. 27 Some options that could 
have led to a real improvement at the EU level have been discussed but because of the choice 
of a stakeholder to maintain its sovereignty over its authorities — thereby maintaining 
unbalanced scope between the enforcement of EU OHS and market freedoms — the ELA will 
be an upgraded version of the existing mechanisms, such as networking and mediations, but 
without real novelty or innovation. This example demonstrates that improving the enforcement 
of OHS in the EU does not only depend on what would be legally possible but also on the 
political will of the main actors, starting with the MS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a 
European Labour Authority COM(2018) 131  
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 CHAPTER 2 
The Development of Occupational Health and Safety in the 
European Union: From Privileged to Ignored Topic 
2.1. Introduction 
Whether the EU should take action regarding OHS, and to what extent, is central to the 
current debate.28 The existing literature provides an overview of the current legal framework 
by describing the evolution of the approach applied to the EU OHS law-making activity through 
different stages:29 first, the prescription of technical standards, then a shift towards a goal-
orientated approach with Directive 89/391/EEC, and finally the development of an approach 
based on social dialogue.30 This evolution has taken place within the broader development of 
the European project, and links between the OHS Directives and the broader EU policies have 
been successfully established, especially the importance and the central attention given to the 
single market and the economic development of the Community.31 However, there have been 
only a few studies that have investigated the internal processes of the adoption of the Directive 
to explain the logic of the evolution that has been described previously.32 Most of the previous 
research has focused on the ‘outcome’ of the evolution, not the dynamics and the factors of 
these changes over time. 
 
 
28 See Vogel, L., One swallow doesn’t make a summer—European occupational health policy at a 
crossroads. Social policy in the European Union: state of play 2018, pp.135-152; Regulations, W.T., 2013. Will 
Europe still fly the flag for workers’ safety?. LABOUR RESEARCH. 
29 Gagliardi, D., Marinaccio, A., Valenti, A. and Iavicoli, S., 2012. Occupational safety and health in Europe: 
Lessons from the past, challenges and opportunities for the future. Industrial health, 50(1), p.8; see Wright, F.B., 
1992. The Development of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in the European 
Communities. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 8(1), pp.32-57. 
30 See Liu, K. and Liu, W., 2015. The Development of EU Law in the Field of Occupational Health and Safety: A 
New Way of Thinking. Management and Labour Studies, 40(3-4), pp.207-238. 
31 See Vogel, L., 2015. The machinery of occupational safety and health policy in the European Union. History, 
institutions, actors, Brussels, ETUI.; see Neal, A.C., 1998. Regulating health and safety at work: Developing 
European Union Policy for the Millennium. International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 14(3), pp.217-246. 
32 Note that the general decision-making in the European Union in fields other than OHS has been broadly covered. 
See Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E., 1999. Decision-making in the European Union. Macmillan International Higher 
Education; Peterson, J., 1995. Decision‐making in the European Union: Towards a framework for 
analysis. Journal of European public policy, 2(1), pp.69-93.; Richardson, J., 2006. European Union: Power and 
policy-making, Routledge  
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Thus, a series of questions need to be raised to complete the existing literature. The 
primary research question is: which rationale or rationales have shaped decision-making in the 
EU in the field of OHS law? Two subsidiary questions should also be considered: How might 
we assess the impact of this rationale on the EU OHS legal framework? Is this rationale still 
important today when it comes to decision-making with respect to OHS? By addressing these 
questions, the current chapter investigates the logic behind the legal decision-making of EU 
OHS Directives by identifying the underpinning concepts and factors that have tailored the 
evolution of the EU OHS. 
Using an historical and socio-legal approach, the chapter follows a chronological 
analysis of the development of the OHS legal framework and policies in the EU and is 
structured around three main periods: the early development of OHS in the European 
Community from 1957 to 1985, the turning point that came with the Delors Commission in 
1985 and the adoption of the SEA and the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, and the OHS 
principles adopted in 1989, which evolved under Commissions with different economic 
agendas. Placing the legal evolution of the OHS legal framework within a broad historical scale 
— a span of more than 60 years — it is possible to contextualise it within the general 
institutional and political evolution of the European project. This is fundamental because, 
depending on the agenda of the Commission, the place and the importance of OHS changes, 
and thereby the willingness of the MS to agree to adopt innovative directives. 
Therefore, the core of the current study is based on a close analysis of primary sources 
related to the OHS field, such as Council Decisions and Resolutions, the Commission’s 
recommendations, social action programmes, and Community programmes concerning safety, 
hygiene, and health at work between 1957 and 2018. This study is also based on the European 
Treaties and how they impacted the evolution of OHS — especially the SEA 1986. All EU 
OHS Directives were examined for this study, and an in-depth analysis of Directive 
89/391/EEC was conducted. This Directive — also called the ‘Framework Directive’ — is the 
basis for the current OHS legal framework and provides general right and duties for both the 
employer and the workers. The main idea is that employers have a general obligation regarding 
the health and safety of their workers and have to evaluate and prevent risks at the workplace. 
On the other side, the workers have an individual responsibility to take care of their own health 
and safety. To understand the challenges raised by the adoption of this Directive, related 
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archives available were carefully investigated, e.g., the different drafts submitted by the 
European Parliament and the Commission.33 
The understanding of the overall transformation of the EU OHS field has been 
strengthened by secondary sources — mainly academic literature. Based on these elements, it 
was possible to tailor interviews targeting the gaps highlighted during the first phase of the 
study. The study empirically draws on three interviews with stakeholders who were part of or 
witnessed the EU OHS decision-making at the end of the 1980s: Alexandre Berlin was a civil 
servant with the Commission in the Directorate General (DG) V tasked with developing EU 
OHS policies between 1970 and 2004; Marc Sapir was the first director of the Bureau 
Technique Syndical; and Jean Lapeyre was the secretary general of the European Trade Union 
Congress at the end of the 1980s. 
Based on a broad overview of the changes made to the OHS legal framework and 
policies in the EU since 1957, I argue that there is a continuity of the Commission’s role as a 
coordinator among the MS with the aim of finding a consensus and compromise accepted by 
all the actors. However, as shown in the final part of this chapter, an analysis of the current 
situation shows that a consensus or compromise between the MS and the social partners appears 
to be difficult to reach. This may mean that the concepts that have contributed to the current 
OHS legal framework are not suitable to the current context; this might partially explain the 
difficulty in adopting additional directives to cover new risks. The identification of these 
elements might help the debate to consider not only what action the EU should, in theory, take 
regarding OHS but also what, in practice, it is reasonably possible to achieve. Under the current 
institutional setting, it seems unlikely that compromise and consensus leading to new significant 
OHS directives will be found. 
2.2 Occupational Health and Safety in the Early Development of the European 
Union: 1957 to 1989 
Analysis of the actions of the various European Commissions in OHS from 1958 to 
1985 highlights that, in the initial institutional context, the possibilities for developing OHS 
 
 
33 See Official Journals of the European Communities No C-326/78, No C-326/83, No C-326/89, No C-158/131, 
No C-158/135, No C-175/22 and No C-175/24 
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policies evolved in parallel alongside the more general evolution of the European project. Three 
periods can be distinguished related to these various Commissions. First, the Hallstein 
Commission (Hallstein Commission I 1958–1962, Hallstein Commission II 1962–1967), which 
was the first Commission, had an ambitious vision of the European project. Its approach 
reflected OHS as a necessary field of action to complement economic development. The second 
period, from the Rey Commission (1967–1970) to the Masholt Commission (1972–1973), is 
the decade of non-intervention of the Commission in OHS. Then, starting with the Ortoli 
Commission (1973–1977), the European Commissions started to develop the OHS legal 
framework in a broader dynamic of a general reflection over the building of Europe. 
2.2.1. The Hallstein Commission 
The action on OHS filed at the time of the first Commission shows interesting 
initiatives. It underlines the special role of OHS and its link, from an early stage, with the 
freedom of workers and the single market. It also shows the initial role of the Commission as a 
coordinator and the Council providing general political direction. 
Under the presidency of Hallstein, the first Commission was particularly active and had 
political ambitions beyond the provisions of the Treaty of European Economic Community 
(TEEC). The Hallstein Commission was in favour of a more positive form of European 
integration and saw the role of the Commission as minimising the economic divergence within 
the Community.34 Because OHS was seen as a side effect of economic integration, the 
Commission did not hesitate to use the institutional provisions at its disposal to operate in that 
field. Two main actors were involved in framing OHS: the Council and the Commission. With 
the Decision on Mines Safety, the Council made the Commission coordinator between MS in 
charge of information and communication of the progress made in the different MS.35 The 
Council Decision aimed to define a general political direction for the MS. With the three 
Recommendations adopted by the Commission between 1962 and 1966, it appears that its role 
 
 
34 Cini, M., 1996. The European Commission: leadership, organisation, and culture in the EU administration. 
Manchester University Press. p.45 
35 Decision adopted the 9 July 1957 concerning the terms of reference and rules of procedure of the Mines Safety 
Commission [487/57] 
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was expressly to promote close collaboration between the MS.36 The Recommendation on 
occupational disease aimed at the adoption of a harmonised and uniform list of occupational 
disease ended up being indicative and not mandatory. This harmonisation was seen as useful 
and necessary for the free movement of workers to ensure the same protection for all workers 
in the EC. These goals were ambitious and had a direct connection with OHS; however, by 
being embodied by non-legally binding provisions, their implementation has been sharply 
limited37 and has had little impact on the national legislation. 
The role of the Commission was to suggest ideas to the MS for working together on a 
voluntary basis. The Commission never intended to take direct European action; it hoped that 
executing a coordinated action by the MS would be enough. Moreover, it has been emphasised 
that this early stage of activity was mainly due to the leadership of Hallstein, and it changed 
considerably with the next Commissions.38 
2.2.2. Post-Hallstein Commission 
The initiatives and commitment of the Commission before 1967 contrast starkly with 
the Rey Commission and others following 1967 which adopted nothing specific regarding the 
social aspect of the European Community and OHS.39  After the Hallstein Commission ended 
in 1967, there were eight years of complete inactivity in that field. Despite no official or legal 
activity, there was a change of mentality both at the European and national level.40 One 
illustration at the European Level was the Paris summit Declaration in 1972:  
“6. The Heads of State or Heads of Government emphasized that they attached as much 
importance to vigorous action in the social fields as to the achievement of the Economic 
and Monetary Union. They thought it essential to ensure the increasing involvement of 
labour and management in the economic and social decisions of the Community. They 
invited the Institutions, after consulting labour and management, to draw up, between 
 
 
36 [2188/62] Commission Recommendation to the Member States on the adoption of a European list of 
occupational diseases, 23 July 1962; [66/462/EEC] Commission Recommendation to Member States on the 
conditions of compensation for the victims of occupational diseases, 20th July 1966; [66/464/EEC] Commission 
Recommendation to the Member States on the medical control of workers exposed to particular risks, 27th July 
1966 
37 Vogel, L., 1994. L’organisation de la prévention sur les lieux de travail. Un premier bilan de la Directive-cadre 
communautaire de 1989. BTS.TUTB.TGB. p.68  
38 Cini, M., 1996. The European Commission: leadership, organisation, and culture in the EU administration. 
Manchester University Press. p.51 
39 Malfatti Commission (1970-1972); Mansholt Commission (1972-1974) 
40 For some countries like France, it was even a broader political critic. 
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now and 1 January, 1974, a programme of action providing for concrete measures and 
the corresponding resources particularly in the framework of the Social Fund, based 
on the suggestions made in the course of the Conference by Heads of State and Heads 
of Government and by the Commission.  
This programme should aim, in particular, at carrying out a co-ordinated policy for 
employment and vocational training, at improving working conditions and conditions 
of life, at closely involving workers in the progress of firms, at facilitating on the basis 
of the situation in the different countries the conclusion of collective agreements at 
European level in appropriate fields and at strengthening and co-ordinating measures 
of consumer protection.”41   
Additionally, some scholars consider some of the national social protests as a complementary 
factor for restarting the European social action in 1974.42 The economic situation was also a 
factor that changed the approach. Indeed, following the 1973 economic crisis, the initial belief 
that economic growth would have an automatic positive impact on the social aspect was heavily 
challenged.43 Thus, the Community started to realise the necessity for a social path independent 
of the economic one.44 
Within this context, the level of commitment and activity restarted under the Ortoli 
Commission with the adoption of two Council decisions.45 From a legal perspective, both were 
legally enforceable and represented the first legally binding acts at the European level on OHS. 
Even if the Commission had the necessary power to control the implementation at the national 
level of the rules laid out by the Council in these decisions, no further action by the Commission 
has been observed on these specific topics. The impact of these decisions has been relative; 
there was a theoretical commitment but not a willingness to be directly responsible for the 
enforcement. 
 
 
 
41 Art.6 of the Paris Summit Declaration 1972 
42 Vogel, L., 1994. L’organisation de la prévention sur les lieux de travail. Un premier bilan de la Directive-cadre 
communautaire de 1989. BTS.TUTB.TGB. p.69   
43 Dinan, D., 2004. Europe recast: a history of European Union (Vol. 373). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.p.12 
44 Venturini, P., 1989. 1992, the European social dimension. European Communities. p.16; Berlin, Alexandre. 
Interview, November 08, 2017. Archives, University of Glasgow p.2 
45 Council decision on the setting up of an Advisory Committee on Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at 
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2.2.3. The Jenkins and the Thorn Commissions 
The next step was made with the Jenkins Commission (1977–1981) and the Thorn 
Commission (1981–1985), when OHS started to emerge as a topic on its own, as illustrated by 
the first action programme devoted exclusively to health and safety at work by the Council. As 
recognised in the literature, the improved OHS had a substantial economic impact.46 Many 
studies have underlined the positive impact of good working conditions on economic 
productivity.47 This element was discussed in interviews conducted with former European civil 
servant Alexandre Berlin. According to Berlin, the emergence of OHS as an autonomous field 
of action can be explained by the general political context of that time. Indeed, this modification 
of approach happened in the broader context of a discussion on the relationship between the 
economic and the social domains at the European level. At that time, some members of the 
Commission concluded that the social area was not only complementary to the economic field 
but was just as crucial. Berlin stated that “Without the social, the economic is too abstract”.48 
This may have been an important reason the EU institutions decided to engage in a legislative 
process on health and safety. 
The first illustration of this new mindset was the first wave of legally binding acts and 
Directive focused on quantifiable factors. The first OHS directive was Directive n°77/576/EEC 
on the harmonisation of national laws on safety signs in the workplace. Following a European 
scandal about the effect of the vinyl chloride,49 Directive 78/610/EEC on the harmonisation of 
occupational exposure limits to vinyl chloride monomers was adopted. It was the beginning of 
a more significant movement of directives determining the limits of exposure to toxic products 
at the workplace. This determination of limits could be seen as a quantitative and normative 
approach. This policy was illustrated by a Framework Directive adopted in 1980 that framed 
the risks of exposure to chemical, physical, and biological agents,50 which was the basis for 
further directives. Three other Directives on OHS were adopted under the Thorn Commission. 
 
 
46 See Burton, W.N., Conti, D.J., Chen, C.Y., Schultz, A.B. and Edington, D.W., 1999. The role of health risk 
factors and disease on worker productivity. Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 41(10), pp.863-
877; ILO, 2003. Safety in Numbers: Pointers for a Global Safety Culture at Work.p.17 
47 https://healthy-workplaces.eu/previous/all-ages-2016/en/news/benefits-osh-reduced-costs-business-and-better-
conditions-workers-all-ages 
48 Berlin, Alexandre. Interview, November 08, 2017. Archives, University of Glasgow. p.2  
49 Livock, R., 1979. Science, Law and Safety Standards: A Case Study of Industrial Disease. British Journal of 
Law and Society, 6(2), p.173  
50 Council Directive 80/1107/EEC of 27 November 1980 on the protection of workers from the risks related to 
exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work 
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They concerned major accident hazards of specific industrial activities,51 protection from 
exposure to metallic lead,52 and protection from exposure to asbestos.53  
The reason to focus on the quantifiable approach might have been that these topics 
covered pragmatic problems. Berlin stated that it was the most “reasonable subject” to start 
with to find a consensus among the MS.54 In that respect, OHS was easily quantifiable: if there 
was no workplace accident, the OHS improved.55 During his interviews, Berlin provided further 
details on the variety of origins of the three OHS Directives initiatives.56 Indeed, all the partners 
showed eagerness to initiate the discussion that led to the adoption of an OHS Directive.  
The problem of motivating the discussion on the lead Directive 82/605/EEC contained 
a particular example of an initiative by an MS government: the economic problem of octane in 
fuel.57  At the time, a substantial part of the German economy relied on the car industry. Cars 
produced were powerful and required a high-octane ratio in the fuel. Therefore, the EU had to 
find a solution to the German problem, and it had consequences in other countries.58 There were 
two ways to increase the octane level in the fuel: either by changing the composition of the fuel 
or by increasing the lead rating. The latter was the cheaper. Modifying the composition of the 
fuel would have implied modifications of the production process — it was not reasonable at the 
European level. Thus, a discussion started to increase the level of lead in the fuel to raise the 
octane ratio. The direct consequence was the emission of lead into the air. Consequently, the 
challenge was to mitigate economic and OHS problematics.59 This was an underpinning 
problem throughout the development of the EU OHS framework. Everybody agreed on the 
need to have OHS rules; the challenge was to find the acceptable scope of action for the EU 
 
 
51 Council Directive 82/504/EEC of 12 July 1982 amending Directive 78/663/EEC laying down specific criteria 
of purity for emulsifiers, stabilizers, thickeners and gelling agents for use in food 
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80/1107/EEC); All of them referred to the Framework Directive of 1980 and the action programme of 1974. They 
were based on Art. 100, Art. 117, and Art. 235 of the TEEC. 
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57 Council Directive 82/605/EEC of 28 July 1982 on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure 
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(while balancing the economic interests). This testimony is in line with the findings of some 
scholars who argue that domestic preferences determine the intergovernmental bargaining 
behaviour of EU members.60 
 As we can see, the commitment and level of action of the Commission and the Council 
in the OHS field have changed over time. At first sight, this wave of legally binding Directives 
could be seen as a change in the approach to OHS at the EU level when compared to previous 
actions. However, the Framework Directive of 1980 had conditional content.61 It meant that 
even if implementation was mandatory, the method of implementation was flexible and did not 
match with the expressed aim of harmonisation. Once again, general directions were given to 
the MS, more as a way to coordinate the actions at the national level. Initially, more particular 
hazards should have been subject to a directive, but the impossibility of finding common ground 
for the Directive on benzene stopped the entire policy of determining exposure limits for 
workers.62 The institutional obligation to adopt a directive unanimously weakened the content 
of legally binding instruments considerably, and so marked the end of this quantitative 
approach. The following Delors Commissions (Commission-Delors I 1985–1988, 
Commission-Delors II 1988–1992, Commission-Delors III 1992–1995) made further steps in 
terms of commitment in the OHS field, as well as in European social development in general 
through the first major institutional change with the SEA. 
2.3. The Delors Commissions: 1985 to 1992 
The previous European activity of adopting OHS directives stopped due to a lack of 
consensus in the decision-making process.63 This illustrates a bigger problem that the Thorn 
Commission had faced: immobilism, which could have been a sign of the limits of the 
unanimity processes.64 Therefore, when Jacques Delors was appointed head of the Commission, 
 
 
60 Hosli, M.O., 1996. Coalitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European 
Union. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(2), p.255; Schneider, G. and Cederman, L.E., 1994. The 
change of tide in political cooperation: A limited information model of European integration. International 
Organization, 48(4), p.644 
61 Directive 80/1107/EEC, Art. 3.1. “In order that the exposure of workers to agents be avoided or kept at as low 
a level as is reasonably practicable Member States shall, when they adopt Provisions for the protection of workers, 
concerning an agent, take the measures (…)” 
62 Vogel, L., 2015. The machinery of occupational safety and health policy in the European Union. History, 
Institutions, Actors, p.15 
63 Ibid 
64 Delors, J., 2004. Mémoires, Paris. pp.213-214 
  
 
35 
his mission was to restart the European dynamic. Delors thought that the best way to achieve a 
European dynamic was to move forward with economic integration through a single market. 
The economic priority appears clearly in the white paper that his Commission presented in 
1985, alongside various speeches made during his presidencies.65 The establishment of the 
single market was the absolute priority, and all the other proposals revolved around it, including 
social development and OHS.66 In that respect, there were only a few remarks on the social 
construction of the EC.67 To overcome the previous paralysis and to establish a single market, 
some substantial modifications had to be made to the TEEC. These profound changes were 
made with the SEA in 1986. Among the various revisions, one dealt directly with the problem 
of paralysis caused by the unanimity vote: Art. 118A, which extended the qualified majority 
vote (QMV) of the Council to directives on the working environment. Future directives would 
combine positive and negative integration, relying upon minimum rather than exhaustive 
harmonisation. Therefore, the aim was not to have an identical situation everywhere, but 
equivalent circumstances based on minimum standards. These directives were intended to set 
minimum requirements and be gradually implemented. 
To explore if the introduction of the Article 118A and the extension of QMV to working 
conditions changed the decision-making behaviour of OHS directives, it is necessary to 
examine to what extent the QVM changed general EU decision-making. It is then possible to 
illustrate previous theories on the impact of the QVM in the OHS filed with data collected 
through interviews. Finally, an in-depth analysis of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC — 
especially a comparison between the different drafts provided by the Commission and the 
European Parliament (EP) — shows a certain continuity with the previous OHS Directives, 
despite the overall appearance of a major shift. 
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66 Commission of the European Communities, 1985. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council (Vol. 85). Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
point 20 
67 The first one was reinforcing the communication with governments and the social partners so that the 
opportunities of the establishment of the single market to be completed by appropriate measure to achieve goals. 
Delors was conscious of this "unbalance" between the social and the economical aspect of his programme, so to 
compensate he organised the Val Duchess Summit at the end of January 1985 (See Endo, K., 1999. The presidency 
of the European Commission under Jacques Delors: The politics of shared leadership. Springer.p.135). This was 
the beginning of so-called Social Dialogue at the European level involving both sides of the industry. 
  
 
36 
2.3.1. The institutional context: Did the qualified majority vote change the 
dynamic in occupational health and safety? 
The extension of the QMV to new fields was supposed to facilitate and increase the 
efficiency of the decision-making process. This led to some doctrinal debates around the 
various models of the decision-making behaviour at the EU level, especially among the Council 
of the EU. There was an opposition between two main approaches. The first focused on the 
formal, institutional procedures in the Council based on the arguments of the rational 
institutionalist (RI) and the power index models. The second focused on the continued use of 
consensus decision-making. 
First, the method focusing on institutional decision-making dynamics with the power 
index model is used by intergovernmentalists to deduce the ability of individual governments 
to influence Council decisions by computing a function of the portion of all mathematically 
possible winning coalitions to which each government is pivotal.68 At the end of the 1980s, 
QMV was the dominant rule in decision-making within the Council of the EU.69 According to 
Hosli, the QVM opened a new dynamic based on MS’ preferences, leading to the formation of 
coalitions within the EU. Thus, mathematical foundations of the original power index and the 
extension were used to establish a priori probabilities of coalition formation.70 
However, this approach has been strongly criticised by Garrett and Tsebelis.71 They 
have two main concerns regarding the power indices method. First, according to them, by taking 
into consideration only the Council, this model underestimates the power to set the agenda that 
varies according to the EU’s different decision-making procedures.72 For them, as RI scholars, 
it is as crucial to examine the initiation of the legislative process as it is the outcome of it.73 The 
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second concern was that the method did not consider the policy preferences of MS governments 
in Council decision-making.74 They also underline that the likelihood of coalition depends on 
the topic discussed.75 In other words, the RI models analyse the dynamics and connections 
between the various institutions of the EU, depending on the political agenda and the 
procedures.76 
These two models, focusing in one way or another on the institution, are contested by 
scholars focusing on the informal dynamic behind the decision-making. Indeed, some scholars 
give some attention to the importance of the informal norms of decision-making77 and stress 
the significance of the informal norms of consensus as modes of decision-making.78 Heisenberg 
suggests that an analysis of power within the Council based on an MS’s importance in a number 
of coalitions was likewise impacted by consensus. She criticises the methods focusing only on 
formal decision-making, arguing that they rely on the assumption that “any EU legislative 
proposal can be classified on a linear scale from “less integration to more integration””, and 
that they focus more on the interinstitutional dynamics than the substance of the proposal.79 
According to Heisenberg, despite the formal change made by the SEA, the informal culture of 
consensus persisted.80 She argues that, in their search for agreement on an issue, MS need to 
meet the demand for another legislative act on that issue.81 In other words, the topic discussed 
goes beyond one negotiation or one act. 
 In the context of OHS — especially concerning the adoption of the Framework 
Directive, 89/391/EEC — some aspects and the findings and hypothesis of the latter method 
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are reflected in interviews with various former European stakeholders. The importance of 
consensus despite the possibility of using the QMV in OHS was a theme in three interviews 
conducted in the current study: one with Alexandre Berlin, a former European civil servant 
working in the DG V and in charge of health and safety from the 1970s to 2004, and two with 
former members of the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC): Jean Lapeyre and Marc 
Sapir. 
Berlin stated that to have successful discussions in the OHS field, there had to be a 
consensus between all the partners involved, especially between the employers and the 
workers.82 He believed that a consensus and the right balance between the interests of these 
three partners was the best way to achieve something positive. Some studies have noted the 
leading role of the Commission in establishing a system of multi-level IR in Europe in which 
unions and employers have influential voices on working conditions.83 According to Berlin’s 
experience as chair of numerous working groups for the OHS Directives and based on the 
interviews, it is possible to underline two main components of what was necessary to reach a 
consensus. The first feature of the consensus was to be reasonable. He stated: “What would 
have been desirable and what was reasonable are two different things. It is necessary to be 
reasonable and realistic”.84 He recognised that sometimes the idea that would have been 
desirable was not reasonable and supporting these ideas would have blocked the development 
of the EU OHS framework at a crucial moment. 
The second element is that it should be a unanimous consensus despite the possibility 
of a qualified majority. Berlin kept trying to find an “absolute consensus” even though it was 
not mandatory. His motive was to guarantee the highest support possible from all the MS. He 
thought that with the qualified majority, the MS that were against a provision would have found 
a way not to apply the directive.85 Sapir has also mentioned the general context of consensus 
during his interview.86 However, according to Sapir, the compromise found during the 
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consensus led to “blurred aspects” of the OHS legal framework: in order to avoid offending 
anyone, the meaning of certain parts were not thoroughly discussed.87 Further studies support 
this argument by stating that an opposition pattern during the transposition is possible when the 
government did not want the directive in the first place.88 Additionally, Lapeyre mentioned the 
importance of the consultative committee of Luxembourg during the discussion on the content 
of the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC.89 It was during one of these meetings with the 
Luxembourg Committee that the ETUC — represented by Lapeyre — underlined the 
importance of having a pyramidal approach to OHS: the basics with a Framework Directive, 
and then individual directives setting up the specificities. According to Lapeyre, the key to the 
Framework Directive had to be the principle of responsibility of the employers. The ETUC 
played a crucial role in the qualitative approach of the Framework Directive, ensuring that the 
technicalities were set-up in the following individual Directives.90 They saw the Framework 
Directive as an embodiment of principles that would last through the years and the individual 
Directives as specific norms that would evolve depending on scientific evidence and 
knowledge. These statements emphasised the importance of non-institutional behaviour in the 
decision-making of OHS Directives at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. 
The global dynamic of decision-making and the fact that more than one negotiation was 
involved was echoed by both Lapeyre and Sapir. Both mentioned the strong connection 
between the adoption and the discussions of Framework Directive 89/391/EEC and Directive 
89/392/EEC.91 Indeed, to achieve a single market and the free movement of goods, it was 
necessary to have common standards in the methods of production. This led to technical 
normalisation: Directive 89/392/EEC. The corollary principle was to frame the use of the 
machines and thereby the health and safety of the workers. 
It is in this context that the Framework Directive on OHS (i.e., Directive 89/391/EEC) 
was discussed and adopted. Indeed, this link with Directive 89/392/EEC appears clearly in the 
third section on workers’ obligations, which has only one article.92 Two aspects are important 
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in the workers’ obligations. First, the stress on the responsibility of each worker for his own 
safety and the persons affected by his acts. Second, the particular focus on the use of machinery 
and equipment. Sapir also mentioned the importance of establishing common principles to 
establish the single market in the 1980s.93 Lapeyre mentioned that during a discussion with 
Sapir and Delors, he underlined the fact that there was a lot of work done regarding the technical 
normalisation of the market, but nothing was in place regarding the social aspect of that 
normalisation.94 For Lapeyre, it was evident that the technical normalisation of the machines 
and way of production would affect the working organisation and the health and safety of the 
workers. Thus, there was a need “to make the technical and the social coincide in terms of 
health and safety”.95 According to Lapeyre, Delors understood and supported this idea with the 
creation of the Bureau Technique Syndical (BTS) and Directive 89/391/EEC, which is the 
cornerstone of the current EU OHS legal framework. 
 To conclude, two main approaches to examining the influence of the QVM on the 
decision-making dynamic have been covered in the literature: the RI, focusing on the 
institutional decision-making dynamics with the power index model, and the scholars, focusing 
on the importance of the informal dynamics behind the decision-making behaviours. The latter 
has been illustrated by interviews and shows the importance of consensus and compromise 
during discussion in the OHS field. The importance of the informal dynamics in OHS also 
supports the argument of the continuous role of the Commission as a coordinator between the 
various stakeholders. However, even if consensus and compromise were necessary to secure 
the application of European principles in the national legal systems, they also led to some 
confusion regarding the content of the obligations and how to fulfil them. The difficulty was to 
find the balance between compromise and detailed provisions without having a 
counterproductive effect — either by being too detailed and risking the opposition of certain 
MS or by being too general and risking having considerable differences in the way the European 
obligations are enforced. Considering the general context of the EU development and the goal 
of establishing a single market, it seems that the need for broad European integration won and 
flexible principles were favoured over clear provisions. 
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Based on these considerations, it is possible to argue that despite the crucial institutional 
change of Article 118A with the SEA, the former dynamic of consensus and compromise that 
were applicable under the unanimity rules still existed in an informal manner. Therefore, we 
can hypothesise that despite the novel appearance of the adoption of the Framework Directive, 
89/391/EEC, the same rationale and dynamic of consensus that was applicable with the 
previous OHS Directives was still applicable during its adoption and discussion but in an 
informal way. 
2.3.2. Directive 89/391/EEC: A new framework built with old tools 
The new function of the European institutions in the social fields and the special 
attention given to the OHS was also confirmed by the adoption of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. An entire section underlines the importance of 
improving living and working conditions.96 Article 7 of the Charter recalls the importance of 
social development through the completion of the internal market, and so links with the 
statement of the Paris Summit in a more formal way. Article 19 addresses the question of OHS 
precisely; it emphasises the aim of a “harmonisation of conditions […] while maintaining the 
improvement made”.97 This statement corroborated the dynamic to the top emphasised in 
Directive 89/391/EEC. The Charter also expressly mentions measures “for the training, 
information, consultation, and balanced participations of workers as regards the risks” in the 
workplace, also embodied in the Directive.98 Considering that similar workers’ rights were 
mentioned both in the Charter and the Directive, it might mean that these rights can be 
considered as fundamental workers’ rights. There is also a reference to the implementation of 
the internal market and the interconnection between these two fields. However, the Charter has 
no legal value but a strong political one; added to the legal value of Directive 89/391/EEC, it 
increased the chance of being effectively implemented in the MS. However, all the MS signed 
the Charter (except the UK, which waited until 1997 to do so). This fact can be seen as the start 
of a divergence of the perspectives on the new social role of the European institutions that the 
UK would fight for years. 
 
 
96 The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, Art. 7 to Art. 10 
97 Ibid, Art.19 
98 Ibid, Art.19 
  
 
42 
These tensions illustrated the importance of the Framework Directive as the central 
piece of OHS, extending social rights. The significance of the Directive has also been widely 
acknowledged in the literature.99 So far, attention has been given mostly to the final version of 
the Framework Directive and its content. However, this section shows that the various drafts 
submitted during its adoption can provide an additional element regarding the logic behind (and 
during) its adoption. Therefore, I argue that a close examination of the suggestions submitted 
by the EP and the European Social Committee (ESC) compared to the final version chosen by 
the Commission and the Council reveals that, despite certain aspects of novelty100 (e.g., general 
duties and rights, certain characteristics of the former decision-making rationale, the consensus 
and compromises of a quantitative approach) were still applicable. 
2.3.2.1. New balance between OHS and economic consideration – the first novelty of 
the Directive 89/391/EEC  
The novelty of Directive 89/391/EEC appears in the preliminary statements of the 
Directive, which state that competition should not be done at the expense of OHS, and at the 
same time, OHS should not be subordinate to purely economic considerations. In addition to 
the new balance between OHS and economic considerations, the nature of the obligation 
changed. Indeed, the major innovation was that the Directive planned the implementation of 
the minimum standards through general principles and general guidelines for the 
implementation of the said principles.101 This approach contrasts with the previous strategy of 
determining exposure limits. There was a shift from a quantitative to a qualitative approach. 
 
 
99 Ales, E. ed., 2013. Health and safety at work: European and comparative perspective. Kluwer Law 
International. p.15; See preface of Vogel, L., 1998. Prevention at the Workplace. Brussels: European Trade Union 
Technical Bureau for Health and Safety.; Aires, M.D.M., Gámez, M.C.R. and Gibb, A., 2010. Prevention through 
design: The effect of European Directives on construction workplace accidents. Safety science, 48(2), p.249; Leka, 
S. and Jain, A., 2014. Policy approaches to occupational and organizational health. In Bridging occupational, 
organizational and public health pp. 238-241. Springer, Dordrecht.; Eichener, V., 1997. Effective European 
problem-solving: lessons from the regulation of occupational safety and environmental protection. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 4(4), p.593 
100 Liu, K. and Liu, W., 2015. The development of EU law in the field of occupational health and safety: A new 
way of thinking. Management and Labour Studies, 40(3-4), p.222; Barnard, C., 2012. EU employment law. OUP 
Oxford. pp.511-512; Valdés de la Vega, B. Occupational Health and Safety: An EU Law Perspective. In Ales, E. 
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In this Directive, the principles covered and implemented were connected to the national 
laws and practices. 102 There was an implied reference to what has been done previously at the 
national level, but also to the legal tradition. Thus, the role of the European institutions was to 
establish minimum requirements, so that the MS could pursue higher standards.103 It is 
mentioned that the European Community (EC) encourages improvements to guarantee a better 
level of OHS protection,104 even if the EP proposed the formula where “the health and safety 
of workers should be protected at the highest possible level”.105 Additionally, the Directive 
stressed the individual responsibility of the MS to encourage improvements in OHS in its 
territory. The remainder of the MS’ responsibilities coincided with the continuous role of the 
Commission to coordinate and encourage the MS to have a common collective behaviour. 
2.3.2.2. The embodiment of general OHS definitions and concepts – the first novelty 
of Directive 89/391/EEC 
The novelty of Directive 89/391/EEC appears also in the embodiment of general 
definitions and concepts. However, the willingness to innovate varies depending on the 
institutions, i.e. the Commission and the EP. Overall, the EP and the ESC advocated for a more 
innovative approach in the nature of the obligations whereas the Commission tried to keep the 
previous approach of quantifiable risks and focused on a new way of phrasing the obligations. 
This idea can be illustrated by various examples, as will be explored in the following 
paragraphs. 
First, the ESC advocated for homogeneity of definitions with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) conventions.106 However, one definition disappeared through the 
consultation process. Indeed, the EP added the definition of “health in the context of work shall 
encompass not only the absence of sickness or disease but also all physical and mental factors 
 
 
102 i.e., The prevention of occupational risks, the protection of OHS, the information, the consultation, the balanced 
participation, and the training of the workers. 
103 According to the competences provided by Art 118A(2) of the Single European Act 
104 Directive 89/391/EEC, Art. 1.1.  
105 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 326/78 19 Dec 1988. Amendment n°1 of proposal for a 
directive COM(88) 73 final 
106 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 175/22 4 July 1988. Opinion on the proposal for a Council 
Directive on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at the 
workplace (88/C175/09) S.2.2 
  
 
44 
affecting health and directly related to safety and health at work”.107 Thus, the question of why 
this definition was deleted was addressed during the interviews conducted during the current 
study. The definition suggested by the EP would have expressively covered the mental aspect 
of OHS, which was already acknowledged by the ILO.108 According to the interview with 
Berlin, the reason for this initiative might have been that the role of the EP was to suggest ways 
forward; whereas it was the role of the Commission to adopt a more conservative position in 
order to take national positions into consideration.109  
In addition, the Commission advocated for consistency with the previous Directives by 
focusing on the quantifiable aspect of OHS. It was willing to have a more general directive-
framework but on quantifiable elements. The reason why the psychological or mental aspect of 
the workers’ health was discarded was that the Commission wanted to concentrate on concepts 
that were easier to define and relatively objective. The psychological or mental aspect of the 
workers’ health might be understood differently depending on the national contexts. Therefore, 
it was not a suitable topic for a European debate at this stage. According to Berlin, it might have 
compromised the achievement of a consensus and the adoption of the Directive. 
Other examples within the Framework Directive can be found, particularly in the 
employers’ obligations.110 The general provision emphasised that the employer has a duty to 
ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect related to the work.111 However, the 
Directive opens the possibility for MS to exclude or to limit the employers’ culpability in cases 
of unusual and unforeseeable circumstances. This means that European institutions recognised 
the existence of the responsibility but allowed MS to determine the limits of its applicability. 
The Directive coordinates the MS without imposing a detailed obligation on them. The 
divergence of opinions is apparent with the provision of the risk assessment, which is one of 
the employers’ obligations. Indeed, the employer shall be in possession of a health and safety 
at work risk assessment, including those facing groups of workers exposed to particular risks.112 
The ESC advocated for further detailed provisions concerning the element contained in the risk 
 
 
107 Official Journal of the European Communities No C 326/83 16 Nov 1988. Amendment n°26 of proposal for a 
directive SCOM(88) 73 final  
108 Art. 3I Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No.155)  
109 Berlin, Alexandre. Interview, November 08, 2017. Archives, University of Glasgow p.6 
110 The employers’ obligations represent the main body of the directive. 
111 Directive 89/391/EEC, Art. 5.1 
112 Directive 89/391/EEC, Art. 9.1(a) 
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assessment.113 Overall, the opinion of the ESC and the amendment made by the EP formed a 
more detailed version than the final version. In the end, the Commission opted for a more 
generic version. During his interview, Berlin expounded that a more detailed version could have 
compromised the adoption of the Directive. The more detailed is the text, the more difficult it 
is to find a compromise.114 He was convinced that the Framework Directive needed to be 
general and generic as a first step; only with specific directives, was it possible to enter into the 
details. 
Another example of the tensions between the European institutions was Article 14, 
Health surveillance. The EP added an entire section, “Medical care at work”,115 with three 
sections that were more detailed than the current Art. 14. This provision was subject to 
amendment a second time by the EP.116 This version was still more detailed. 
Further examples can also be found in the second part of the employers’ obligations: 
information of workers,117 consultation and participation of workers,118 and training of 
workers.119 Overall these rights were new because they were addressed to workers and not 
employers, their MS, external agencies, or committees, as was the case before. The concept of 
information was not too problematic: duty to communicate the appropriate information to the 
worker so they know the risks of their work and can act accordingly. However, the concept of 
consultation embodied by Article 11 has been subject to modification during the debate. In the 
beginning, the Commission underlined only the consultation aspect of this obligation. Both the 
ESC and the EP asked for more emphasise on the participation of workers, alongside 
consultation.120 The EP added a considerable number of amendments to develop the concept of 
cooperation beyond consultation. In that respect, the EP extended the provision to open the 
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possibility of workers proposing new measures. Similarly, the notion of workers representatives 
was detailed in the Parliament draft, specifying that they should be elected.121 At the second 
reading, the EP was more flexible and inserted, “in accordance with the procedures and/or 
legislations existing in the MS”, but maintained the importance of balanced participation and 
cooperation.122 However, in the final version, this notion of balanced participation disappeared 
from the title, and most of the provisions were lightened in comparison of the version submitted 
by the EP. Berlin clarified this point, saying that the notion of participation is closely linked to 
the national understanding, and it would have been complicated to find an agreement.123 
Once again, this underlines the intention of the Commission to pursue a general 
framework with generic quantifiable concepts as a common step in the EU OHS development. 
It also emphasises the position of the Commission as a coordinator of the national legal systems. 
The obligation to train workers corresponds to the global tendency to involve more workers 
and to make them more responsible. 
To conclude, even if certain aspects of Directive 89/391/EEC were a real change 
compared to the previous generation of OHS Directives, the former patterns were visible during 
the discussions that led to its adoption. The general phrasing of the rights and obligations 
embodied in Directive 89/391/EEC was a turning point compared to the previous OSH 
Directives with detailed provisions on maximal value of exposition. However, the Commission 
maintained its logic to reach a consensus accepted by everyone even if it meant less clarity. The 
innovative approach of the EP and the ESC was opposed by the traditional and quantitative 
approach of the Commission. Nevertheless, the fact that the duties were general and broad gave 
later some opportunity to extend its application to unquantifiable risks, such as psychosocial 
risks and emerging risks.124 Thus, it is important to underline that the application and the 
reading of the Directive we now have changed over time and do not correspond to their initial 
role. It opens the possibility to keep working on the general concepts and extend them to the 
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OHS situation that needs to be covered nowadays.125 Not only has the understanding of rights 
and obligations changed over time, but the overall approach of OHS within the construction of 
the European model has changed since 1989. 
2.4. The Changing Relationship Between the EU Economic and OHS 
Construction: 1989 to 2018 
Since its adoption, the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, has been considered the 
cornerstone of the OHS legal framework in the EU. In its continuity and based on its general 
principle more than 30 Directives have been adopted. Thanks to its dynamic and flexible 
structure, the Framework Directive has opened opportunities to cover new risks, such as 
psychosocial risks.126 However, the adoption of these individual Directives, framework 
agreements, and the role of Directive 89/391/EEC strongly depended on the general social 
policies of the Commissions since 1989. After examining of the Commissions’ action 
programmes and the adoption of OHS Directives, it seems that the Commissions often justified 
their OSH positions based on economic considerations. Two scenarios are then possible, either 
the OSH and economic fields complement or compete with each other. 
2.4.1. The development of an OHS legal framework as necessary to economic 
development 
In the early 1990s, the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, constituted a new basis for 
the adoption of additional OHS directives. In a white paper, Delors gave priority to the 
establishment of the single market and integrated the social policy within this context.127 
 
 
125 This idea will be developed further in the second part of the CH5 of this thesis, pp.150-161  
126 Illustrated by the adoption of the European autonomous framework agreement on work-related stress in 2004 
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Therefore, the Commission programme concerning safety, hygiene, and health at work focused 
on the program’s provisions relating to the completion of the market.128 
Under the Delors Commissions, the vast majority of OHS Directives affiliated with the 
Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, were adopted.129 However, over the three Delors 
presidencies of the Commission, a decline in the number of acts adopted is noticeable after the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.130 It can be hypothesised that this first generation 
of daughter Directives might have been adopted to facilitate the functioning of the internal 
market: to prepare it before the Treaty and then to ensure its functioning. The development of 
the OHS was then necessary for the economic development and expansion of the Union. 
The Prodi Commission (1999–2004) continued the idea of the Delors Commission by 
basing its action on the substantial acquis of many decades of Community policies centred 
around the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC. In the programme adopted by the Prodi 
Commission, the normative approach for adapting existing standards and adopting new ones 
remained essential. Its approach was built upon Article 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
that states, “Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her health, 
safety and dignity”. For the Commission, the involvement of social partners was important to 
promote progressive approaches. However, the addition to the legislative framework was 
minimal and did not change the rationale explained above. 
2.4.2. The development of the OHS soft framework as an addition to economic 
development 
 Some Commissions, like the Santers Commission (1995–1999), focused on non-
legislative measures and marked a break from the Delors era. The fourth Community 
programme concerning safety, hygiene, and health at work for 1996 to 2000 clearly stated that 
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the adoption of new OHS directives was the last option, only when there was no alternative 
possible. 131 One of the main points of the non-legislative OHS policy was the creation of the 
SAFE programme (Safety Actions for Europe). The SAFE programme was intended to 
support measures to ensure proper implementation of Community directives on health 
and safety at work, to continue to promote high standards in health and safety at work 
in the Community and to ensure effective involvement of the two sides of industry in 
developing, formulating and implementing Community policy initiated by the 
Commission on protection of the health and safety of employees.132 
However, the programme never became a reality. Therefore, the Commission decided to 
transfer its missions to the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work and the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.133 
The development of alternatives was also illustrated by the extension of the actors in 
charge of OHS in the EU with the creation of the SLIC, which was the result of close 
cooperation between its members and the Commission.134 The action programme focused on 
the evaluation of the previous legislation, in cooperation with the MS and social partners, to 
identify the enforcement problems, effectiveness, and socio-economic impact of the health and 
safety legislation. This action plan was complemented by the increasing attention given to 
social dialogue in the establishment of OHS policies. Indeed, the Santers Commission period 
corresponded to the overall increase in social dialogue.135 
It was during this period that the first sectoral agreement on health and safety was 
adopted and was then implemented through Council Directive 1999/63/EC.136 Paradoxically, 
for Lapeyre — who has been in charge and the ETUC representative for the dialogue between 
the social partners at the EU level for more than ten years — OSH was not a suitable topic for 
social dialogue because it is not something that should be the subject of bargaining and 
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compromise.137 This tendency of using non-legislative tools to frame OHS is confirmed from a 
more general perspective. Indeed, in March 2000, the Lisbon Treaty introduced the open 
method of coordination (OMC), presented as a suitable instrument for identifying and pursuing 
common European concerns while respecting legitimate national diversity by committing MS 
to working together towards common goals, without seeking to homogenize their national 
practices.138 Here, the Commission reinforced its role as coordinator — or even simple adviser 
— of MS. 
When the Santers Commission adopted legislative measures, it was to ensure the 
implementation of the existing framework. It reserved the adoption of new legislation only in 
the fields of high risks activities. Additionally, the Commission underlined the importance of 
approaching Community OHS legislation from a global point of view. Considering that OHS 
requirements were at a crossroads and might overlap with different fields and strategies, it was 
necessary to ensure there were no duplications with another field before adopting a new 
directive. These considerations had the effect of limiting the scope of action considerably for 
the Commission and might have been an illustration of the limited ambitions of the Santers 
Commission in the adoption of new OHS directives. As a result, the Commission adopted only 
two Directives based on 89/391/EEC between 1995 and 2000, and they indeed covered high 
risks.139 The overall tendency was a distancing from Directive 89/391/EEC and the previous 
Delors Commissions. This approach of the legislative action must be placed in the bigger 
political context. Under the Prodi Commission in June 2002, in the context of the European 
Commission’s Better Regulation programme, the Commission started to implement an impact 
assessment process, which would examine the potential social, economic, and environmental 
impacts of European Commission proposals.140 This requirement not only encouraged the 
development of non-legally binding action at the EU level but also reduced the capacity of 
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action of the European Commission in the OHS field by making the initiative and legitimisation 
process more complex.141 
2.4.3. The OHS legal framework as a barrier to economic development 
During the Barroso Commissions (Barroso Commission I 2004–2009; Barroso 
Commission II 2009–2014), a new relationship between the economic field and OHS was 
developed: OHS was a threat to the economic competitiveness. The Barroso Commission was 
paradoxical in its approach, by officially emphasising the importance of the current OHS 
framework and at the same time trying to reform and reduce it to a minimum because this same 
framework was a burden for competitiveness. 
In support of the existing OHS and social construction, Barroso said, “Economic and 
social progress are two parts of the same, European whole. Europe has always rested on an 
economic pillar and a social pillar […] Open markets and social solidarity are not, and should 
not be, contradictory”.142 This position was illustrated with the sixth action plan on OHS, 
entitled “Improving quality and productivity at work”,143 which recognised that the lack of 
adequate protection to ensure health and safety at work has a considerable human dimension 
but also a major negative impact on the economy.144 The Commission also recognised the 
positive impact of the OHS Directives on levels of protection at the national level as well as the 
considerable disparities regarding the quality and coverage of the law transposing Directive 
89/391/EEC.145 Thus, for the Commission, it was fundamental that national legislatures 
implement the OHS Directives effectively and in a uniform manner to guarantee comparable 
levels of protection in MS. In that respect, the Commission stressed that in its role as “guardian 
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of the Treaties”, it would ensure the appropriate and effective implementation of OHS 
Directives. Therefore, with this action plan, the Barroso Commission aimed to guarantee the 
proper implementation of the EU legislation, support the Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in the implementation of the legislation in force, adapt and simplify the legal 
framework to changes in the workplace, and promote the development and implementation of 
national strategies. If we look only at the action plan, it seems that the Barroso Commission 
valued the OHS acquis communautaire and wanted to improve them. 
In comparison, if we look at the general policy of the Commission and its impact on 
OHS, the perspective changes considerably. The Commission aimed to simplify OHS 
legislation. This simplification was part of a larger political agenda called “Better Regulation” 
and REFIT, the Commission’s regulatory fitness and performance programme aimed at making 
EU law simple by removing unnecessary burdens and adapting existing legislation without 
compromising on policy objectives.146 In 2017, the Commission branch of REFIT concerned 
with OHS announced its intention not to proceed with proposed OHS Directives for 
musculoskeletal disorders and display screens, and the new carcinogens and mutagens 
Directives.147 The Commission also initiated a review of the Framework Directive and 23 
related Directives hoping to justify centralising all of them in one text with annexes. 
The REFIT programme has been a major concern for TUs as an illustration of the 
Commission abandoning a cornerstone of European social policy.148 Some scholars have seen 
this policy as a real threat to EU OHS.149 Indeed, Vogel qualified the strategy as “pre-emptive 
justification for Community inaction”, and that the terminology has been used in the action plan 
since 2002 to justify a withdrawal by the Community institutions and the Commission in 
particular.150 This description of the Commission’s positions corresponds to the more general 
analysis from scholars. Indeed, the Barroso Commission and its president are considered to 
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have had a more liberal and “economic” orientation than the previous one.151 Some other 
scholars have noticed that the EU level is becoming increasingly politicised and that the 
Commission itself has become more right-wing in the 2000s.152 To conclude, it seems that there 
are apparent disparities between what the Commission said and did. Despite proclaiming 
support of the OHS legal framework, the Barroso Commission has been the first Commission 
to act aggressively toward OHS. 
2.4.4. Conclusion  
The examination of the action programmes of the Commissions and their legislative 
behaviours with the adoption of OHS Directives demonstrates the different balance that can 
exist between the development of the OHS legal framework and economic considerations. 
Right after 1989 and during the entire Delors era, the adoption of OHS Directives was a way to 
achieve the establishment of the single market and ensure its functioning. The centrality of the 
EU OHS action around the Framework Directive was confirmed by the Prodi Commission, 
which also saw OHS as an important factor of economic development. For these Commissions, 
OHS and economic development complemented each other. Under the Santer Commission, 
OHS was still important but more as a soft coordinating tool than a powerful motor for 
economic growth. The Santer Commission focused on enforcing the existing framework and 
opened the way to legitimatise limiting the adoption of new directives, arguing that it can be 
counterproductive. Under the Santer Commission, OHS could be beneficial to the economy if 
it was not too limiting. Finally, under the Barroso Commission, the extensive OHS framework 
was described as too constraining and needed to be lightened because it was a burden to 
competition. Here the OHS and the economic field were competing with and challenging each 
other. 
To conclude, it is clear that the development and the approach of the OHS legal 
framework are highly political, and their connections with economic considerations is crucial. 
However, with the European elections in June 2019, a new Commission has been appointed. 
One may ask if, under these new conditions, developing the OHS legal framework would be 
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possible within the current context. In other words, is the rationale that was in place from the 
“golden age” of legal development of the OHS until 1995 still applicable today? 
2.5. The Limits of Applying Former Logic to Modern Challenges 
As previously described in this chapter, the analysis of the Commissions’ OHS 
programmes over the past 50 years, and the interviews explaining the rationale of the decision-
making, stress the importance of consensus and compromise, as well as the importance of 
enforcement. However, it might be necessary to question if these elements are still suitable to 
the current situation. Therefore, this section highlights the possible limits to consensus between 
stakeholders and MS. The difficulty of having effective enforcement mechanisms — both at 
the national and European level — is stressed. This is essential because these mechanisms are 
the basic requirements to give meaning to the OHS legal framework. 
2.5.1. Consensus between social partners weakened by the imbalance of power  
Consensus between partners is currently weakened by an imbalance in power due to the 
economic crisis.153 Even if the Commission has played an essential role in establishing multi-
level, IR in Europe, some authors argue that its position has changed dramatically since the start 
of the crisis.154 The DG Economic and Financial Affairs depicted collective labour relations as 
obstacles to market coordination and hence to economic and employment growth.155 This is a 
significant difference compared to the testimonies provided by stakeholders who were working 
during the 1990s. As Dimitrakopoulos argues, the Commission should be considered to be both 
an actor and an arena in which different Directorates General (DGs) vie for attention and 
support for their sectoral policies.156 Thus, it should not be assumed that the Commission and 
Parliament are forever tied to an “ever closer” and ever deeper union, nor that the position 
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within the Commission is homogenous.157 Indeed, the position of the DG Economic and 
Financial Affairs in 2012 corresponded to the position defended by the Barroso Commissions 
(2004–2014): answering the crisis with severe austerity and increasing market liberalisation.158 
With the adoption of five Regulations and one Directive on “economic governance”, the EU 
reinforced its authority over national economic policies.159 Meanwhile, unions are struggling 
and put under massive pressure by the economic crisis.160 Collective bargaining mechanisms 
have been weakened.161 Some researchers have focused on crisis-related developments in 
collective bargaining in the private sector across the EU since the onset of the crisis in 2008.162 
The researchers focus on the influence of economic factors, IR institutions, and public policy 
to support collective bargaining.163 It has been suggested that the changing economic situation 
may affect the power balance between the workers and employers.164 
The 2008 crisis and the neo-liberal turn operated from 2004 affected the crucial variable 
of balance between partners’ perspectives that has been the keystone of EU OHS development. 
Even if a future Commission reconnected with the previous position of the EU, national reforms 
have been conducted, and it will not be possible to return to it. Therefore, the current settings 
are not based on a balance of power between European partners but between a weakened partner 
(i.e., TUs), a strong partner (i.e., employer, benefiting from some national reforms) and a 
neutral partner (i.e., the Commission). 
2.5.2.  Consensus between Member States weakened by different visions of the 
EU   
Currently, there is also a limit of consensus within the broader union. The vote for Brexit 
is an example of an MS seeking to leave the EU. In less absolute terms, the history of the EU 
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shows examples of MS trying to opt out of specific areas of decision-making.165 The debate on 
a multispeed EU started after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.166 Since then, 
continuous controversy about what the nature of European integration should be has been 
dominated by two integration theories: intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (now 
constructivism).167 Underlining the divergences of cultural heritage and national preferences in 
economic, political, and social policy led to developing the multispeed model theory.168 
However, some scholars are opposed to the development of a “twin-track” Europe, and warn 
that encouraging the “two-speed Europe” might lead “the current integration of Europe to total 
ruin, entailing dangerous economic and political consequences resulting from the collapse of 
the integration project”.169 Recently, some academics have questioned the concept of 
integration, arguing that we are at the institutional limits of the EU.170 At the moment, non-
integration, further integration, and divided integration all seem at risk. The EU appears to be 
at an impasse where the “politically feasible policies appear to be ineffective and illegitimate”, 
and “radical policy changes seem to lack political feasibility”.171 
The tension among the MS about the reform of the posted workers Directive is an example of 
the different expectations of the EU’s role and the scope of integration. .172 Regarding the OHS 
field, there has been a period of legislative paralysis at the EU level. There have been no 
significant OHS directives between 2004 and 2014. Those Directives adopted were mainly to 
revise or provide details on former Directives. The political climate during that time might 
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explain this inertia. José Manuel Barroso was the president of the European Commission from 
2004 to 2014. During that period, he orchestrated a “liberal turn” of European orientation, 
especially to the European social model.173 However, the legislative gap might also express an 
unwillingness or demand from the MS to move further in that field. It might suggest that one 
of the prerequisites of the approach that was applied at the time of the construction of the EU 
OHS framework (1970–2004) does not exist anymore. Even if it has sometimes been difficult 
to find common ground in the past, we might have reached the point where no new common 
ground can be — or wants to be — found between MS. 174 
2.5.3. The impact of EU OHS standards weakened by the lack of enforcement at 
the EU level  
Another challenge is the lack of sanction when an MS refuses to apply the norms 
adopted by a majority. During the interviews conducted during the current study, the question 
of the effectiveness and the feasibility of sanctioning MS was raised. Berlin recognised that, in 
fact, it is complicated to condemn an MS when it refuses to implement directives.175 In theory, 
the Commission can take legal action via an infringement procedure against an EU country that 
fails to implement EU law. Recently the Commission has described MS compliance with EU 
law as “not yet good enough”.176 Despite the increase in open infringement cases in 2016 (up 
by 21%), the impact of the CJEU’s decisions might be limited.177 Due to its lack of 
administrative infrastructure, the effectiveness of the Court’s role in the enforcement of 
European law is contingent upon the support of national judiciaries, and it may vary across 
national judicial cultures.178 Some authors have underlined the importance of the political 
context of the CJEU rulings, and the pressures that can be applied by the MS.179 Additionally, 
it is fundamental to remember that the CJEU has the power that the MS give it. The 
effectiveness of the Court’s decision will strongly depend on the support of national judges and 
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authorities, and it might vary considerably depending on the country.180 Furthermore, only the 
Court’s vision of the meaning of the Treaty and EU law is binding, but it is not the case for the 
opinions on particular cases that represent most of the preliminary rulings.181 In the current 
context of mistrust towards European institutions, at a time where nationalist parties are gaining 
power in the EU, it is important that 
the Court might be aware that the ultimate success of EU law depends on national 
judicial support, and that excessive bossiness and doctrinal overreach could be 
counterproductive.182 
This development resonates with Berlin’s vision regarding the necessity of having the support 
of all the MS despite the institutional possibility of adopting an OHS directive with the qualified 
majority. It underlines the practical necessity to avoid having opposite positions. However, with 
respect to the two arguments developed above, it also confirms that the situation might currently 
be blocked. 
2.5.4. The impact of EU OHS standards weakened by the lack of enforcement at 
the national level  
The last challenge is the limits of the EU’s action concerning the enforcement at the 
national level illustrated by the case of the national LIs. On this latter point, the Barroso 
Commission stressed that it is fundamental that LIs are seen as facilitating compliance with 
legislation rather than an obstacle to business activity.183 Interestingly, the Commission said 
that “there are around 20,000 labour inspectors in the EU — approximately one inspector per 
9,000 workers covered by relevant national labour inspectorates.184 Considering that the ILO 
threshold is one LI for 10.000 workers, it gives the impression that there are enough LIs in the 
EU to cover the enforcement of EU OHS standards. However, an examination of the number 
of LIs per number of workers in each MS shows that in 2012, the majority of MS did not meet 
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the ILO threshold and were above the 1/10 000 ratio.185 This means that even if the Commission 
communicates the idea that there are enough resources, in practice, it is not the case. 
Recently, under the Juncker-Commission (2014–2019) a “social summit” was held on 
November 17, 2017. The discussions between heads of state or government at the summit 
showed a lot of common ground on the need for Europe to be equipped with a substantial and 
tangible social dimension.186 The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) was launched at the 
summit as one of the ten priorities presented by Juncker before the EP.187 The EPSR drives the 
EU’s social agenda at all levels and aims to help the EU move towards upwards social 
convergence in the single market. It is about delivering new and more effective rights to citizens 
to ensure equal opportunities and access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and 
social protection and inclusion. The EPSR is designed to be a compass for a renewed process 
of convergence towards better working and living conditions across the EU.188 
The EPSR is a recent and rare initiative that aims to support rather than deregulate 
labour market and welfare systems.189 Some researchers emphasise that the EPSR on its own 
does not necessarily change much but can have a meaningful impact if the stakeholders allow 
it to.190 It is a tool, and its effectiveness depends on how it is used. One project of the EPSR has 
been to establish the European Labour Authority (ELA), presented as a tool to improve the 
enforcement of employment standards and relying on the LIs. Even if this project seemed like 
a good option to improve OHS standards, an in-depth analysis of the Commission’s impact 
assessment document shows that it might be a missed opportunity.191 
Overall, the fact that in most MS, OHS rules are mainly driven by carrying EU OHS 
Directives into national legislation while labour inspection has remained the responsibility of 
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the MS raises considerable difficulties.192 Thus, the question is where the responsibility of the 
EU institutions stops with regard to the enforcement of EU OHS standards in the MS. During 
an interview conducted in the current study, Berlin underlined the importance of respecting the 
diversity of the national LI authorities193 while supporting and organising meetings with 
national LIs so they can exchange their perspectives and best practices.194 The meetings are 
formalised with the functioning of the SLIC. However, their actions remain limited, based on a 
soft approach, so the national divergences persist. It leads to a non-harmonious way of 
enforcing EU OHS standards, which is particularly problematic for cross-border employment 
situations. 
To conclude, we can see that the crucial concepts of compromise and consensus that 
were at the heart of decision-making at the time of the adoption of most of EU OHS Directives 
are profoundly challenged today. In the past, compromise and consensus were possible because 
the positions of the various stakeholders had relatively the same importance. Considering the 
crisis and the weakening of the TUs, compromise and consensus are no longer possible (or only 
at the costs of the TUs’ claims). Moreover, it was previously possible to find a common position 
because most of the MS had a common idea of the role of the EU. After the latest extension of 
the EU, as recent national elections show, there are significant divergences among the MS 
regarding the role of the EU, especially in the social field.195 This means that it is now more 
difficult to find agreement to move forward. Meanwhile, these recent national elections also 
show a rise in Euroscepticism, challenging the authority of European institutions.196 The 
application of the EU OHS legal framework relies on enforcement at the national level, which 
implies that national courts will follow the ruling of the CJEU. This is no longer guaranteed. 
Enforcement at the national level is also challenged by the lack of resources and coordination 
of the national LI authorities. Based on these considerations, it is unlikely that new OHS 
directives will be adopted in the near future. This means that the only way to improve the OHS 
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in the EU is to focus on the enforcement of the existing Directives. The following chapters of 
this thesis map the similarities and differences of enforcement of the Framework Directive in 
different MS.197 How enforcement in front of the courts198 and by the LIs might be improved 
in the EU is then explored.199 
2.6. Conclusion 
To conclude, the rationale that has framed the EU’s legal decision-making regarding 
OHS can be observed and analysed over three distinctive periods: 1957 to 1985, 1985 to 1989, 
and since 1989. As I have shown in this chapter, throughout these different phases, the 
Commission has always been a coordinator between the MS, attempting to find a consensus 
and compromise accepted by all the actors. However, its involvement and approach to OHS has 
changed over time. 
First of all, between 1957 and 1985, the Commission emphasised its role as coordinator 
of OHS policies between MS. The degree of commitment depended on the president of the 
Commission. It appears that during this period, OHS was developed primarily as a corollary of 
economic construction. However, the early development of the European economy — also due 
to the various crises in the 1970s — shows that social construction is as important as economic 
development. From a political perspective, OHS began to be recognised as an “independent 
topic”, or at least as different from other social policies. From a legal point of view, the first 
legally binding OHS Directives focused on quantifiable risks. As illustrated in the interviews 
conducted for the current study, the origins of these Directives vary. However, the compromises 
and the consensus among MS and actors (e.g., TUs, employers, and Commission), have been 
two continuous factors. This approach reached an institutional limit due to the requirement of 
the unanimous vote, so an essential institutional change was made with the SEA coming into 
effect in 1987. In it, Article 118A introduced the QVM, which proved to be a turning point for 
framing the working conditions and underlining the unique role of the OHS. However, the 
findings of this chapter corroborate the idea that, despite the possibility of using the QVM, 
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consensus and an informal unanimity were still required to ensure the transposition of the 
Directive and its enforcement at the national level. 
There was a continuity in the logic behind the adoption of the Directives, despite the 
institutional change. This idea of continuity has also been observed regarding the general 
approach to OHS. With the adoption of the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, there was a 
recognition of general concepts, rights, and duties. That aspect was an innovation and a crucial 
turning point; it opened possibilities for a more comprehensive and broad understanding of 
OHS in the decades that followed the adoption of Directive 89/391/EEC. However, the 
interviews conducted suggest that the European actors were still initially pursuing a quantitative 
approach through the establishment of general concepts and duties. Therefore, even if 
nowadays we can apply the principles of Directive 89/391/EEC to the non-quantifiable aspect 
of OHS (such as the psychosocial risks), there was a continuity in the aim and the rationale at 
the moment of its adoption. 
Building upon the Framework Directive, more than 30 individual Directives and some 
framework agreements were subsequently adopted. However, the legislative activity was not 
continuous over the years. Indeed, this chapter shows that these variations can be contextualised 
in the broader OHS action plan, which changed depending on the Commission. An analysis of 
the Commission programmes shows three different trends, depending on the president of the 
Commission: (1) seeing OHS as a motor for the economic construction that justifies the 
adoption of a European legislative framework, (2) seeing OHS as a valuable part for the 
economic development that should be encouraged through the adoption of non-legislative tools 
and reserving the legislative action as a last resort, or (3) seeing the OHS legal framework as a 
burden to competition that needs to be reduced. 
Considering that the third scenario is the most recent one (under the Barroso 
Commissions), it may explain why there has been no significant legislative change in the OHS 
legal framework since 2004. Another complementary explanation could be that the key 
rationale and concepts that have been applied at the moment of the adoption of most of the 
European OHS Directives are no longer applicable. Indeed, based on the interviews conducted 
for this study, it appears that the concepts of consensus and compromise between the MS and 
partners were key during the discussions. However, considering the current setting, a consensus 
and a compromise between the MS and between the social partners appears to be difficult to 
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reach. All these elements show that the likelihood of adopting more OHS directives in the near 
future is low. It means that the improvement of the OHS legal framework has to be approached 
by improving the enforcement of the existing framework, both at the European and national 
level. 
 
 
  
  
 
64 
 CHAPTER 3  
National Resistance to the European Union’s Influence on Occupational 
Health and Safety: The United-Kingdom  
3.1. Introduction 
In the UK, OHS regulation has its roots deep in the history of IR, starting as far back as 
the 19th century with the Factory Acts.200 This series of Acts was consolidated and reformed in 
1974 with the adoption of the Health and Safety at Work (HSW) Act, which is now the 
cornerstone of the UK OHS legal framework. The HSW Act was based on the philosophy of 
Alfred Robens and had a basic and enduring principle: the responsibility for taking action lies 
“with those who create the risks and those who work with them”.201  When the UK Government 
had to implement Directive 89/391/EEC within the national legal framework, there was already 
a strong national OHS framework. Additionally, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
never hid her hostility towards closer European integration. Therefore, the leadership of the 
Conservative Party in early 1990 has influenced the implementation of the Framework 
Directive.202 
This chapter aims to consider whether EU legislation changed the initial rationale of 
UK law-making and the development in the OHS field and, if so, to what extent. It is structured 
in two parts. First of all, considering the centrality of the HSW Act in the UK OHS legal 
framework, it is fundamental to understand the rationale that led to its adoption by studying the 
Robens Report. This allows us to see how these ideas were legally translated at a time of the 
specific context of the Social Contract under the Labour Party in the 1970s. In the second part 
of this chapter, a study of the political context at the time of the implementation of Directive 
89/391/EEC shows the national reluctances to reform and embrace the European OHS 
standards, which led to a minimal implementation of the Framework Directive. This reluctance 
towards the EU dynamic in the OHS field also appears in recent reports and reforms advocating 
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for “cutting the red tape” and sometimes blaming the EU OHS legal framework for some 
controversial aspects of the existing system. 
The core of this chapter is based on a close analysis of primary sources related to the 
UK OHS legal framework, such as the Robens Report, the Bills which turned into the HSW 
Act 1974, the SRSC Reg.1977 and the MHSW Reg 1992 (and its amendments). All of this 
material illustrates the idea of self-regulation in the OHS field has been constructed and its 
development over the years; and especially how it has been adjusted to match with EU OHS 
requirements of Directive 89/391/EEC. The understanding of the evolution of the OHS 
approach in the UK has been strengthened by secondary sources – mainly academic literature. 
Based on the analysis of the primary and secondary sources available, it was possible to tailor 
interviews targeting the gaps highlighted previously. The study is completed by three interviews 
with people who have witnessed the evolution of the OHS legal-framework in the UK since the 
1970s: Partick Kinnersly was a journalist, a TU member in the 1970s  and is the author of a 
pamphlet on the Robens report203, Phil James and David Walters are both Professors who have 
conducted extensive research within the fields of both industrial relations and occupational 
health and safety over the past 40 years. 
The principal argument of this chapter is that even though the UK had a well-developed 
legal framework prior the implementation of the EU OHS Directive, some changes were still 
made despite the national agenda to deregulate IR and the reticence towards further socio-
political European integration. It illustrates that the EU legislative action had an impact at the 
national level. However, this impact was theoretical and minimal; the Conservative 
Government only changed the national legislative provisions when they were at high-risk of 
condemnation by the CJEU without compromising on its core philosophy: OHS should be self-
regulated and the employer shall prevent OHS risk as far as reasonably practicable. Therefore, 
the subsidiary argument of this chapter is that the national political agenda, and the relations 
between the MS and the overall European project, impacted the way the EU OHS Directive 
was implemented and applied at the national level. 
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3.2. The Development of Occupational Health and Safety in the UK: From 
Fragmented to Centralised Legislation with the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 
In the UK, the principal Act in the OHS field is the HSW Act 1974, which has been 
completed by Regulations, among them the Safety Representatives and Safety Committee 
Regulations (SRSC) 1977. Before the adoption of this new framework, there was an extensive 
and fractured corpus of rules. The Factories Acts 1961 were ones of the main pieces of 
legislation. The approach adopted in the HSW Act 1974 was entirely different from the previous 
one. It represented a turning point from a normative and quantitative approach towards a more 
qualitative understanding; the enactment of general standards and the significant development 
of the voluntary approach. In order to understand to what extent, the EU action influenced the 
UK OHS legal framework, it is necessary to understand the rationale behind the reform in the 
UK in the 1970s. Only then will it be possible to assess the impact of the EU understanding of 
OHS within the UK.  
3.2.1. The context in the 1970s and the necessity for legislative action 
In British history, OHS had a special place compared to general IR. Some studies have 
underlined that health and safety were relatively uncontentious.204 The consensual approach 
around OHS is illustrated by the appointment of the National Joint Advisory Council for 
Industry in 1954. This Council was a place where the Confederation of Employers, the TUC 
and the Minister of Labour were discussing industrial problems on a monthly basis.205 One 
reason that can explain this difference between the OHS and the other IR topics is that the TUs 
insisted that the employer should be the only responsible for the management of the OHS 
matters.206 It was only in 1964 that TUC changed its approach to OHS by officially launching 
a campaign for legislation and asked, among other things, for more compulsory provisions for 
safety delegates.207 Additionally, the UK has not been marked by significant worker protests 
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regarding OHS. In the 1960s, the protest issues related to raising wages rather than OHS and 
working conditions. Indeed, even if some workers’ representatives tried to bargain for better 
protection, they sometimes had to face negative reactions from the workers who would rather 
have a bonus than better protection.208 
On a factual basis, an increasing number of workplace accidents marked the 1960s.209 
After years of decrease, the number of workplace accidents plateaued and represented a high 
number of accidents.210 According to Duncan, in 1969, two or three people were killed at their 
workplace in the UK every day.211 Throughout the 1960s, there were between 600 and 700 
fatalities and over 300.000 accidents reported per year. As noticed by Beck, at that time 
workplace safety increasingly gained political importance.212 
 In reaction to these dramatic numbers, a first ‘wave’ of proposals was addressed to 
reform the OHS legislation in 1967 but left the existing fragmented framework unchanged.213 
There were continuous tripartite consultations in 1968 but without any success. In 1969, the 
Department of Employment and Productivity recognised that a more radical approach was 
necessary to change the situation. Barbara Castle, MP and Secretary of State for Employment 
and Productivity at that time, was convinced that an independent committee was required to 
provide a significant break with the previous system.214 She was also persuaded that the size of 
that committee was the key to its independence and future efficiency: small with only a few 
members. Therefore, the committee ought to represent both sides of industry, with 
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representatives from political parties, the academic sphere, and the fieldwork and science 
fields.215 The aim of this committee was to 
review the provision made for the safety and health of persons in the course of their 
employment and to consider whether any changes were needed in: (1) the scope or 
nature of the major relevant enactments, or (2) the nature and extent of voluntary action 
concerned with these matters.216 
Lord Alfred Robens was appointed as the head of this Committee. He was a former TU 
official, a Labour MP, and was also minister of labour for few months in 1951. Since then, he 
had been the shadow minister of labour and was one of the leading figures of the Labour 
Party.217 In 1960, the Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan offered him the 
chairmanship of the National Coal Board (NCB), which he accepted. At that time, this 
appointment was very controversial and was a significant disturbance in the inside organisation 
of the Labour Party.218 Lord Robens also served as a member of the Donovan Commission, 
appointed in 1965, with the report published in 1968.219 Considering his knowledge of IR, both 
sides of industry respected him, and his value was recognised by both the Labour and the 
Conservative Parties. Lord Robens’ previous functions — especially his experience as chair of 
the NCB and the Donovan Commission — influenced his vision of OHS and the 
recommendations made. However, one might raise questions regarding the appointment of Lord 
Robens at the head of the Commission in charge of reforming the OHS legal framework 
considering that he was the chair of the NCB at the time of one of the biggest industrial disasters 
in the 1960s: the Aberfan disaster. Some scholars argued that contrary to what Lord Robens 
said,220 the NCB had the technology to prevent the disaster221. The reason for his appointment, 
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according to Phil James, might be that it was particularly important to have someone from the 
NCB because they were the main opposition to the previous attempt of reforms.222 
3.2.2. The basis of the OHS approach in the UK: The Robens Report and 
philosophy   
In July 1972, the Committee published the Robens Report divided into 19 chapters with 
broad coverage.223 Not all chapters are examined in this thesis; only the sections analysing the 
weaknesses of the previous system and the modifications of the legislative framework will be 
covered. Such an analysis will give an understanding of the reasons of what were aspects which 
were important to reform (e.g., apathy at work) and why the Committee recommended to 
develop a self-regulated system based on a legal framework with general duties and rights.  
3.2.2.1. The Robens Report 
The Report starts with a close examination of the weaknesses of the UK OSH legal 
framework.224 For the committee, there was a paradox between society as a whole that keenly 
reacted to major disasters225 and apathy at work.226 According to the inquiry conducted by the 
committee, the workers “argued that standards would be improved if workplaces were visited 
much more frequently by inspectors”.227 The committee analysed this statement as a sign of 
apathy and workers’ reliance on external agencies to improve OHS. Thus, one of the crucial 
points of the report was to place the responsibility of acting in the field of OHS “with those who 
create the risks and those who work with them”.228 Consequently, it concluded that there was 
a “need of a more effectively self-regulating system”.229 This idea would lead to the 
establishment of systems where the organisation of safety included more initiatives from the 
management and more involvement by workers themselves. Here, the committee intended to 
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increase the non-legal responsibility of the management and the workers through a voluntary 
approach.230 
On the legal side, the committee recommended the establishment of a statutory duty for 
every employer to consult his employees and their representatives at the workplace regarding 
measures promoting OHS and to provide arrangements for their participation. However, to 
address the need for flexibility specific to each workplace, the form of such consultation and 
participation would not be specified in the details. The committee also raised the question of 
the employees’ safety representatives, who should be appointed via elections by employees 
among the recognised TU, or through works groups as appropriate. Here, there was no reference 
made to the potential exclusivity of the TU competences to appoint the safety representatives. 
On that point, the committee said that the employees’ safety representatives could be appointed 
either under a statutory provision or by voluntary agreement. Meanwhile, the TUC advocated 
for a legal obligation of employers to meet TU requests for the appointment of workers’ safety 
representatives (and joint safety committees).231 On the other side, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) insisted that the success of such collaboration could only be achieved through a 
common desire of the actors to work together, not by law. 
The second point addressed by the Committee was the obsolescence of the former set 
of laws applying to OHS. Overall, the previous legislation was seen as the emergence of a 
“piecemeal fashion decade after decade” and was due to an empirical approach to OHS 
standards.232 After explaining to what extent the former statutory arrangements were 
counterproductive, the Committee advocated for a unified field of legislation and 
administration.233 One of the crucial features of the suggested unifying statute was its limitation 
to matters that were not likely to require further amendment.234 The details would then be 
provided through more flexible instruments, and so be adaptable depending on needs. The 
Committee thought that this division between general provisions and flexible specificities 
would help to provide a better mechanism for balancing voluntary and statutory activities.235 
 
 
230 See details in Robens, Ibid. pp. 14-24 
231 Robens, A., 1972. Safety and health at work: report of the Committee, 1970-72 (Vol. 2). HM Stationery 
Office.p.552 
232 Ibid. p.4 
233 Ibid. pp.31-39 
234 Ibid. p.40 
235 Ibid. p.30 
  
 
71 
These recommendations aimed to take the opposite approach to the previous ad hoc method of 
adopting Acts. The idea developed by Robens was the continuity and stability of the principles 
enacted by Parliament.236 
3.2.2.2. Limits of the Robens Report 
The two aforementioned aspects of the report have been very controversial. Even if the 
Robens Report led to undoubted improvement, some scholars highlighted the limits of the 
report.237 One work, in particular, is examined in detail in this section: the pamphlet published 
right after the publication of the report as an answer by Theo Nicols and Peter Armstrong in 
1973 called Safety or Profit?238 
The authors acknowledged that the unification of the statutory framework was not 
controversial; however, the persistent tendency of the committee to advocate for a voluntary 
approach rather than legal restraint was.239 They argued that the apathy theory on which the 
report was based was nothing more than an unsubstantial assumption.240 They also questioned 
and were opposed to the assumption of “greater natural identity of interest” between both sides 
of industry regarding OHS.241 These two mains assumptions of the report might not be 
appropriate if the general pressure in factories for profit and continuous production were taken 
into consideration.242 Indeed, after Nicols’ and Amstrong’s investigations in factories, they 
highlighted the difference between “safety before production” in theory, and “production before 
safety” in practice. Based on testimonies from workers who had been victims of workplace 
accidents, they concluded that these workers put themselves in dangerous situations to try to 
maintain or restore the production. It was not by ignorance or because they did not care about 
their health and safety; the problem of production and the pressure by the management was a 
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factor of insecurity. Paradoxically, these elements were mentioned in the Robens Report: “Good 
intentions at board level are useless if managers further down the chain and closer to what 
happens on the shop floor remain preoccupied exclusively with production problems”.243 
Another problem regarding the voluntary approach was the fact that it was impossible 
to separate the OHS field from the rest of the industrial relationship. Indeed, by tradition, the 
industrial relationship is based on an imbalance of power between management and workers.244 
This imbalance might be compensated by a legal intervention to protect the workers, or by a 
strong collective organisation of the workers that can bargain and defend the workers’ 
interest.245 The consequence of the Robens recommendation seemed to take away the 
possibility of having some protection through litigation by the workers so that they had to rely 
on the influence and power of their safety representative to obtain tangible improvements at 
their workplaces. 
Another limit regarding the novelty of the report appears after an examination of the 
evidence submitted to the committee.246 Some contributions influenced the choice of 
developing the voluntary approach and how to reform the legislative framework. The 
contributions examined in this section are as follows: the Department of Employment, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the Law Commission,247 and the TUC and CBI. There is 
strong evidence that some of the main ideas of the Robens Report — considered innovative at 
the time — originated from the government (the Department of Employment (DE) and the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)). For example, the intangibility of the legislation and 
the lack of flexibility due to legislation dealing with special hazards had been raised by the 
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DE.248 In one of their conclusions, they even asked for “a system whereby a basic statute is 
supplemented by codes of practices”.249 
The DTI also advocated for the unification of legislation.250 However, when it came to 
the way to reform the legislation, the Law Commission had a different point of view; it 
recognised the strength of having separate legislation in certain fields. Conscious of the need 
and demand for flexibility, it recommended completing the legislation with “parent statutes” 
via the adoption of regulations. If the approach of the Commission had been followed, that 
would have guaranteed for the TUs that the former OHS standards would not have been 
lowered.251 They did not mention the voluntary approach. 
Meanwhile, the CBI and the TUC assessed the need for the industry to continue to 
develop systems of joint safety consultation voluntarily. 252 Nevertheless, the TUC insisted on 
the fact that a statutory framework for the development of safety organisations within industry 
was the only way to secure real and lasting improvement.253 Therefore, the TUC explicitly 
asked that future legislation would define standards as a minimum threshold. When necessary, 
these standards would be completed by subordinate regulation. They clearly stated that they did 
“not accept the arguments of those who advocate replacing the specific requirements imposed 
by existing legislation, by a general duty of care”.254 They were worried about the implication 
of such a general duty regarding the enforcement and extent of the employer’s liability. It seems 
that the position of the TUC was closer to the Law Commission, with one single Act completed 
by regulations with a legal value that framed the OHS structure. If the position of the TUC and 
the Law Commission had been followed, the voluntary approach would have been understood 
as a space for dialogue between workers and management to take into consideration the 
specificities of the workplace, but with the guarantee of minimum legal protection. Meanwhile, 
the approach of the government (with the example of the positions of the two departments 
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mentioned) and the CBI was a single statute with general duties, completed by non-legislative, 
voluntary tools, which was closer to the collective laissez-faire ideology.255 
It seems that the Robens Committee followed the latter recommendations and went 
against those of the TUC, which might have raised questions regarding its independence and 
innovation. It seems that the committee was more of a way for the government to justify an 
action that it intended to conduct regardless.256 
3.2.3. Adoption of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
From a political perspective, the Robens Report reached a consensus between the 
Conservative and the Labour Party.257 The Heath Conservative Government, under the 
supervision of Mr William Whitelaw, was the first government to attempt to pass a Bill based 
on the Robens Report in January 1974.258 Due to the defeat of the Conservative Party and the 
election of the Labour Party in February 1974, the Bill introduced by the Tories was not debated 
further. However, in April 1974, the Labour Government reviewed the Conservative Bill in 
order to submit it for a second reading.259 The similarity between the two drafts of the Bill was 
utterly recognised.260 Mr Whitelaw acknowledged that the Bill submitted by the Labour 
Government was “basically the same except for one provision”.261 
Two points were subjected to modification and discussion. The first was that, although 
the Conservative Party was not against a statutory duty for employers to consult their employees 
on matters of health and safety, they questioned to what extent the legislation should prescribe 
the terms and conditions of the joint consultation.262 The Conservative Party also expressed its 
opposition and concerns about clause 2(4), concerning the employees’ representative 
appointment that would be possible only with the “recognised trade unions”.263 From their 
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perspective, the draft presented by the Labour Government was too rigid on these two points 
and might damage the entire voluntary approach defended by the Robens Report.264 Despite the 
Conservative Party’s concerns, the Bill presented by the Labour Government was enacted by 
the HSW Act 1974. During the parliamentary debates, it was admitted that most of the matters 
covered in the Robens Report were incorporated into the Act.265 However, the government 
insisted on going further on certain aspects. The current subsection highlights the connections 
between the socio-political context and the legal provisions in order to compare them with other 
national systems. Therefore, a study of all the provisions of the Act is unnecessary. Only Part 
1, “Health, Safety and Welfare in connection with work, and control of dangerous substances 
and certain emissions into the atmosphere”, will be covered in this study, specifically the 
sections that correspond to the problems raised above.  
The influence of the Robens Report appears in the beginning of the Act with the 
establishment of general duties for the employer towards the employee or any person who 
might be affected by how he conducts his undertaking.266 Concerning relationships with 
employees at the workplace, every employer has to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
the health, the safety, and the welfare at work of all employees.267 The concept of “reasonably 
practicable”268 is fundamental, but also controversial, and leads to an important series of cases 
with respect to its interpretation, allowing economic considerations to be taken into account in 
deciding the scope of the duty to ensure health and safety.269 Additionally, the employer must 
provide information and training as is necessary to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
the health and safety at work of employees.270 
On the employee side, every employee shall take reasonable care of his or her health 
and safety and that of others who may be affected by his or her acts or omissions at work.271 
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Employees must also cooperate with their employer so far as is necessary.272 The use of words 
such as “reasonably practicable” and “necessary” could be seen as the translation of the balance 
between legal prescription and the importance given to the voluntary approach. Indeed, these 
words allow a subjective reading of the law that might vary from one situation to another. This 
is what the Labour Government meant by “unity but not uniformity”. However, this approach 
might lead to uncertainty in the way that the courts and LIs enforce the Act. 
Concerning the safety representatives, the Act provides that only recognised TUs would 
appoint them amongst the employees. Those representatives would represent the employees in 
consultations with the employers.273 The consultation of those representatives is an employers’ 
duty, aiming to establish collaborations between them to develop and promote OHS.274 The 
Safety Representatives and Safety Committee Regulations (SRSC Reg) 1977 provided more 
information and precisions on the methods of appointment. These specific provisions of the 
HSW Act were subject to controversy during its adoption due to their opposition to the Robens 
recommendations. The adoption of these provisions was the result of a long TU campaign for 
such statutory rights that started back in 1963.275 Some members of the Labour Party had 
defended this position before the publication of the Robens Report. In addition, the HSW Act 
and the SRSC Regulation were adopted within the particular context of the social contract 
between the Labour Government and the TUC.276 This is also the reason why the Employment 
Protection Act 1975 removed s2(5) of the HSW Act 1974. This section opened the possibility 
of having a regulation to choose safety representatives from among the employee via elections. 
In order to ensure the monopoly of the TUs on that field, this option was disregarded, limiting 
the existence of health and safety representatives to workplaces with recognised TUs. 
One part of the Act dealt with the question of the connection between health and safety 
Regulations and approved Codes of Practice. The function of the Health and Safety 
Commission in this respect is essential as it approves and issues the Codes of Practice that 
complete the Regulations and statutory provisions. However, the Commission needs the 
consent of the Secretary of State to approve a Code of Practice. The role of the Secretary of 
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State is to make health and safety Regulations.277 The legal values of these Codes of Practice 
are, without a doubt, not legally binding.278 Therefore, a failure to fulfil the requirements of the 
provisions cannot itself make someone liable in any civil or criminal proceedings. Here, the 
Robens philosophy of using flexible and non-legislative tools is respected. However, it also 
confirms Nichols’ worries that none of these codes is of any help or support for employees if 
employers do not respect their duties. 
To conclude, the HSW Act 1974 is a crucial turning point in the construction of the 
OHS legal framework in the UK. However, the principle that it carries that the responsibility to 
take action lies “with those who create the risks and those who work with them”279 was not 
limited to the TUs in the Robens philosophy. The integration of the provision giving TUs a 
monopoly on health and safety representatives’ appointments was due to particular 
circumstances: a Labour Government and strong TUs. The result of having general legal 
principles that relied on workers and the employers to apply them, and the presence of TUs at 
the workplace, aligned the OHS approach with the rest of British IR at that time. Like the rest 
of these IR, despite an impression of legal continuity, the application of the OHS legal 
framework was affected by the political turn at the end of the 1970s with the election of 
Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. 
3.3. The Impact of Directive 89/391/EEC in the UK Legal System 
Although the HSW Act 1974 is still the cornerstone of the OHS framework in the UK, 
some authors observe that the EU action has been a “main driving force in UK occupational 
health and safety law since the late 1980s”.280 Therefore, to explore if the EU has been a factor 
of convergence, we must examine the impact of Directive 89/391/EEC in the British legal 
system. Thus, it is necessary to review the industrial policies regarding TUs that were conducted 
under Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major. Only then will it be possible to understand the 
context of the adoption of the Management Health and Safety at Work Regulation (MHSW 
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Reg.) 1992 that transposed the Framework Directive. After this review, a close examination of 
the provisions of these Regulations is conducted. 
However, to complete the assessment of the impact of Directive 89/391/EEC, we must 
also examine how this regulation has been integrated into legal strategy before the civil and the 
criminal courts. The current study emphasises the crucial role of LIs in the enforcement of the 
MHSW Reg. Finally, this section will show how enforcement in front of the courts is linked to 
available resources and is, therefore, subject to the approach and reforms adopted by the 
government. In that respect, the approach adopted by the various governments in power since 
1997 has had a detrimental effect on OHS in the UK in one way or another. 
3.3.1. The minimal legislative implementation of Directive 89/391/EEC in the UK 
3.3.1.1. The national political policy as a protection of the British tradition against the 
European dynamic 
Since the adoption of the HSW Act 1974 and the SRSC Regulation 1977, the political 
background in the UK has changed substantially. One of the most important turns in British 
political history was the election of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in 1979. Her policies 
were considerably different from those of both the former Conservative and Labour 
Governments. Her election was the results of a special meeting of circumstances: first, the 
Labour Party failed to control inflation with its Keynesian approach, and this forced them to 
turn toward a monetarist approach in the middle of the 1970s.281 The Labour Party conducted 
a deflationary economic policy, which restraining wages. The consequence was the so-called 
“Winter of Discontent” in 1978/79, with a series of strikes by public sector TUs.282 This led to 
bad publicity of TUs and the development of a common idea that they were too powerful. These 
events and the economic situation of the UK led to the election of Margaret Thatcher. 
The belief that TUs were too powerful legitimated the Thatcher government policies on 
IR. Three mains themes characterised the industrial policies conducted in the 1980s: the 
reversal of corporatism and de-politicisation of TUs, the empowering of employers to resist TU 
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demands, and the reduction of the solidarity and collective actions of the TUs by encouraging 
individualistic behaviours.283 The OHS laws and Regulations were not targeted directly by the 
Thatcher government’s industrial policies.284 This was surprising because, at the time, some 
people expected her to do so, but it was more “politically correct” to avoid changing the OHS 
provisions.285 However, Thatcher’s policies did have an indirect impact on OHS. The first 
notable change came with the adoption of the Employment Act (EA) 1980, especially the 
provision of unfair dismissal. According to section 6 of the EA 1980, tribunals were required 
to consider the employer’s size and resources to qualify an unfair dismissal. This situation 
covered the case of safety-related dismissals, and it also changed and lessened the employer 
burden of proof for “reasonable” action. Here, the lack of clarity of what was considered 
“reasonably practicable” in the 1970s turned in favour of the employer in the 1980s. The 
interpretation of this notion included the idea of cost-benefit analysis, which can be dangerous 
in a period of economic crisis and recession. The principle of involving the workers in OHS 
only through TUs and taking some distance from the external agencies was also damaging in 
the long-term. Indeed, the EA 1980 massively reduced the TU industrial power286 — one such 
limiting action taken by the EA was to repeal of statutory recognition procedure.287 This meant 
that the presence of safety representatives, which was linked with the recognition of TUs, was 
no longer guaranteed. The last source of protection for employees was the LIs. However, studies 
have shown that the cuts to the workforce and resources of the inspectorate after 1979 had a 
severe effect on the occupational accident rate.288 
In addition to change at the national level, there was also fundamental change at the 
international level. In 1974, the United Kingdom joined the European Community. As was 
underlined in Chapter 2, no major steps were taken in the period up to 1985 regarding the social 
dimension. Therefore, when Delors was appointed head of the Commission, the direction he 
gave to the European project did not match the “expectations” of the Thatcher Government. In 
that respect, it is necessary to distinguish two aspects of the relations between the UK and the 
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EC. Indeed, the position of the UK was different regarding the overall development of the social 
dimension and the adoption of the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC.  
Tensions regarding the development of the social aspect of the European Community 
arose already with the opening of discussions concerning the adoption of Article 118 in the 
Single European Act – especially the provisions regarding Qualified Majority Voting (QVM). 
The main concern was that QVM would endanger or “damage” the sovereignty of the UK. This 
idea can be illustrated by the intervention of Lord Stoddart of Swindon, in 1986:  
“What on earth does that paragraph mean? Does it mean that the Government of this 
country will now be obliged to set standards in this regard by majority vote of other 
countries within the EC? If so, and it can be done not by unanimity but by qualified 
majority, is it not the case that other countries – not our own Parliament, but other 
countries in the EC acting with the European Parliament – will be able to impose 
financial burdens on this country to which our own Parliament has not agreed? That is 
the worrying point. Here again the control of the British Government, even over internal 
expenditure, will now be qualified by other countries whose backgrounds and whose 
history in these matters may be completely different from ours. In fact, our own 
Parliament could have imposed upon it expenditure for which they would have to tax 
but over which they would have no control. I hope Members of the Committee 
understand what I am getting at because the objectives of these articles are not in 
dispute. It is the effect of them that worries me”.289 
One element that might have contributed to the eventual acceptance of Article 118A is 
that QVM covered “only” the field of OSH. Therefore, the position of the UK Government was 
different regarding the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC: “The Government supports the aim 
of ensuring that decent comparable standards of health and safety apply through the European 
Community”.290 The reasoning for this support might have been due to the enduring and 
straightforward idea that UK OSH standards were already amongst the highest in Europe, and 
the existing legal framework (i.e., HSW Act 1974) already covered the principles embodied in 
the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC.291 Therefore, the UK Government was not opposed to 
this directive based on the belief that the national legal framework would not be affected. For 
these reasons, the UK Government lobbied on two points: (1) the new directive should not be 
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a burden on the competitiveness of the companies,292 (2) the respect of the “reasonably 
practicable” approach.293 As Cope emphasised: “We must be careful to ensure that the 
legislation suits us”. Indeed, the UK Government managed to protect the national approach of 
reasonably practicable even when the Commission argued that in doing so it was not 
implementing the Framework-Directive 89/391/EEC effectively.294  
When it came to discussions concerning the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, 
the political consensus founded upon OHS (and Art 118A) disappeared, and the divergence of 
views between the UK and the EU/EC reappeared. As emphasised during the Parliamentary 
debates by one Labour MP:  
“It (i.e. The Social Chapter) is important because it illustrates perhaps more graphically 
than any other issue the awesome gap that stands between the Government’s vision 
and ambition for Britain and for Europe and that of all other European Community 
countries.”  
“The Tory party’s lonely vision of Europe is of a marketplace alone and its myopic 
ambition is to dominate it by low wages, low standards and down-market, service-based 
activities. The market exclusively will matter to the Tory party. Commerce will count, 
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money will rule and people will be kept in their place – at the bottom of the rights 
league.”295 
The problem was broader than the social aim of the EC; it also concerned the European 
model and the shared competences, and so the delegation of national sovereignty.296 The issue 
could be summarised as such: “where rules have to be made, who makes those rules?”.297  For 
the UK, there was a considerable number of topics that should be left at the national level. This 
position was clearly expressed through the speech that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher gave 
in Bruges in 1989.298  It ended with the historical opt-out of the UK from the Social Chapter 
and the European Social Charter of Fundamental Rights.299  
The adoption of the Working Time Directive increased the divergence between the UK 
and the EU. The legal basis for the adoption of the Directive was Art 118A, meaning that the 
Commission legally justified this initiative as an improvement of health and safety. For the UK 
Government, this legal basis was an abuse of Article 118A, and the treaties.300 The UK 
Government argued the legal basis of the directive before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, which in its ruling adopted a broad understanding of health and safety, and of working 
conditions – and rejected the claim of the UK Government.301 Following the decision of the 
CJEU, Directive 94/104/EC was implemented in the UK in the form of the Working Time 
Regulations 1998. However, even after the election of New Labour in 1997 and the 
implementation of the Directive and the ratification of the Social Chapter, the UK Government 
pursued an essentially neo-liberal approach, advocating that the social development of the EU 
be kept to a bare minimum.302  
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To conclude, the provisions of the HSW Act 1974 and its Regulations were broad 
enough to provide general duties to promote prevention at the workplace with the participation 
of workers through decades, but its flexibility made its effectiveness heavily dependent on the 
political context and the state of IR, which were particularly prone to change. The theoretical 
approach of the HSW Act 1974 proved to be stable through time but fluctuant in its 
enforcement. In 1990, John Major succeeded Margaret Thatcher as head of the Conservative 
Party, which won the general election. Major’s Government pursued a deregulation approach. 
In this context, the Deregulation Unit was created.303 It was evident that the regulatory dynamic 
of the EU and its adoption of directives did not coincide with the national dynamic. The national 
position of the government strongly influenced the way Directive 89/391/EEC was 
implemented. First, the British Government maintained the position that they did not have to 
reform much to implement the Framework Directive as most of the European provisions were 
already explicitly or implicitly included in the HSW Act 1974.304 So, Major’s Government 
adopted Regulations to extend employers’ obligations in the OHS field. Six Regulations were 
adopted to transpose the Framework Directive and its sub-directives (“six-pack”).305 For the 
purpose of this study only the Regulation that implemented the Framework Directive – i.e., the 
MHSW Regulation 1992 – will be examined. According to Taylor and Emir, “in practice the 
1992 six-pack regulations actually do little more than put some flesh on the bones already 
established in 1974”.306 The Regulation that implemented the Framework Directive was the 
MHSW Regulation 1992. The action of minimum transposition can be analysed in different 
manners: as an opposition to European action or as a protection of the British legal order and 
tradition. 307 
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3.3.1.2. Transposition of the European provisions of the Framework Directive for better 
compliance with British tradition 
The general aim of the Framework Directive was already embodied within the HSW 
Act 1974.308 However, the Framework Directive was explicit in details, and some concepts 
were new to UK law. The transposition of the Framework Directive was an opportunity to 
clarify the general conditions of the HSW Act 1974, according to European standards. 
There were some obvious similarities in the content of the MHSW Reg. 1992 and the 
framework directive: eight articles were transposed almost word for word from the Framework 
Directive. Some commentators observed the evident impact of EU law on the UK OHS 
framework, considering the inclusion in Schedule 1 of the MHSW Reg. of “general principles 
of prevention” that must be the basis for employers’ protective measure and are a reproduction 
of Art. 6(2) of the Framework Directive.309 However, a close examination of the Regulations 
shows that the implementation was meant to be broad, and some of the transposition omitted 
significant ideas of the Framework Directive that might have been contrary to the British 
tradition. 
  Among the new concepts implemented in the UK legal system, regulation 3 requires the 
employer to make a risk assessment. As in the Framework Directive, this obligation is vague. 
The provision is written as follow: 
3.(1) Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of — 
(a)the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst 
they are at work; and 
(b)the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or 
in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking, 
for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the 
requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant statutory 
provisions and by Part II of the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations 1997. 
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Details are provided in the ACOP Code of Practice, which is a useful tool for employers 
but not legally binding as such.310 Indeed, they may be admissible in evidence and – under 
specific circumstances – the court may take them into account when judging whether a legally 
binding rule (e.g. a statutory rule contained in the HSW Act 1974 or the MHSW Reg. 
1996/1999) has been breached.311 However, “a failure on the part of any person to observe any 
provision of an approved code of practice shall not of itself render him liable to any civil or 
criminal proceedings”.312 Therefore, it is difficult to prove the failure of this obligation in front 
of the judges in the context of civil claims, and it must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Interestingly, although these provisions are broad, they are the ones most often used in civil 
legal strategy.313 It should be underlined that the proof of the breach of the Reg. 3(1) is different 
for criminal trials. By virtue of s.33(1) of the HSW Act 1974, it is a criminal offence to 
contravene the terms of MHSW Regulation (1996/1999). Additionally, s.40 of the HSW Act 
1974 places the burden of proof on an accused in offences consisting of a failure to comply 
with a duty or requirement embodied in the Act. 
One other significant change to the British OHS system as a result of the Framework 
Directive was regulation 7, which covers the procedures for serious and imminent danger and 
dangerous areas. The idea is similar to the Framework Directive, but some key wordings are 
missing in the MHSW Reg. 1992. For example, the protection of workers from being “placed 
at any disadvantage because of their action and must be protected against any harmful and 
unjustified consequences, in accordance with national laws and/or practices”.314 The Directive 
clearly established that action by workers who — in the event of serious, imminent or 
unavoidable danger — leave their workstation or a dangerous situation, “shall not place them 
at any disadvantage, unless they acted carelessly or there was negligence on their part”.315 
However, the protection of the worker after they have used their right in these conditions is not 
mentioned anywhere in the MHSW Reg. 1992. It was necessary to wait until the adoption of 
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the Employment Right Act (ERA) 1996 to have complementary provisions to guarantee this 
protection. Indeed, s.44 of the ERA 1996 provides that: 
“An employee has the right not to be subject to any detriment by any act, or any 
deliberate failure to act, by his employer done on the ground that –  
(d) in circumstances of danger which the employee reasonably believed to be serious 
and imminent and which he could not reasonably have been expected to avert, he left 
(or proposed to leave) or (while the danger persisted) refused to return to his place of 
work or any dangerous part of his place of work, or 
(e) in circumstances of danger which the employee reasonably believed to be serious 
and imminent, he took (or proposed to take) appropriate steps to protect himself or 
other persons from the danger”.316  
 
According to s.100 of the ERA 1996, under these circumstances, the employee also 
benefits from protection against dismissal by its employer. (Here, the notion of “reasonably 
believed” resonates with the “reasonably practicable” for the employer’s duty.) Prior to the 
adoption of the ERA 1996, some authors have underlined the possibility that the application of 
this right, in the former context of the British statute, might lead to dismissal of the workers – 
in the event where the workers leave its workstation with the honest belief that there is a serious 
imminent risk, but it turns out to be a “false alarm”.317 The transposition of this aspect of the 
Framework Directive took place in a two-step process and combined secondary and primary 
legislation, which shows the influence of the Framework Directive on this aspect of the UK 
legal framework.   
The concept of consultation,318 which was one of the fundamental concepts of the 
directive during the debate, is another example of vague transposition in an attempt to preserve 
the British tradition. Indeed, transposing the concept of consultation was problematic because 
it was not usual in the British industrial relation.319 In Regulation 9 of the MHSW Reg. 1992, 
the concept of consultation was replaced by cooperation and coordination, which are slightly 
different. Indeed, the European directive highlighted consultation, but also balanced 
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participation.320 Importantly, the MHSW Reg. 1992 imposed an obligation of coordination with 
other employers, but not with workers, as was set in the Framework Directive. In that respect, 
it can be argued that the MHSW Reg. did not transpose Article 11 of Directive 89/391/EEC. 
However, this non-transposition might be because the obligation of consultation was already 
embodied in previous Regulations, such as the HSW Act 1974 or the SRSC Regulation 1977. 
In the SRSC Regulation 1977, the concept of consultation is mentioned briefly twice.321 
Both provisions refer to the general obligation of consultation that can be found in the HSW 
Act 1974, expressed as follows: 
It shall be the duty of every employer to consult any such representatives with a view to 
the making and maintenance of arrangements which will enable him and his employees 
to co-operate effectively in promoting and developing measures to ensure the health and 
safety at work of the employees, and in checking the effectiveness of such measures.322 
Two observations can be made. First, it is only one sentence, and the overall disposition 
with the SRSC Regulation and the MHSW Reg. 1992 is far from what is expressed in the 
Framework Directive. Second, the consultation is limited to the health and safety 
representatives who are, according to SRSC, subordinate to TUs. Some authors rightfully 
noticed that up to the reform in 1999, worker participation in the area of health and safety was 
utterly dependent on the employer’s discretionary decision regarding whether or not to 
recognise a TU.323 However, in the first half of the 1990s, the CJEU adopted a series of cases 
that overturned UK law’s traditional reliance on recognised TUs as the “single channel” of 
employee representation.324 The cases were about the duty to consult workers’ representatives 
framed by the EU directive on collective redundancies and the transfer of undertaking. The 
Court held that to exclude workers for whom no union was recognised was to deprive them of 
the legal Community right to have informed and consulted representation.325 
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This rationale was the same as with the health and safety workers’ representatives, 
prompting the Major government to adopt the Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) 
Regulations 1996 to prevent any future condemnation by the Court. 326  The regulation placed 
an obligation on employers to consult employees not covered by TU safety representatives. 
These consultations could be conducted either through elected representatives or directly with 
individual employees. In practice, the direct channel with individual employees was preferred 
by the employers, but also led to abuses.327 
The transposition of the concept of consultation is also revealed in the implementation 
of the “workers’ obligations” in “employees’ duties”.328 The regulation partially transposed the 
European provisions: the informational part was included, but the provisions about cooperation 
from the workers were neglected. Additionally, Bell noticed that these provisions do not fit 
with the contemporary trends in the labour market. For example, in the private sector, only 
15,1% of workers are members of TUs, meaning that the majority of workers are only covered 
by the lower standards of the 1996 Regulations. 329 Moreover, research suggests that a strong 
legislative foundation is a crucial prerequisite to effective worker participation in health and 
safety.330 The question is how much progress can be made in the absence of willingness to 
consider legislative reform. 
The MHSW 1992 was reformed in 1999. However, the reform did not change its 
substance; it mostly completed the previous legislation by extending the scope to the “risk 
group” mentioned in Art. 15 of the Framework Directive. Consequently, the regulation was 
extended to cover children and expect mothers. Moreover, Schedule 1 of the MHSW Reg. 
added a direct reference to Art. 6 of the Framework Directive. The main idea stayed the same; 
the New Labour Party did not take this opportunity to explain or to improve compliance with 
Directive 89/391/EEC and shared the minimalistic approach of the Tories. 
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3.3.1.3. Integration of the Management Health and Safety at Work Regulations in the 
UK as a tool of compensation, not prevention. 
First, it is important to emphasise that the MHSW Reg. 1992/1999 (and the HSW Act 
1974) presents obligations for employers on the basis of criminal law and does not open rights 
for civil claims. According to the British legal system, criminal law related to health and safety 
is enforced through the activities of inspectorates.331 These activities are shared between local 
authorities, environmental health officers, and inspectors working for one of the Health and 
Safety Executives (HSEs).332 Only they can prosecute employers who breach the MHSW Reg. 
1992; workers and TUs cannot. The health and safety representatives can report what they have 
noticed when they inspect the workplace, but they cannot prosecute even if they notice a breach 
of the law.333 
In theory, the MHSW Reg. 1992/199 is not useful in civil claims. However, an 
examination of the case law where the MHSW Reg. 1992/1999 is mentioned in the period 
between 1992 and 2018 shows a different trend (see Figure 1).334 The main observation is that, 
other than during the first four years, there were more civil claims brought than criminal ones. 
Regardless of the nature of the jurisdictions, almost all the cases have at least one mention of 
regulation 3 of the MHSW dealing with the risk assessment.335 Before the civil courts, claimants 
usually use this regulation to reinforce a tort claim based either on negligence by the employer 
 
 
331 De Baets, P., 2003. The labour inspection of Belgium, the United Kingdom and Sweden in a comparative 
perspective. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 31(1), p.37  
332 See the Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998 for further details. 
333 Bell, M. Occupational Health and Safety in the UK: At a Crossroads? in Ales, E. ed., 2013. Health and safety 
at work: European and comparative perspective. Kluwer Law International. p.380 
334 In total, 161 case laws were examined with no distinction of jurisdictions (administrative cases have been 
excluded) based on the Westlaw UK and LexiNexis databases. 
335 Reg.3 of the MHSW Reg. was mentioned in 115 of the 161 cases, representing 71% of the jurisprudence 
analysed.  
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or a breach of the duty of care. At first, the claims were related to physical injuries, and, over 
time, psychiatric injuries due to stress, violence, and harassment were also covered. 
  
The breach of the obligation to conduct risk assessments is often considered by the 
judges; however, the breach of this regulation is not enough by itself to obtain damages for the 
workers. Reg. 15 (now Reg.22 of the MHSW Reg.1999) is often mentioned as a reminder of the 
exclusion of civil liability. The failure to conduct appropriate risk assessments has also been 
integrated into claims of gender discrimination against pregnant workers to challenge the 
fairness of their dismissals. Thus, the breach of Reg. 3 is part of the burden of proof that the 
worker has to submit to prove negligence or a breach of the duty of care.336 However, the 
number of civil cases has dropped considerably since 2013, which might be seen as a sign of 
the success of the reform suggested by Lord Young Report to fight the “compensation 
culture”.337 
 
 
336 The difference between the civil and the criminal proceedings has to be underlined. By virtue of Section 33(1) 
of the HSW Act 1974, it is a criminal offence to contravene the terms of MHSW Regulation (1996/1999). 
Additionally, Section 40 of the HSW Act 1974 places the burden of proof on an accused in offences consisting of 
a failure to comply with a duty or requirement embodied in the Act.  
337 See Young, D.Y.B., 2010. Common Sense Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of Graffham to the Prime 
Minister following a Whitehall-wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of the 
compensation culture. Cabinet Office. 
Figure 1- The evolution of the jurisprudence based on the Management Health and Safety at Work Regulation 
1992/2018. 
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On the other side, the decline (not to say the limited number) in the number of criminal 
cases might coincide with the decline of HSE resources over the past decades.338 Additionally, 
since 2000, a new approach orientated towards fewer prosecutions and more “soft enforcement” 
has been developed by the Blair Government and followed by the governments since then.339 
However, criminal prosecutions are happening mostly when there has been a fatal accident, and 
the responsibility of the employer is foreseen. As underlined previously, in criminal trials if 
there is a breach of any provision of the code of practice the burden of proof is reversed. Indeed, 
as stated s.17(2) of the HSW Act 1974:  
“Any provision of the code of practice which appears to the court to be relevant to the 
requirement or prohibition alleged to have been contravened shall be admissible in 
evidence in the proceedings; and if it is proved that there was at any material time a 
failure to observe any provision of the code which appears to the court to be relevant 
to any matter which it is necessary for the prosecution to prove in order to establish a 
contravention of that requirement or prohibition, that matter shall be taken as proved 
unless the court is satisfied that the requirement or prohibition was in respect of that 
matter complied with otherwise than by way of observance of that provision of the 
code. » 
This provision underlines the special legal status of the ACOPs.340 It means that 
prosecutions are reactive and not preventive. Therefore, it would be interesting to look at the 
number of prosecutions made by LIs over the same period, in order to compare them. 
To conclude, it seems that the MHSW Reg. 1992 transposition of the Framework 
Directive was well integrated into the legal strategies used in court by workers to support their 
claims, but the regulation — as the HSW Act 1974 — was used to obtain compensation when 
there is damage. Thus, its primary function of prevention may have been more efficient if the 
LIs’ context was different. In that respect, the Blair Government initiatives did not help enforce 
the MHSW Reg. (or, indirectly, Directive 89/391/EEC). 
 
 
 
 
338 For further analysis of the figures provided by the HSE for the period around 2000, see James, P. and Walters, 
D., 2004. Health and safety revitalised or reversed? Institute of Employment Rights. 
339 As explained further below 
340 https://www.hse.gov.uk/legislation/legal-status.htm 
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3.3.2. The 2000s: The UK’s fight against the EU OHS dynamics by “cutting the 
red tape” 
3.3.2.1. The political turning point of OHS under the New Labour  
During its 1997 campaign, the New Labour made it clear that it was not the traditional 
Labour Party; it wanted to be different, particularly regarding its relationship with TUs. In the 
New Labour’s manifesto, the direction was clear: new centre and centre-left politics focused on 
the “promotion of dynamic and competitive business and industry”341 and the decentralisation 
of the political power throughout the UK”.342 The Employment Act (EA) 1999 could have had 
an impact on the appointment of health and safety representatives, but only if Schedule 1 did 
not limit the recognition of the TUs to the collective bargaining conducted on behalf of a 
bargaining unit. The appointment of health and safety representatives stayed linked to the 
prerequisite of having a recognised TU at the workplace, which stayed voluntary. The direct 
consultation with employees had still the same weaknesses as explained before. 
Regarding OHS, the Blair Government went a step further by officially starting to 
present OHS legislation and associated inspections as a burden for competition that needed to 
be expunged. Until this point in time, OHS has not been officially and directly presented as bad 
for business. This was a significant shift in the public approach to OHS that impacted the 
enforcement of previous legislation and also motivated reform on the basis that less is more. 
The new approach to OHS can be illustrated with two official documents: the 2000 HSE 
report Revitalising Health and Safety (RHS) and the 2005 Hampton Report. The publication of 
RHS had been described as a critical shift towards market-based regulation regarding health 
and safety policy.343 One of the main ideas of this report was to develop a partnership rather 
than relying on enforcement, an idea that has been already developed by the Robens Report in 
1974 and coincided with the dynamic of self-enforcement. 
 
 
341  Labour Party, U.K., 1997. New Labour: because Britain deserves better. Labour Party Manifesto. commitment 
n°3 
342 Ibid, commitment n°9 
343 Tombs, S. and Whyte, D., 2009. A Deadly Consensus 1: Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation Under 
New Labour. The British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), p.51 
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The RHS report stated that enforcement should only be brought into play if 
encouragement and guidance had failed. Additionally, it was one of the first policy documents 
to advocate formally for a “risk-based” approach to health and safety; it encouraged businesses 
to compare the costs and benefits of good health and safety management. The traditional aim 
of improving the health and safety conditions, reasonably practicable, was replaced by an 
economic view: is it economically worth it to improve the health and safety conditions? Thus, 
the legal compliance of the OHS provisions became motivated by an economic rationale rather 
than a moral or a legal one, contrary to Robens philosophy. This opened the way for the idea 
that OHS prevention was too costly and had to be reduced because it was a burden to 
competition. Logically, RHS was a first step that was subsequently completed by the Hampton 
Report. 
The Hampton Report, Reducing administrative burdens: Effective inspection and 
enforcement, was published in March 2005. This report advocated for more focused 
inspections, greater emphasis on advice and education, and removal of the “burden” of 
inspection from most premises. The link with the Better Regulation Task Force’s report, Less 
is More, is officially recognised.344 One of the aims of the report was to “reduce the need for 
inspections by up to a third, which means around one million fewer inspections”.345 Hampton 
based his argument on the observation that resources are limited, and because enforcement 
requires many people, it has to be reduced. To strengthen his point, Hampton said that fewer 
inspections and less enforcement do not lead to less effective regulation if self-regulation is 
developed. The weakness of this system — already supported by the Robens Report at the time 
— is that self-regulation is vulnerable to regulatory degradation.346 Tombs and Whyte argue 
that 
If government withdraws from regulatory enforcement […] and in the absence of 
countervailing power of trades unions within and beyond workplaces, then regulations 
becomes increasingly reliant upon market-based mechanisms.347 
 
 
344 See Hampton, P., 2005. Reducing administrative burdens. London [Hampton Report] 
345 Ibid pp.8 
346 Tombs, S. and Whyte, D., 2009. A Deadly Consensus 1: Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation under 
New Labour. The British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), p.50 
347 Ibid p.50 
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In other words, under the New Labour, the government adopted policies of deregulation and 
did not reinforce the power of trades unions, leaving them globally weak.348 Thus, the 
enforcement of regulations became reliant upon market-based mechanisms, like the cost-
benefit approach. 
3.3.2.2. OHS under the Coalition: when economic overcome the human aspect  
From 2010 to 2015, the deregulatory approach was pursued by the Cameron-Clegg 
coalition government composed of members of both the Conservative and the Liberal 
Democrat. The main idea was that 
The burden of excessive health and safety rules and regulations on business had become 
too great and a damaging compensation culture was stifling innovation and growth.349 
According to the government, there were too many inspections of relatively low-risk and well-
performing workplaces. An overly complicated structure of regulation and a “compensation 
culture” led businesses to a fear of being sued for accidents, even when they were not fault. 
Thus, the government concentrated health and safety enforcement on higher-risk areas by 
applying a risk-based approach, targeting health and safety interventions. This resulted in a 
substantial drop in the number of health and safety inspections carried out in the UK.350 
During this period, the HSE reduced the overall amount of health and safety legislation 
by 50% to have simpler and more modern legislation.351 The coalition government introduced 
new rules so civil claims for compensation for people injured at work could only be brought in 
cases where the employer was negligent, and so could not be found liable if he or she had taken 
all sensible steps to prevent injury. The Coalition Government based its reform on a report 
presented by Lord Young in October 2010: Common sense, common safety. In this report, Prime 
Minister David Cameron acknowledged that health and safety have never been less valued by 
 
 
348 Dodds, A., 2006. The Core Execut’ve's Approach to Regulation: From ‘Better Regulation’ to ‘Risk‐Tolerant 
Deregulation’. Social Policy & Administration, 40(5), p.529 
349 Policy paper – 2010 to 2015 government policy: Health and safety reform. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-health-and-safety-reform/2010-
to-2015-government-policy-health-and-safety-reform 
350 Ibid. According to the government, the Health and Safety Executive has reduced the number of proactive 
inspections it does each year by a third, from around 33,000 to 22,000.  
351 Ibid 
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the public. For Cameron, the reason for this is an inappropriate scope covering low-risk, leading 
to “absurd examples of senseless bureaucracy”.352 
The central point of the Common sense, common safety report was to fight what was 
described as “the compensation culture”. It aimed to make workers personally responsible for 
their own actions, motivated by “common sense”. To some extent, this was not far from Robens 
and the apathy of the workers, or the wish to make everyone, including workers, responsible 
for OHS. The difference was that, in Common sense, common safety, workers claim 
compensation for damages when there is a workplace accident, and so out of an employer’s 
fear of being sued rather than a desire to improve accident prevention and OHS itself. According 
to Lord Young, compensation culture is the consequence of a health and safety consultant 
“employing a goal of eliminating all risk from the workplace instead of setting out the rationale, 
proportionate approach that the Health and Safety at Work Act demands”.353 However, one 
can argue that the phenomenon of workers suing their employers for damages is a consequence 
of the reasonably practicable approach of the HSW Act 1974. Considering that the concept of 
reasonably practicable is relative to specific circumstances, it seems logical that workers ask a 
judge to decide whether or not the risk was reasonably practicable, and if the employer is 
responsible. 
The fact that the report critiques the action of claiming damages for “even minor 
accidents” opens a potentially dangerous debate regarding the distinction between the damages 
“worth a compensation” and others. This might lead to a situation where some damages are no 
longer prevented because they are not worth the compensation. However, some research has 
raised the possibility that a preventive approach, based on worker participation and external 
inspection and enforcement, remains the preferable path to pursue.354 Of course, not every 
damage should lead to compensation regardless of the circumstances. However, the HSW Act 
1974, as well as Directive 89/391/EEC, emphasised that if the worker is proven to be 
responsible for his or her own damages, the employer cannot be held fully responsible. This is 
a principle that the courts are already applying. The Common sense, common safety report is 
 
 
352 Young, D.Y.B., 2010. Common Sense Common Safety: A report by Lord Young of Graffham to the Prime 
Minister following a Whitehall-wide review of the operation of health and safety laws and the growth of the 
compensation culture. Cabinet Office. p.5 
353 Ibid p.7 
354 Bell, M. Occupational Health and Safety in the UK: At a Crossroads ? in Ales, E. ed., 2013. Health and safety 
at work: European and comparative perspective. Kluwer Law International. p.380 
  
 
96 
not about reforming the core approach to the HSW Act 1974, but about the compensatory 
aspect. Interestingly, in his report, Lord Young argues that the UK OHS framework is: 
“Part of the responsibility lies with the EU where the Framework Directive of 1989 has 
made risk assessments compulsory across all occupations, whether hazardous or not, 
and part to the enthusiasm with which often unqualified health and safety consultants 
have tried to eliminate all risk rather than apply the test in the Act of “reasonably 
practicable” approach”.355 
 
According to Young, the EU OHS framework goes against the core of the Robens 
philosophy and, therefore, the initial legal framework. It is worth noting that Reg. 15 of the 
MHSW Reg. 1992 states clearly that the sole breach of the risk assessment, on its own, cannot 
open a right to claim damages. Therefore, the breach of risk assessment is always raised in 
cases where there is actual damage. Thus, some doubts can be expressed about how the EU 
Framework Directive 1989 could be responsible for compensation culture, especially with the 
CJEU case validating the “reasonably practicable” approach. Young even recommended that 
“we go back to the European Commission and negotiate a reduction of burdens for law hazard 
environments”.356 For once, the UK and the EU approach might have been the same considering 
that, in 2010, the EU Commission shared the same vision of OHS being an obstacle to 
competition that needed to be reduced. 
Some commentators in the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 
observed that  
there appear to be two extremes in practice: some organisations that have 
misinterpreted, in an overly-bureaucratic fashion, the process of risk assessment, 
alongside other organisations that fail to undertake even basic risk assessments.357  
Additionally, in a study on OHS Bell said that the deregulatory steps proposed by Young’s 
review “reflect an outdated view of occupational health risks as those likely to lead to serious 
physical injury. He emphasised that the most common sources of work-related ill-health and 
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absences from work are stress and musculoskeletal disorders, and there are limited to high-
risk sectors – all the contrary”.358 
In 2011, the UK government published a report: Good health and safety, good for 
everyone. This report continued to support the idea that it is necessary to focus “on higher-risk 
industries and on tackling serious breaches of the rules”.359 This meant reducing the number 
of pro-active inspections in fields where there are low or no risks. The consequence of this is 
that an inspection would only occur in low-risk fields when there is a breach or an accident. 
This could mean little to no prevention in these sectors — which is against the spirit and the 
application of Directive 89/391/EEC. In the Good health and safety, good for everyone report, 
the government explicitly targeted the EU OHS activity: 
a plethora of legislation has grown up, compounded by the introduction of European 
Union legislation from 1992 onwards. There are now 17 Acts owned and enforced by 
HSE, and over 200 regulations owned and enforced by HSE/Local Authorities.360  
It seems that the motivation for reviewing health and safety regulation is always to ease further 
burden on business, not improve the OHS of people in the workplace substantially. 
To complete this assessment, and with a hope to legitimise further reform, the 
government asked Professor Ragnar to 
re-examine those regulations originating from European Union Directives to ensure 
that, where the Directive has not simply been copied out into UK law, there is a sound 
justification for this, and UK businesses are not being unnecessarily burdened 
compared to other member states.361 
This shows that EU OHS standards, which were supposed to be minimum standards, came to 
be understood as maximum ones. This approach encourages a race to the bottom by MS in order 
to increase the competitiveness of their companies. 
In his report, Reclaiming health and safety for all, Professor Ragnar concluded that 
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in general, there is no case for radically altering current health and safety legislation. 
The regulations place responsibilities primarily on those who create the risks, 
recognising that they are best placed to decide how to control them and allowing them 
to do so in proportionate manner. There is a view across the board that the existing 
regulatory requirements are broadly right, and that regulation has a role to play in 
preventing injury and ill health in the workplace. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that proportionate risk management can make good business sense.362 
For him, the problem was not the regulations themselves but the way in which they were 
interpreted and applied. Regarding EU law, Professor Ragnar said that “many of the 
requirements that originate from the EU would probably exist anyway, and many are 
contributing to improved health and safety outcomes. There is evidence, however, that a 
minority impose unnecessary costs on business without obvious benefits”.363 Furthermore, he 
supported EU dynamism revolving around a risk-based approach with the Better Regulation 
Agenda. 
To conclude, the post-2010 reports and reforms profoundly changed the OHS 
perception in the UK. As Hutter underlines, not long ago, intervention and enforcement were 
positive signs of regulators’ capacity to manage relations with duty holders, not of their 
unreasonableness.364 Maybe the most rooted change is that opposition to OHS is not as clear as 
it used to be; the novelty here is to present it as common sense, as if anything else would not 
be.365 
3.4. Conclusion 
During the 1970s, the UK developed a strong OHS legal framework deeply rooted in 
the existing voluntary system of IR. At the time of the implementation of Directive 
89/391/EEC, the Conservative Party was in government under Margaret Thatcher. In this 
chapter, I have argued that these facts help to explain why the impact and influence of the 
Framework Directive on UK law were limited. Only that which was necessary to avoid 
condemnation of the CJEU has been reformed, such as risk evaluation and the right of workers 
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to leave their workstations in case of serious and imminent danger. Therefore, the rationale and 
the logic of OHS in the UK has not been changed, even when elements, such as the concept of 
consultation of workers, have changed. European Union law had an impact and led to reforms 
on the appointment of health and safety representatives, but this change was motivated by the 
directive on collective redundancy and not the Framework Directive. Nevertheless, it had an 
impact on one of the initial key concepts in British OHS development. Interestingly, this phase 
of minimising the impact of EU law was followed by an approach of actively counteracting the 
effect of the EU OHS law in the UK. Indeed, since the beginning of the 2000s, a series of 
reports sponsored by the government have advocated for less enforcement by external actors, 
e.g., LIs, and developing more partnership at the workplace. 
Some reports, like the Hampton report, kept emphasising the importance of developing 
self-regulation. Hampton also qualified the inspections of “burden” for the companies. This 
idea has been developed further since 2010, with inspections being reduced and targeted 
towards specific sectors. Lord Young went so far as to say that, by requiring a risk assessment, 
the Framework Directive went against the Robens philosophy of preventing risk as far as is 
reasonably practicable. However, using the Robens philosophy to fight EU OHS Directives is 
misplaced because it uses the voluntary approach and reasonable practicability out of context. 
The Robens philosophy is deeply embedded in the existing system of IR in the UK, based on 
the existence and presence of TUs. Advocating for self-regulation in a context of unbalanced 
industrial power while cutting the red tape and reducing inspections only lead to workers having 
no protection under the law or the TUs Additionally, as rightfully emphasised by Professor 
Ragnar, many of the requirements that originated from the EU would probably exist regardless. 
Therefore, an analysis of the implementation of the Framework Directive in the UK reveals two 
interesting aspects. First, it shows the limits of the transposition of the EU directives in countries 
that have already developed their own OHS framework. It also underlines the importance of 
the political context and the fact that the implementation of a directive should be understood 
and analysed within the broader context of national IR and the relation between the EU and the 
MS. Second, it also underlines that beyond the legal framework and the general principles, 
enforcement and application by judges are crucial to the effectiveness of these principles for 
the workers. 
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 CHAPTER 4  
The European Union as a Catalyst for National Improvement through 
Occupational Health and Safety: France 
4.1. Introduction 
Like the UK, the first OHS laws were adopted in France in the 19th century and focused 
on vulnerable populations, such as children366 and women.367 The concept of a general duty of 
prevention for the employer is also deeply rooted in French industrial history both from a 
jurisprudential368 and legal perspective.369 The Law of 12th of June 1893 and the Decree of 10th 
of March 1894 specified the scope of the employers’ duty to adapt the workplace to guarantee 
the security of the workers.370 As underlined by Verkindt, this legal framework was an 
ambiguous mix of “philanthropy and cynical utilitarianism”.371 For him, the rationale was that 
protecting the workers meant protecting the tool of production: the workforce. However, this 
idea centred around prevention could not develop further and was stopped by the Law of 9th of 
April 1898, which installed a system of automatic but limited compensation in cases of 
workplace accidents as a counterpart of civil immunity for employers.372 Collective prevention 
was forgotten in favour of an individual monetary compensation approach to OHS, at least until 
the 1970s. 
Indeed, in the 1970s, the idea of developing collective prevention over individual 
compensation started to regain power. In the 1980s, laws surrounding workers’ rights regarding 
working conditions and the creation of the Comité d’Hygiène, de Sécurité et des Conditions de 
Travail (CHSCT – CHSWC) legally acknowledged this preventive aspect of the OHS. 
Therefore, there was a favourable ground when the Framework Directive had to be 
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implemented in the French legal framework. Moreover, contrary to the UK situation, a Socialist 
Government was in charge of the implementation of the OHS Directives.  
This chapter attempts to consider whether EU action changed the initial rationale of 
French law-making and the development of the OHS field, and if so, to what extent? It is 
structured around three main periods. First, the study of workers’ protests in the 1970s and the 
legislative answers in the 1970s and 1980s show how the promotion of collective prevention of 
OHS came from the workplace. The second period focuses on the implementation of the 
Framework Directive and underlines the importance of the political leadership at the time of 
implementation; as much as a Conservative Government tried to minimise the impact of the 
Framework Directive in the UK, the French Socialist Government embraced the concepts of 
Directive 89/391/EEC and saw an opportunity to reform, clarify, and improve its own legal 
system. However, the third period, which focused on the recent OHS reforms in France, shows 
some similarities with the UK in its “deconstruction” of tools, actors, and services that were 
necessary to the proper functioning of OHS in France. Therefore, this chapter confirms the 
argument that the national political agenda, and the relations between the MS and the overall 
European project, impacted the way the Framework Directive was implemented and applied at 
the national level.  
4.2. Initial Construction of the Occupational Health and Safety Framework 
In French history, the events of May and June 1968 remain a symbol of contestation by 
the whole society against past societal rules.373 Particularly on the workers’ side the 
mobilisation in May and June 1968 in various factories all across the French territory was the 
culmination of years of tensions and periodic conflicts, which created an environment in which 
workers’ claims could be expressed.374 Simultaneously, the 1960s corresponded with a period 
where workers started to question their working organisation.375 Most of the conflicts in the 
1960s — and later in the 1970s — were due to the workers’ dissatisfaction with their working 
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conditions.376 Taylorism changed working organisation and conditions at that time 
profoundly.377 From the employers’ side, the division of work was a way to guarantee their 
control over their workers.378 From the workers’ side, this division of work removed, to a 
certain extent, their feeling of control over the product and the making process.379 
The decomposition of the production process led to mental and physical deteriorations 
of workers’ health; their work was not only physically hard, but they could no longer identify 
themselves as being part of the production process.380 In response, qualitative claims started to 
be expressed on top of traditional quantitative claims, e.g. wage and working time.381 The 
workers also started to question the legitimacy of the TUs, who were the traditional worker 
representatives, and the workers became willing to speak directly for themselves. There was a 
growing tendency for workers to attempt to take back control of their work from the employers 
as well as the TUs. Thus, the 1970s were a pivotal period between two social and industrial 
models.382 During this decade, the three oil crises impacted the economic situation, and it 
switched from strong growth to an economic crisis.383 Additionally, the technological 
revolution changed the nature of work and, therefore, the nature of risks. Meanwhile, it was 
also the moment for workers to protest for better work conditions, and OHS in general, not at 
the national level but the factory floor level. 
Therefore, this section provides an overview of the workers’ protests in the 1970s and 
see to what extent, if any, the protests influenced the OHS legal rationale. First, a short analysis 
of the protests during the 1970s shows that there was an increasing interest in the qualitative 
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aspect of the OHS rather than the quantitative one. The workers and some TUs argued in favour 
of a structural and organisational approach to OHS, in opposition to the ad hoc approach where 
damages were individually ‘fixed’. Even employers recognised the importance of OHS and 
working conditions and attempted to repress workers’ expression and channel their claims 
through committees they controlled. 
Interestingly, this structural and organisational approach to OHS was also discussed in 
some reports and national collective agreements. Unfortunately, the Conservative Governments 
of the 1970s did not consider these ideas, especially from the mid-1970s onward due to the 
economic crisis. Only beginning in the 1980s, with the election of a Socialist Government, did 
workers’ claims and the suggestions made in reports for a more humane vision of working 
organisations and conditions found transposition in legal terms. 
4.2.1. Questioning the traditional quantitative OHS approach: The social 
background 
During the 1970s, one particular conflict illustrated the workers’ claim to better working 
conditions and a right to health: the Pennaroya conflict.384 The archaic and obsolete working 
conditions in Pennaroya were harder than the usual working conditions in factories and led to 
many of the workers developing lead poisoning.385 However, the link between the development 
of this disease and the working conditions was denied by the employer. Therefore, the workers 
structured their claims around two main topics. 
First, in order to get monetary compensation, the workers asked for official recognition 
of the occupational aspect of their disease. However, the workers’ claims went beyond 
traditional compensation: they also asked for decent working conditions and a change in 
organisation to prevent the disease at its origin. One of their slogans, “Our health is not for 
sale”, emphasised the workers’ refusal to resolve the conflict only through monetary 
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compensation. 386 After almost a decade of conflict and tension, they finally obtained 
recognition of the occupational origin of the lead poisoning and better prevention with a change 
of their working conditions.387 
The will to overcome the traditional compensatory approach was also defended more 
broadly by some TUs, such as the CFDT, which also advocated for developing a preventive 
approach to OHS. Lapeyre, who served as a member of the CFDT, explained that in the 
company where he was working at the beginning of the 1970s, the working conditions were 
hard because tasks were tedious and overall quality of the working environment was poor, e.g. 
the quality of the air.388 The CFDT representatives advocated for focusing on the origin of the 
problem rather than addressing the consequences solely with monetary compensation for the 
workers exposed to the risk. The collective preventive and organisational approach were 
preferred over the individual monetary solution. 
Additionally, in 1977, the CFDT published Les dégâts du progrès, which covered the 
latest evolutions in terms of working organisation and equipment. 389 The aim was to underline 
the risks these evolutions represented for workers and how to prevent them. The examples 
provided in Les dégâts du progrès were collected from various sectors and provide valuable 
information about the workers’ mobilisation based on these new risks, and subsequently, OHS 
claims.390 
However, not all the French TUs shared the vision of the CFDT; others, such as the 
Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), still defended the former quantitative approach. 
According to Lapeyre, the CGT refused to recognise the structural differences of the workers’ 
claims and new approaches following the events of May to June 1968. This difference in 
approach has been a clear obstacle in the unity of action of the French TUs in that field, which 
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poses a significant problem when the social partners had to agree on the working conditions at 
the inter-sectoral level.391 
Furthermore, not all the strikes were as successful as the Pennaroya’s action. In the late 
1970s, it became especially difficult to start a protest. Due to the economic crisis of 1973/74, 
some companies faced intense difficulties and, in a period where jobs were in danger, striking 
was not the most suitable way to express workers’ claims. One of the main consequences was 
a shift in the balance of power in IR. Consequently, expression and defence of workers’ 
concerns were transferred from the workplace to the public sphere; there was a move from 
striking to voting. This transfer was encouraged by the main TUs, which wanted to focus on 
the coming general presidential elections in 1981. However, it also marked the end of the 
factories as political spaces and the end of the contestation period, which lasted an entire 
decade.392 
Not only workers, but employers learnt from the events of May 1968. They 
subsequently tried to adapt their workplace strategies to maintain control while avoiding 
tension. There were two antagonist strategies: the first was to address conflict through 
repression, and the second was to focus on prevention to avoid situations that could lead to 
strikes. Indeed, most of the employers were still hostile towards TUs in the workplace despite 
the legal improvement of their rights after the events of May and June 1968.393 Some repression 
was internal to the workshop, either in a subtle way with informers among the workers in charge 
of alerting the employer to everything happening in the workshop, or a more direct way with 
internal militia among the workers in charge of physically breaking a strike if there was one.394 
Even if the right to strike was theoretically protected in France, some employers 
dismissed workers who joined the strikes or were pro-actively opposed to their employer. 
Additionally, some employers did not hesitate to go to court in cases of conflict in order to have 
the legal authorisation to dismiss the strikers.395 All of these elements were intended to create 
an atmosphere of fear among workers to dissuade them from starting an industrial action. 
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However, some employers did not only take the initiative through repression; some of them 
also acted upstream in order to prevent trouble. One way was to employ more immigrant 
workers, assuming that they would react less and be more willing to work in poor conditions.396 
The language barrier of the foreign workforce during the first years was also a guarantee for 
employers that workers might not be able to communicate with one another and would, 
therefore, be less likely to coordinate an action. Of course, this strategy had limits and did not 
prevent the workers of Pennaroya from taking industrial action, but it seems that it was the 
exception. 
The second way to prevent tension in the workplace, and thereby the risk of industrial 
actions, was to improve working conditions. Initially, the TUs were in charge of improving 
working conditions.397 Therefore, to counter the influence and importance of TUs in that field, 
some employers decided to create groups with a similar aim of improving working conditions. 
For example, at the Peugeot factory in Sochaux, the employer created a separate council for the 
improvement of the working conditions. It was a led by the employer, contrary to the 
commission on working conditions led by the TU. Through the creation of a distinctive 
committee, the employer wanted to improve the workers’ trust in management and to diminish 
the role of the TUs.398 However, as soon as the first economic difficulties appeared in 1979, 
Peugeot gave up on this pro-active strategy of improving working conditions.399 
This example illustrates the fact that the prevention of working conditions, and so of 
health and safety, was the first element to be neglected in times of crisis. This underlines the 
importance of developing institutions to protect OHS and proper working conditions without 
being subject to external economic circumstances and the willingness of political parties. The 
autonomy and continuity of the kind of worker representative institutions such as the 
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Committee of Hygiene, Safety, and Working Conditions (CHSWC) was, and still is, an 
essential characteristic of the sustainable development of OHS. 
To conclude, the 1970s was a crucial turning point in the approach to OHS for all social 
partners: workers, TUs, and employers. The workers, by stating that their “health was not for 
sale”, challenged the working organisation and pushed toward an inclusive structural and 
organisational approach to OHS. The working conditions and the impact on the workers’ health 
and safety was not something that could be addressed exclusively with monetary compensation; 
it was part of the work and needed to be treated as such. As shown, some TUs recognised this 
change and advocated for a collective and preventive approach to OHS, even if it was not 
legally recognised. Interestingly, the behaviours of some employers showed that the key 
challenges to OHS in the 1970s were the centrality of the workplace and the importance of the 
workers’ expression of their working conditions: they either abstained or channelled it. 
Therefore, we must address to what extent the legal sphere developed and changed during the 
1970s and if there were any similarities between the legal and workshop levels. 
4.2.2. The legislative counterpart to workers’ claim: Theoretical change under 
the Conservative Governments and the Socialist Party 
4.2.2.1 Theoretical changes and questioning of the OHS status quo against 
governmental reticence leading to minimal legislative change 
4.2.2.1.1. The Governmental Reports  
Following the events of May 1968, the Government ordered several reports to 
understand the state of French IR, and the reasons behind the recent workers’ protest. The first 
report was delivered by Yves Delamotte to the Labour Minister in 1972 and developed a more 
humane working organisation.400 The Delamotte Report was unique in its analysis and 
comparison of foreign IR.401 The main idea of the report was to develop social aspects of the 
workplace, and not only economic considerations such as productivity. Based on the situation 
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in the countries examined in the report, the possibility for a more democratic functioning of the 
workplace was raised. 
Then, the Sudreau Report in 1974 examined the dysfunctionality of French IR and 
proposed ideas to resolve it. 402 The main recommendation for OHS was the recognition of 
workers’ right of expression regarding their working conditions. This report underlined the 
importance of humans in a working organisation, the function of TUs, and the necessity of 
workers being able to express their vision. 403 Even if these suggestions were not significantly 
innovative, it was still too much for the Conservative Government which ignored them.404 In 
fact, after the economic crisis and from 1976 onward, Prime Minister Raymond Barre 
advocated for firmness on social conflicts and IR in general. The position of the Government 
illustrated the turn from the reforming impulse of the beginning of the 1970s, when the workers 
and TUs had power, to the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, when the employers regained 
power in industrial balance. 
4.2.2.1.2. The Laws   
The law adopted on the 27th of December 1973, improved working conditions with two 
mains provisions and was the first major step in the OHS field. The first provision was the 
creation of the Commissions to Improve the Working Conditions (CIWC) at the workplace. 405 
These commissions were different from the Committee of Hygiene and Security (CHS), which 
was a part of the Works Council. 406 The CIWC was also affiliated with the Works Council and, 
therefore, had a strong link with TUs, but had a broader scope regarding working conditions. 
The second important provision was the creation of a national agency to improve working 
conditions, called the National Agency for the Improvement of Working Conditions (L’Agence 
Nationale pour L’Amélioration des Conditions de Travail; ANACT), which worked closely 
with the minister of labour. The ANACT also had a consultative function and was working with 
companies to improve the working conditions. Additionally, the law of the 6th of December 
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1976 introduced, for the first time, an obligation to participate in training regarding security 
rules, as well as a general principle of prevention and the responsibilities of the employer in 
case of a workplace accident.407 However, no additional law was adopted in the second half of 
the 1970s, which may have been due to an economic crisis and a change in government 
priorities. 
4.2.2.1.3. The inter-sectorial agreement   
This change of dynamism in the 1970s can also be illustrated by the bargain of an inter-
sectorial agreement on working conditions that started in 1973 and ended in 1975.408 The 
content of the final agreement was innovative in many respects. First, it did not limit its scope 
to health and safety;409 instead it extended it to the working organisation,410 working time,411 
and management role. The social partners aimed to reach real improvement rather than seeking 
monetary compensation412; expectations of the workers’ productivity had to be compatible with 
workers’ physical and mental capacities.413 In this agreement, an entire title was devoted to 
OHS. The development of OHS was recognised as essential to improving working conditions. 
Therefore, the development of OHS has to be considered by management and employers 
whenever a concern regarding working organisation and production was discussed.414 
The agreement also underlined the importance of the prevention of OHS accidents at 
the earliest stage possible, emphasising that OHS accident prevention is the responsibility of 
everyone in the managerial hierarchy, especially those at the top-level. The workers and their 
representatives have to be involved in the OHS process of prevention.415 These dispositions 
acknowledged the second aspect of the workers’ claims with a pro-active role in the prevention 
of risks instead of monetary compensation for accidents. 
Unfortunately, even if the agreement contained interesting dispositions, its application 
and implementation were limited for various reasons. First, the initial context of bargaining was 
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characterised by the radicalisation of social partners; the employers wanted to diminish the 
power of the TUs as much as possible, and the TUs were in complete opposition to the 
employers’ power.416 Interestingly, it was the CNPF — the employers union — that asked to 
start a discussion. Based on a neo-liberal approach, the social partners wanted to regain control 
of the organisation of the workplace and to increase the autonomy of the social partners before 
the adoption of a new law by the Government. Unfortunately, this initial dynamic failed due to 
the extensive length of the discussion: two and a half years. The Government became impatient 
and adopted a new law in 1973. This law marked a break in the dialogue and was the reason 
for the small impact the agreement had afterwards. 
Another limit to the application of the agreement was the paradox between workers’ 
wanting to claim more power at the company level and the French tradition of bargaining at a 
centralised level to pressure the government. Thus, the difficulties of coordination between the 
different levels of bargaining and the complexity of the French IR limited the effect of the 
recommendations made in the agreement. Therefore, it was necessary to wait for the elections 
in 1981 and the victory of a Socialist Government to see these principles legally recognised. 
4.2.2.2. The legal recognition and consecration of a decade of OHS development 
The election of President Mitterrand in May 1981 brought the Socialist Party to power 
in France after 23 years of Conservative leadership. Therefore, the TUs had high expectations 
and the CNPF concerns regarding future reforms of the Labour Code.417 As underlined by 
former Labour Minister Auroux, the TUs did not have common claims and everyone asked the 
new Government for something different.418 On one side, the CFDT wanted to give more 
importance to and to develop collective bargaining; on the other side, the CGT and Forces 
Ouvrières (FO) were in favour of developing a legal framework. 
According to Jean Auroux, the OHS legal framework needed to be reformed for several 
reasons in 1982. First, the reactive and individual approach of OHS did not correspond to the 
reality and the wish to develop a pro-active approach.419 Second, the implementation of new 
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technologies complicated the concept of health and safety, and the development of unknown 
risk made the previous laws less relevant.420 Reforms of the OHS legal framework occurred in 
two steps: first, a report presented an analysis of the situation, then two fundamental laws were 
adopted which have been the basis of the OHS legal framework in France for the past 30 years. 
In June 1981, President Mitterrand, who was conscious of this need for change, required 
a report to prepare the reform of the Labour Code. Contrary to the reports previously studied, 
which were led by experts or a member of Parliament, Auroux himself was in charge of the 
research. The report, The workers’ rights, was published in September 1981.421 Coherency was 
at the heart of the future reform, so all the TUs intensively cooperated with the elaboration of 
this report.422 Auroux wanted to change workplace organisation profoundly and officially 
recognise the importance of workers as humans. Therefore, the report was structured around 
two ideas: workers have to be both citizens and active actors in their workplace. The concept 
of citizenship was linked to the concept of rights; hence, the report focused on an existing 
fundamental right, the right to health and safety, and recognised new rights with the right of 
expression. Additionally, becoming actors of organisational change in the workplace required 
the development of collective bargaining, which was made mandatory on an annual basis. This 
report was the reference for the four mains laws adopted by Auroux (so-called “Auroux’s 
Laws”).423 However, only the law of the 4th of August and the 23rd of December are studied in 
the current thesis because they are the two that directly relate to OHS. 
 The first Auroux’s law, adopted on the 4th of August 1982, focused on workers’ 
freedoms in the workplace. One of these freedoms was the freedom of expression of working 
conditions.424 The law provided that “the workers benefit from a right of direct and collective 
expression on the content and the organisation of their work as well as on the definition and 
the implementation of actions for improving working conditions at the factory/workplace”.425 
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A collective agreement provided the details of the application of this right.426 The function of 
the collective agreement underlined the idea that the law secured general principles at a 
centralised level, but the specificities of every sector of activities and factories were to be 
discussed in collective agreements. There were no more normative quantitative laws but rather 
qualitative ones that legally framed methods of acting, such as the right to expression. The 
informal corollary of this right was an employer’s duty to listen, brought about through the 
empowerment of the Committee of Health and Safety when it became the CHSWC.427 
The fourth Auroux law was adopted on the 23rd of December 1982 and focused on the 
workers’ representative Committee initially in charge of health and safety. With this law, the 
Committee merged with the Committee for the Improvement of Working Conditions created in 
1973 and became the CHSWC. This reform echoed the dynamic of coherence recognising the 
link between health and safety and working conditions, and the importance of treating them 
together in order to have an efficient and coordinated action. This law recognised the pro-active 
behaviour of workers and their representatives in OHS accident prevention at the workplace as 
well as new duties for the employers. On the workers’ side, they obtained a right to alert and 
retreat in case of a serious and imminent threat to their life or health. In such a case, they would 
signal the risk to the management and be allowed to leave their workstation.428 The employer 
or the management could not ask a worker to restart work if the working conditions showed 
serious and imminent danger.429 This implied that the employer had a responsibility to take care 
of the situation. 
Meanwhile, in the case of serious and imminent danger, the CHSWC could ask for an 
investigation to determine the origin of the danger and prevent it. Additionally, the CHSWC 
had a general duty to prevent the OHS risk and improve the working conditions. In that context, 
the employer had an obligation to consult the committee before any taking action related to 
OHS and the working conditions.430 
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Overall, the TUs recognised that Auroux’s laws addressed their claims, especially 
concerning health, safety, and working conditions.431 On the employers’ side, some of them, 
including young entrepreneurs (the Centre des Jeunes Dirigeants d’Entreprise), thought that 
Auroux’s laws could promote progress.432 For them, the right to expression could bring an 
interesting dynamic to IR and was a fundamental need of workers. However, most employers 
were ideologically opposed to these laws because they did not agree with the notion of 
“citizenship at the workplace”; from a technical standpoint, they also thought that the new legal 
framework was too strict and lacked flexibility.433 
Despite their recalcitrant position, these laws have since been well accepted and are the 
bases of IR as we know them today in France (at least until recently).434 The reforms adopted 
after Auroux’s laws confirmed this idea of social democracy, and up until 2018, the CHSWC 
was a powerful and central institution at the workplace.435 However, Auroux’s laws relied on 
strong TUs, which are now in a period of decline.436 Therefore, it is possible that these laws 
were built on an unstable foundation, much like the HSW Act 1974 and the exclusive ability of 
TUs to appoint health representatives in the UK. Auroux himself recognised that even if the 
mains ideas of his laws are still being applied today, there has been a significant weakening of 
TUs and a lack of dynamism in collective bargaining, which was not what he expected in 
1982.437 For him, the fact that the individualism took over the collective aspect of IR is the 
reason for the decrease in TUs’ power, collective bargaining, and IR as a whole.438 
4.2.3. Conclusion  
To conclude, the 1970s was a crucial turning point in the approach to OHS with claims 
and development of an organisational understanding of OHS rather than one that focused only 
on the individual and monetary compensation. All the social partners recognised a link between 
the OHS and general working conditions and the need for workers or their representatives to be 
involved in the decision-making process with their management or employer. There were two 
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instances of legislative recognition of this change. First, the ideas that addressed workers’ 
claims by developing workers’ right to expression at the workplace and regarding their working 
conditions, through the publication of reports and the adoption of a national collective 
agreement. Second, the legal creation of the CIWC to complete the Committee of Hygiene and 
Security was a fundamental step towards legal recognition of the workers’ right to be involved 
in OHS from an organisational perspective. Unfortunately, due to the economic crisis that 
started in the mid-1970s and the political preferences of the Conservative Government, there 
were no further legal improvements to OHS in the 1970s. However, the election of the Socialist 
President Mitterrand in 1981 introduced further legal reforms based on the ideas developed in 
the previous decade. The workers’ right to express their working conditions and the importance 
of the organisational preventive approach of OHS were officially recognised with the law of 
the 4th of August and the 23rd of December 1982. This means that most of the key concepts of 
the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC already existed in the French legal framework when the 
directive was implemented. 
4.3. Implementing the Framework Directive to Strengthen French OHS 
This section focuses on the provisions of the implementation Law n°91-1414 that 
transposed the provisions of the Framework Directive.439 The question of the impact of 
Directive 89/391/EEC on the French legal system, and whether it has substantially changed, is 
examined. By the end of the chapter, it will be possible to evaluate whether or not the 
implementation of the Framework Directive led to a convergence of the British and French 
legal systems regarding their OHS legal frameworks.  
To understand the crucial issues of the implementation of Directive 89/391/EEC, it is 
important to contextualise the situation at the end of the 1980s and then to conduct a close 
examination of the report at the origin of the draft, as well as the parliamentary debates in both 
chambers (the Senate and the National Assembly). This analysis highlights what has been 
problematic and challenging from a theoretical point of view. The section then focuses on the 
jurisprudence of the French judiciary high court — Cour de Cassation — based on the articles 
of the Labour Code implemented by law 91-1414.440 Thus, it is possible to observe what has 
 
 
439 TITLES I & III of law n°91-1414 
440 A total of 296 cases, between 1995 and 2019  
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been challenging from a practical perspective at workplaces, the position of judges, and how 
the French courts understand and apply the European concepts within the French legal tradition. 
4.3.1. The increase in workplace accidents and the need to implement OHS EU 
directives as an opportunity to update the French OHS legal framework 
The end of the 1980s corresponded with a dramatic change in the rate of workplace 
accidents in France. After ten years of continuous decline, the number of accidents began to 
grow for the first time in decades, affecting mainly the construction industry.441 Even more 
concerning, the severity of accidents also increased.442 In reaction to this alarming situation, the 
second Mitterrand Government requested a new report on what was causing this increase in 
accidents. 443 The aim of the report was also to improve accident prevention in high-risk sectors. 
The main recommendations of the report were to improve the knowledge about workplace 
accidents, generalise OHS training, revitalise accident prevention, bolster control and 
enforcement of the existing legislation, extend the number of CHSWC,444 and work on the 
“pricing” of social security for employers in case of accidents. The explanations for the increase 
in workplace accidents were structural:445 there was economic growth in France that led to more 
people being employed, but also more subcontracting agreements,446 and inspections by LIs 
had stagnated — not to say reduced.447 Therefore, the French Government needed to reform, or 
at least update, the OHS legal framework. 
Meanwhile, at the European level, the end of the 1980s corresponded with a 
revitalisation of legal activity in the OHS field.448 During this period, the French Government 
implemented seven European directives in its national legal system.449 For the French Labour 
Minister, Martine Aubry, the transposition of these directives was the opportunity to address 
 
 
441 Between 1977 and 1987; Daubas-Letourneux, V. and Thébaud-Mony, A., 2001. Les angles morts de la 
connaissance des accidents du travail. Travail et Emploi, 88, p.26 
442 From 258 fatal accidents in 1987 to 362 fatal accidents in 1988.  
443 François Mitterrand was elected for the first time in 1981 and was re-elected for a second mandate in 1988 until 
1995. The Report is also nown as the “QUERRIEN Report” and has been published in 1990 
444 Comité d’Hygiène et de Sécuité; The Health and Safety Committees 
445 Assemblée nationale – 3ème Séance du 19 November 1991. pp.6331 
446 Increase of 45% in the construction industry between 1987 and 1989. 
447 380 000 inspections from the Labour Inspectorates in 1987, 330 000 in 1988 – Assemblée nationale – 3ème 
Séance du 19 November 1991. pp.6331 
448 See Chapter 2, p.30 
449 Directive 89/391/ EEC; Directive 89/392/ EEC; Directive 89/ 686; Directive 89/ 655; Directive 89/ 656; 
Directive 89/654/ EEC; Directive 89/379/EEC 
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the deficiencies of the French legal approach to OHS accident prevention, not only in the 
construction industry but in general.450 She highlighted the need to implement the European 
concepts of prevention while respecting the rationale of the previous laws that had shaped the 
French OHS legal approach.451 Aubry, and draftsman Alain Vidalies, also expressed their 
support of the social development of the EU and wanted to set an example by being the first 
MS to implement the directives, and particularly the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC. They 
justified their support by citing the fact that the directives had been adopted under the French 
presidency of the European Commission by Jacques Delors, and that French approach had 
inspired the directives. Aubry was also a member of Auroux’s Cabinet in 1982 and had been in 
charge of drafting the OHS laws in 1982, which places the implementation of the European 
directive in the continuity of the previous OHS laws in France.  
4.3.2. Legislative context of law 91-14141 
4.3.2.1. Report by Jean Madelin and Alain Vidalies 
In 1991, a report written by Jean Madelin (Senate) and Alain Vidalies452 (Assembly 
Nationale, Socialist Party) completed and introduced the draft of Law n°91-1414 that was 
debated before the National Assembly.453 To set the context and the importance of the future 
law, they emphasised three points. 
First, Madelin and Vidalies acknowledged that there were difficulties in implementing 
EU OHS Directives in the French legal system. Although French law influenced and was at the 
root of plenty of EU OHS directive provisions, the directives synthesised different legal 
traditions. Some of them were far from the French approach, especially the Anglo-Saxon 
conception.454 Additionally, the French Constitution makes a distinction between what should 
 
 
450 Assemblée nationale – 3ème Séance du 19 Novembre 1991. pp.6333 
451 See law of 6 December 1976 n°76-1106, and the law of 23 December 1982 n°82-1097  
452 The draftsmen of the law project 
453 Constituted by Parliament and the Senate 
454 Madelain J., 1991. Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires sociales (1) sur le projet de loi modifiant 
le code du travail et le code de la santé publique en vue de favoriser la prevention des risques professionnels et 
portant transcription de directives européennes relatives à la santé et à la sécurité du travail. n°327, p.12 
  
 
117 
be framed by the law455 and what by regulations.456 Therefore, not everything could be 
implemented by laws, and part of the directives had to be transposed with regulations. 
The report also summarised the fundamental principles of the French OHS conception. 
Regarding liability, the Labour Code distinguished two categories of actors being potentially 
liable: on one side the employers, and on the other side the manufacturers, sellers, and 
distributors of dangerous products and equipment.457 Their responsibilities were both civil and 
criminal. If there was a workplace accident, the employer was liable due to the existence of the 
subordination link with the worker, and the fact that the employer was in charge and therefore 
responsible for the working conditions. The law of the 9th April of 1898 created a special regime 
for worker compensation: in case of a workplace accident, the workers could claim damages 
without having to prove the fault of the employer. However, the reparation of the damage was 
a lump-sum. This concept might seem contradictory to Article 13 of Directive 89/391/EEC, 
which introduced the concept of workers’ responsibility for their own safety and health and that 
of other persons affected by their acts or omissions at work. This difference of approach raised 
some opposition during the debates. Overall, in the report, the Framework Directive was 
presented as a text with general provisions that were obvious or already implemented in the 
French legal system.458 Nevertheless, the Directive defined a general prevention strategy and 
introduced the idea of provisional management of health and safety in companies. This existed 
previously in the French Labour Code but not as clearly and therefore needed to be reframed 
as a whole. 
Second, the authors of the report highlighted the need to implement the Directive in a 
clear and effective manner, based on the previous jurisprudence of the CJEU.459 To identify 
what was the appropriate way to transpose the Framework Directive, the authors considered the 
legal foundation of the Directive: Article 118A. This article aimed at a harmonisation but not a 
unification of the national legal systems. According to the authors, the French legal system 
already satisfied the minimum standards provided by the Directive. However, this had to be 
 
 
455 Article 34 of the French Constitution  
456 Article 37-1 of the French Constitution  
457 See article L.4121-1 (former art. L.231-1) and former L.231-2 
458 Madelain J., 1991. Rapport fait au nom de la commission des affaires sociales (1) sur le projet de loi modifiant 
le code du travail et le code de la santé publique en vue de favoriser la prevention des risques professionnels et 
portant transcription de directives européennes relatives à la santé et à la sacurité du travail. n°327, p.22 
459 Ibid, p.36 
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expressed unambiguously. The authors underlined the importance of the CJEU’s control, 
especially in the situation of preliminary ruling where it can directly affect the Directive if not 
implemented appropriately by the national law. This was a situation the French Government 
purposefully wanted to avoid. This might explain why not many subsequent preliminary ruling 
cases before the CJEU on that legal basis were coming from France.460 
Third, the authors raised the difficulty of the National Assembly having a debate on the 
law-draft because it was already the result of preliminary negotiations between the Government 
and the social partners. Also, the Government had already lobbied in favour of the social 
partners’ position during the debates of EU OHS Directives. These previous dynamics resulted 
in a fragile balance, that did not take into consideration the National Assembly’s perspective or 
function. Therefore, the debate on the transposition of EU OHS Directives was not about the 
fundamental concepts as such, but about applying technical modifications to avoid conflict with 
the previous provisions embodied in the French Labour Code. The authors also emphasised the 
challenge of implementing EU OHS concepts while reinforcing the role of the national 
CHSWC. 
4.3.2.2. Debates at the National Assembly: Senate and Parliament 
The draft of the Law n°91-1414 did not lead to significant disagreement among the 
various political parties and their representatives within the National Assembly, except for the 
Communist Party. Apart from it, everybody agreed on the positive aspect of European social 
development and the adoption of the seven EU OHS directives. However, the Communist Party 
saw these EU OHS directives as a threat to the acquis won by the workers through protest. 
According to them, these directives aimed to ensure the functioning of the single market in 
order to increase the profits of a minor part of society, not to answer human needs.461 The 
communist group voted against the implementation of the law and was the only group to do so. 
The position of the right-wing party RPR was also interesting.462 It acknowledged the 
legitimacy of the EU’s social goal but expressed concerns about the potential economic impact. 
In the view of the RPR, not all of the MS develop OHS standards at the same pace, and it 
 
 
460 See Chapter 5, pp.152-154  
461 Mrs. Muguette Jacquaint, Assemblée nationale – 3ème Séance du 19 Novembre, 1991. pp.6338 
462 Rassemblement pour la République, known today as Les Républicains. 
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worried that creating further rules and duties for employers would be a burden for the French 
economy.463 Interestingly, this is an argument that has also been used in the UK and at the EU 
level.464 Therefore, even though the RPR agreed on the general idea, it was not in favour of an 
additional law and was convinced that the French Labour Code already complied with most of 
the Framework Directive provisions.465 Thus, the RPR voted in favour of the law of 
transpositions, but only under the conditions of amendments. Regarding the Senate members, 
they agreed with the general aim of the law but suggested some modifications towards a more 
liberal approach and understanding of the European directives. 
Regarding the content of the draft, the first title focused on the implementation of the 
fundamental principles of the Framework Directive through the “General principles of 
prevention”. One article guaranteed the scope of the application of provisions relating to the 
Framework Directive; Art. L.230-2 of the Labour Code translates Article 6 of the Framework 
Directive almost word for word.466 The only difference was that the term “employer” was 
replaced by “chef d'entreprise”, which is a French specificity and was necessary to guarantee 
coherence with the rest of the legal system.467 The chef d'établissement was required to take all 
measures of protection, prevention, information, and training, and adapt them whenever there 
was a modification of circumstances and improve them whenever possible. Similar obligations 
already existed in the French labour law, but there were now explicit general duties.468 The 
innovative part of the new provisions was that prevention had to consider the technical 
evolutions and change in the workplace. The third paragraph of L.230-2 restated the obligation 
to conduct a general assessment, which could lead to a modification of work organisation or 
the methods of production. 
As mentioned earlier, although most of the provisions of the Framework Directive were 
not conflictual with the French legal framework, there was one provision transposing the 
Framework Directive that raised a considerable amount of concern and opposition, not only 
between the Senate and the National Assembly but also among the political parties of 
 
 
463 Mr. Christian Cabal, Assemblée nationale – 3ème Séance du 19 Novembre, 1991. p.6339 
464 See Chapters 2 and 3  
465 Mr. Christian Cabal, Assemblée Nationale – 1ère Séance du 16 Décembre 1991. p.7969 
466 Former Art. L.230-1 of the French Labour Code  
467 Especially to coordinate the terms used in the articles concerning the employer’s responsibility; former Articles 
L.260-1 and L.263-1. 
468 Former Art. L.232-1 (health), L.233-1 (security), L.231-1 (training) of the French Labour Code 
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Parliament. Article L.230-3 in the Labour Code, which transposes Article 13 of the directive, 
provides that “it does behove each worker to take care, according to his/her training and 
possibilities, of his/her health and security as well as one of the other people affected by his/her 
action or omissions”.469 The French provision is shorter than Art. 13 of the Framework 
Directive. This article came from the Anglo-Saxon tradition establishing a parallel between the 
employer’s duties and the workers’ obligations regarding health and safety.470 Before this 
article, the duties of health and safety were the exclusive responsibility of the employer. The 
rationale was that the consequence of the employment contract — with the subordination link 
— placed the employer as responsible for all risks created by a company’s activity. 
Although this article was completed by Article L.230-4 of the Labour Code that 
maintained the principle of employer liability, some members of Parliament were strongly 
opposed to the adoption of this article. The most virulent opposition within Parliament came 
from the Communist Party, who qualified Article L.230-3 as “a structural modification that 
shows the complete reversal of the Labour Code's principles, and the withdrawal of a protective 
principle for the workers”.471 Interestingly, the RPR was in favour of this article and would 
have been in favour of even more detailed provisions.472 
The opposition between the National Assembly and the Senate was based on a different 
issue. The Senate advocated for a more detailed version of the workers’ duty to take care of 
themselves and others and supported the idea of having it framed by a decree. It also defended 
the concept of co-responsibility and co-management in the context of L.230-3. The members 
of the National Assembly disregarded the suggestions made by the Senate. For them, the aim 
was to express clearly that workers had to participate in the implementation of the OHS 
prevention policy in companies. The internal rules of the company would frame the details, as 
it was not the function of the law to do it. Regarding the concept of co-responsibility, the 
members of the National Assembly expressly mentioned that this approach contradicted the 
fundamental labour law principle of the employer’s power in the company. According to the 
French legislative decision-making mechanisms, when there is a disagreement between the 
 
 
469 “Il incombe à chaque travailleur de prendre soin, 120uropa120nion de sa formation et selon ses possibilités, 
de sa sécurité et de sa santé ainsi que celles des autres personnes concernées du fait de ses actes ou de ses 
omissions au travail”. 
470 See further details in previous Chapter 3 
471 Mrs. Muguette Jacquaint, Assemblée Nationale – 3ème Séance du 19 Novembre, 1991. p.6338 
472 Mr. Christian Cabal, Assemblée Nationale – 3ème Séance du 19 Novembre, 1991. p.6340 
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Senate and the National Assembly, the vision of the National Assembly predominates. 
Therefore, the shortened version with the express recognition, which did not change the 
previous fundamental principle of labour law, was adopted. Interestingly, even though this 
article raised concerns on theoretical ground, the articles that raised issues in practice were not 
the ones that the National Assembly debated the most.473 
4.3.3. The application of law 91-1414 by judges, illustrated by the Cour de 
Cassation 
In the French legal system, it is possible to bring a claim before the court on three 
grounds: criminal law, civil law,474 and employment law. An examination of all the cases held 
by the high court — Cour de Cassation — basing its decisions on one of the dispositions 
implemented by Law 91-1414,475 shows how the French jurisdictions understood and applied 
EU OHS concepts from the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC.476 
4.3.3.1. The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation  
 
 
473 See next section on the implementation of the transposition law by the French courts  
474 Which can be qualified as the equivalent of tort law in the UK  
475 The articles analysed were : Art. L.230-1, L.230-2, L.230-3, L.230-4, L.230-5, L.231-10, L.231-11 and L.231-
12. The recodification of the Labour Code in 2008 has also been taken in consideration.  
476 295 decisions have been examined – from 1995 to 2019 
Figure 2 - The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Criminal Chamber (Cour de Cassation) from 1995 to 
2019) 
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The cases heard by the Criminal Chamber of the Court de Cassation are based on 
several articles: L.230-1 on the scope of application, L.230-5 on the LI’s power to stop 
construction in case of a dangerous situation. 
The issues discussed are usually about responsibility in the case of unintentional injury 
or homicide, usually completed by the charge of infraction of the health and safety regulation. 
The Court must determine whether the employer is criminally responsible when there is a 
workplace accident. The established jurisprudence from the Court de Cassation is that the 
employer is liable as soon as there is a workplace accident, based on Art. L.230-2, which 
provides the employers’ general obligation. The employer is responsible even if the worker 
made a mistake; if the worker has been “forced” to make a mistake due to the lack of prevention, 
he is not responsible.477 More broadly, the lack of prevention has sometimes been used as a 
reason to hold the employer criminally responsible.478 The Court takes the same position when 
there is a case of employee leasing;479 the employer’s obligation of prevention applies to all the 
workers under his control.480 However, the Court refuses to hold an individual (such as a 
manager or team leader) responsible on a criminal ground when there is not sufficient proof of 
the delegation of powers from the employer to this individual.481 For the Court, criminal 
liability is linked with the concept of authority, and the subordination link that initially exists 
between the employer and the workers. Less frequently, the employer is held responsible on 
criminal grounds for obstruction of the Health and Safety Committee CHSWC482 or the LI.483 
 
 
477 Cour cass. Ch. Crim. 25 Jan. 2000 n°98-87097 
478 See Cour cass. Ch. Crim, 13 March 1996, n°95-82644; Cour cass. Ch. Crim. 8 June 1999 n°98-82732; Cour 
cass. Ch. Crim. 6 June 2001 n°00-86643; Cour cass. Ch. Crim, 24 April 2001, n°00-85911 
479 i.e., “an arrangement in which a company’s workers are employee of another company which pays them and 
manages other costs and responsibilities relating to them.” - 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/employee-leasing 
480 See Cour cass. Ch. Crim 9 Nov. 1998, n°97-80714; and Cour cass. Ch. Crim. 11 Dec. 2001, n°01-81047 
481 Cour cass, Ch. Crim. 11 Oct. 2011, n°10-87.212 ; and Cour Cass, Ch. Crim. 17 Oct. 2017, n°16-80.821 9 
482 Cour cass. Ch. Crim. 12 May 1998, n°97-82188 
483 Cour cass. Ch. Crim. 24 April 2001, n°00-84712 
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4.3.3.2. The Civil Chamber of the Cour de Cassation 
 
The year 2003 was characterised by an increase in the number of cases before the Civil 
Chamber based on Article L.230-2 and Art. 1147 of the Civil Code. First, the Cour de Cassation 
strengthened its position regarding inexcusable mistakes by employers, even when a worker’s 
error caused the accident. As long as the employer should have known about this risk according 
to his training or status and did nothing to prevent the risk, it is an inexcusable mistake.484 The 
Court confirmed that the inexcusable mistake exists even if there is no proof of a breach by the 
employer; the simple fact that he should have known is enough.485 The same principle applies 
when it is a slight mistake by the employer486 or when the mistake is not unusual.487 The Court 
extended its jurisprudence on inexcusable mistake considerably in 2003, hearing 16 cases on 
the knowledge of a risk and the lack of prevention for occupational diseases (most of the cases 
were asbestos).488 From 2008, the Civil Chamber started to refuse to recognise the inexcusable 
 
 
484 Cour de Cass. 2ème Ch. Civ. 12 May 2003, n°01-210 71; confirmed by Cour de Cass. 2ème Ch. Civ. 16 Dec. 
2003 n°02-30 48 ; although the Cour de Cassation has recently tried to narrow the scope of the inexcusable mistake 
– see Cass. 2 civ, 30 March 2017, n°16-1220  
485Cour Cass. 2nd Ch. Civ, 18 Oct 2005, n°04-30.555, n°04-30.558, n°04-30.559, n°04-30.560 ; Cour de Cass. 2ème 
Ch. Civ. 16 Sep. 2003, n°01-21192 
486 Cour de Cass. 2ème Ch. Civ. 16 Dec. 2003, n°02-30777 ; Cour Cass. 2nd Ch. Civ. 22 Nov. 2005, n°04-30.213 
487 Cour de Cass. 2ème Ch. Civ. 18 Nov. 2003, n°02-30188 
488 Cour de Cass. 2ème Ch. Civ. 4 Nov. 2003, n°02-30063, n°02-30065, n°02-30066, n°02-30067, n°02-30068, 
n°02-30069, n°02-30070, n°02-30071, n°02-30072, n°02-30175, n°02-30176, n°02-30177, n°02-30178, n°02-
30178, n°02-30180, n°02-30064 
Figure 3 -The evolution of the jurisprudence of the 2nd Civil Chamber (Cour de Cassation) from 1995 to 2019 
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mistake when there is not enough evidence that the employer knew or should have known about 
the risk.489  
4.3.3.3. The Social Chamber of the Cour de Cassation 
 
The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Social Chamber shows three interesting peaks 
of activity in 2002, 2008 and 2014, each of them illustrating a main turning point in the 
understanding of the OHS legislation.  
In 2002, the Social Chamber held six decisions based on article L.230-2, often combined 
with article 1147 of the Civil Code, to develop the concept of faute inexcusable in the context 
of the employer’s obligation de sécurité de résultat.490 These cases echoed a turning point from 
the Cour de Cass in early 2002. On the 28th of February 2002, the Cour de Cassation changed 
the definition of an inexcusable mistake by an employer.491 Before, the concept of an 
inexcusable mistake required the employer to have made a severe and unusual mistake, but with 
 
 
489 Cour Cass, 2nd Civ. Ch. 2 Oct 2008, n°07-18.437, 13 Nov. 2008 n°07-20.437.  
490 Cour cass, Ch. Soc. 10 oct. 2002, n°01-20.405 and n°01-20.623 ; Cour cass, Ch. Soc. 11 Apr. 2002 n°00-
16.535 ; Cour cass., Ch. Soc. 11 jul. 2002, n°00-17.377 and n°01-20.408 
491From 2002 the definition has been: ““When he/she was, or should have been, aware of the danger to which the 
employee was exposed, and that he/she did not take the necessary measures to protect the latter from such danger.” 
Before 2002 the conditions to recognise the faute inexcusable were stricter.  
Figure 4 - The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Social Chamber (Cour de Cassation) from 1995 to 2019 
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the 2002 cases, the employer became responsible for his mistake if he knew or should have 
known about the risk and still did nothing. The worker still has to provide evidence, but the 
“unusual” and the “fundamental/severe” criteria of the action are no longer required. This 
change in jurisprudence was considered a revolution in French labour law and its approach to 
OHS. 492 Since, the Cour de Cassation used this new concept and combined it with Article 
L.230 and Article 1147 of the Civil Code to allow workers to ask for indemnities when 
employers should have known about a danger but failed to prevent it. However, in 2008, the 
Social Chamber has slightly softened its application of the faute inexcusable over the past years. 
The main argument for refusing the existence of a faute inexcusable is when the Court estimated 
that there had not been enough pieces of evidence proving the causality link between the 
damage and the employers’ behaviour.493  
Nevertheless, in 2014 (the 10th December) the Social Chamber gave a new dimension 
to the understanding of the OHS employers’ obligation and recognised for the first time the 
prejudice d’anxiété for the workers who knew that they were working in dangerous conditions 
without having the employer taking appropriate measures, e.g. asbestos at the workplace.494 For 
the Social Chamber, the awareness of the fear and the high risk of developing an occupational 
disease without being able to prevent it on its own can lead to psychological trouble and 
prejudice. It illustrates the failure by the employer of the obligation to protect the health and 
the safety of the workers. In 2015, the Social Chamber restricted the conditions to recognise 
such a prejudice to only some workplaces, which have been listed in an official document.495 
The latest decision on that topic has been held by the Social Chamber the 11th September 2019 
and reminds the direct link between art L.4121-2 of the Labour Code (new art. L.230-2) and 
Directive 89/391/EEC.496 With this decision, the Social Chamber extends the scope of the 
prejudice d’anxiété to all the sectors where workers have been exposed to dangerous chemical 
products.  
 
 
492 Lyon-Caen A. Une révolution dans le droit des accidents du travail. Droit Social, 2002. p.445 
493 See Cour cass. Ch. Soc. 20 May 2008, n°06-45.521, Cour Cass. Ch. Soc. 11 Apr. 2008 n°07-41.099, and Cour 
Cass., Ch. Soc. 26 March 2008 n°06-43.103 ; Cour cass. Ch. Soc. 21 May 2008, n°07-41.717.  
494 See Cour Cass. Ch. Soc. 10 Dec. 2015, n°13-21.217, n°13-20.137, n°13-20.136, n°13-20.135, n°12-20.134, 
n°13-20.139, n°13-20.140, n°13-21.224, n°13-19.359, n°13-23.691, n°13-22.430 
495 See Cour Cass. Ch. Soc., 19 Nov. 2015, n°14-13.833, n°14-14.084, n°14-15.518  
496 Cour Cass., Ch. Soc. 11 Septembre 2019, n°17-24.879 to 17-25.623 
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Regarding the application of the controversial Article L.230-3, the Court had to decide 
whether or not disregard for health and safety rules provided by an employer can be a reason to 
dismiss a worker. The Court makes a distinction between the degree and the impact of the 
disregard for the health and safety rules by a worker. For example, if a worker refuses to wear 
protective equipment provided by the employer for two days but then complies to the rules 
before the start of the dismissal procedure, then dismissing a senior worker is disproportionate 
and can be considered an unfair dismissal.497 However, when the behaviour of the worker is in 
contradiction of the health and safety rules and makes it impossible for the employer to maintain 
him in the company, the employer has no other choice but dismissal to protect the rest of the 
company’s workforce.498  
Interestingly, in some cases, the Social Chamber mentioned the Directive 89/391/EEC 
directly, either to contextualise the articles of the Labour Code introduced by the Law n°91-
1414, or as such.499 The Chamber did it in two particular situations, (i) in case of harcèlement 
moral500 and (ii) conditions to returning to work after a period of sick leave. Regarding the 
harcèlement moral, the Social Chamber extends the employers’ duty to ensure the safety and 
health of workers in every aspect related to the work, to the psychological aspect of health and 
the employers will be held responsible even if they do not commit the bullying themselves.501 
In this decision, the Social Chamber refers to the Directive to contextualise article L.230-2 and 
to give it a large application.502 However, the Social Chamber also use article L.230-2 
contextualised with the Directive to emphasise that there is no prejudice if there is not enough 
evidence of the bullying or if the employer did everything in his power to stop it.503  
The Social Chamber bases its decisions on article L.230-2 of the Labour Code with the 
Directive 89/391/EEC against workers’ dismissal for health reasons. Indeed, according to a 
continuous jurisprudence of the Court, the medical verification that the worker can restart 
 
 
497 Cour cass. Ch. Soc. 9 October 2002, n°00-44297; The worker has been employed by the company for the past 
22 years. 
498 Cour cass. Ch. Soc. 22 May 2002, n°99-45878 ; Cour cass. Ch. Soc. 24 Feb. 2004, n°01-47000 
499 For the use of the Directive 89/391/EEC as such, see details Cour Cass. Ch.Soc. 28 Jan. 2009, n°07-44.556 – 
regarding a case of leaving the workplace in case of serious danger 
500 The equivalent in the UK would be ‘workplace builling’, which is broader than ‘harassment’ as defined in the 
Equality Act 2010 
501 Cour Cass, 21 June 2006, n°05-43.914 
502 Same idea to protect the worker in Cour Cass, Ch Soc 27 Jan. 2009, n°07-43.257 ; Cour Cass. Ch. Soc. 9 
Jan.2008 n°06-46.043, Cour Cass. Ch.Soc., 25 March 2009, n°07-44.408 and Cour Cass, Ch. Soc. 2 Dec. 2009, 
n°08-44.969 
503 Cour Cass. Ch. Soc., 25 Feb. 2009 n°07.41.846, Cour Cass., Ch. Soc. 1 Jul. 2009 n°07-44.482 
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working after sick leave and the adaptation of the workstation are crucial illustrations of the 
Directive 89/391/EEC. Therefore, even if a worker is responsible for an accident at work, he 
cannot be dismissed if there have been no verification that he could do the job in the first 
place.504 For the Court, the employer did not respect his obligation of prevention by assigning 
task to the worker that was not conform with his capacities. Similarly, an employer cannot 
dismiss a worker for “incapacity to work” if he has not tried to adapt the workstation in the first 
place.505  
To conclude, the Social Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has been heavily using the 
articles of the Labour Code, which have been adopted to implement the Directive 89/391/EEC. 
The Social Chamber applies a broad understanding of EU OHS standards and uses it to extend 
the workers’ protections. Additionally, even if these concepts might have existed before, even 
decades after the implementation, the judges of the Social Chamber reminded the direct link 
and connection with the Directive 89/391/EEC.  
4.4. Challenges to the Foundations of the Legal Framework by Recent Reforms 
The legal framework described above has been working well for the past 30 years. It 
originally focused on prevention with the CHSWC as the health and safety workers’ 
representative institutions, the LIs to enforce the OHS standards, and the labour doctors to 
prevent OHS risks at the individual level. Each of these bodies was crucial for the proper 
functioning of the French OHS system. However, since the beginning of the 2010s, many 
reforms have challenged — not to say threatened — these core institutions, which provided 
stability to the French OHS system. 
First, occupational medicine506 is under enormous reformatory pressures. The role of 
occupational medicine is for prevention of the disease or injury only,507 and health examinations 
are mandatory for all workers regardless of their work-sector. Occupational doctors can and 
should be involved in health and safety training and improving accident prevention and general 
 
 
504 Cour cass. 28 Feb.2006 n°05-41.555, and Cour Cass., Ch.Soc. 13 Dec.2006 N°05-44.580 
505 Cour Cass. Ch.Soc. 5 Jul.2018, n°16-26.916 
506 Médecines du travail  
507 When a disease or an injury is noticed, the worker has to see a general doctor. 
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working conditions.508 Occupational medicine played a crucial role because occupational 
doctors determine if a worker is fit for work or not. After an important reform in 2011 with Law 
2011-867 (20th of July 2011)509 and two décrets510 (followed by another in 2016)511, another 
report was published on August 2018 by La République En Marche (LREM) MP Charlotte 
Lecoq. According to her, “the employers feel the OHS prevention as a compilation of duties 
they have to fulfil, and not like a way to achieve a better performance”.512 This statement can 
be placed in the more general context of political mistrust of OHS, which is considered to be 
an administrative burden in France, the UK, and at the European level. 
Secondly, Labour Inspectorate Authority was created in 1874 to control the application 
of the labour law standards in private companies, and its powers and functions expanded over 
time. Nowadays, LIs are in charge of controlling the legal, regulatory, and conventional labour 
standards.513 They look for infraction of the OHS rules and take action to stop risks, to advise 
and to mediate, and to make some decisions as to the organisation of the company.514 This 
means that the LIs have the general competency to control and enforce labour law, not only 
OHS. The French LIs have one of the broadest scopes of competency in Europe.515 This leads 
to a critical workload and means that not everything can be covered.516 The key to the success 
of this authority is to be autonomous, independent, and have some legitimate power of action. 
However, these fundamental concepts started to be challenged in 2006 and even most 
significantly in 2014 with the Décret Sapin517 and then the Ordonnance Macron.518  
The outcome of the reforms is that LIs cannot themselves decide to control the 
workplace as they want, and they can no longer take sanctions; they have to refer to the 
hierarchy first. Beyond the fact that these reforms raised some concerns regarding their 
 
 
508 Libert, B. and Yamada, Y., 1998. Occupational medicine in France: A perspective at the Fiftieth Anniversary 
of Medecine du Travail. Journal of Occupational Health, 40(1), p.91  
509 Relative à l’organisation de la médecine du travail  
510 Décret n°2014-798 du 11 Juillet, 2014, portant diverses dispositions relatives à la médecine du travail; Décret 
n°2014-799 du 11 Juillet 2014 portant diverses dispositions relatives à la médecine du travail.  
511 https://www.actuel-hse.fr/content/charlotte-lecocq-les-entreprises-vivent-la-prevention-comme-un-
empilement-dobligations 
 
513 Art. L 8112-1 et s. 
514 For example, an employer has to ask the labour inspectorate for authorisation before dismissing a workers’ 
representative (considered a “protected worker”).  
515 Des Inspecteurs Du.Travail, 2016. Où va l’inspection du travail?. Vie Sociale et traitements, n°129. p.70 
516 See Chapter 6 of this thesis p.179 
517 Décret n°2014-359 du 20 mars 2014 relatif à l’organisation du système d’inspection du travail  
518 Ordonnance n°2016-413 du 7 Avril 2016 relative au contrôle de l’application du droit du travail 
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conformity with Article 17 of the ILO Convention n°81, it deeply affected the autonomy of the 
LIs.519 Although the rights and duties of the workers and the employers have not formally 
changed, these reforms raised some concerns regarding the enforcement of the legal framework 
at the workplace. However, the most concerning reform, which was adopted in 2018, effected 
the CHSWC. 
Thirdly, the CHSWC was created in 1982 by Auroux and was mandatory for all 
workplaces with more than 50 workers. The CHSWC’s missions were to help protect 
employees’ health and safety and improve working conditions.520 A series of reforms began 
with the Rebsamen reform, which made the merging of the CHSWC, the Work Council, and 
the Délégué du Personnel into a single workers’ institution possible under specific 
conditions.521 The merging of these independent and autonomous bodies into a single institution 
was not optional since the adoption of the Ordonnances Macron, adopted 22 September 
2017.522 Now, in all companies that employ between 50 and 300 workers, it is mandatory to 
have a single workers’ representative council called the Comité Sociale et Economique (CSE). 
It is no longer possible to have a separate CHSWC even with a collective agreement. The only 
option available is to have a Commission santé, sécurité et condition de travail (CSSCT), but 
this is only possible for companies that employ more than 300 workers, and it must be framed 
with a collective agreement at the company level (i.e., accord d’entreprise). Moreover, even in 
that situation, the commission would still be under the authority of the CSE (the new version of 
the Work Council), sending the situation back to what it was before 1982. 
This reform was surprising considering that studies have proved the importance and 
effectiveness of the CHSWC, even stressing its significance for the entire French OHS 
framework. It was a strong, autonomous, and effective way for workers to represent their OHS 
interests.523 Some authors, like LeRouge, have raised concerns regarding the impact of this 
reform on the effectiveness of OHS in France.524 LeRouge expressed concern that the merging 
 
 
519 Des Inspecteurs Du.Travail, 2016. Où va l’inspection du travail?. Vie Scoiale et traitements, n°129. P.72 
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521 Art. 13 and 14 of the Loi n° 2015-994 du 17 Août 2015, relative au dialogue social et l'emploi  
522 An Ordonnance is a legal act signed by the president without being discussed by the Parliament.  
523 Verkindt P.Y., Le C.H.S.C.T. au milieu du gué. Rapport à Monsieur le Minsitre du travail de l’emploi, de la 
formation professionnelle et du dialogue social. 
524 See Lerouge, L., 2017. Quel avenir pour le rôle et les attributions du CHSCT dans la fusion des IRP: Dilution 
ou maintien? Noticias CIELO, (9), pp.1-5 
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of the institutional representative of workers would unbalance the collective relationship in 
health and safety. Indeed, considering that the responsibilities and functions of the previous 
three separate institutions are now one, the members might be overwhelmed by the new quantity 
of work.525 Therefore, some topics might be overlooked, and consultations on health and safety 
may no longer be a priority. Auroux himself shared this concern.526 
Additionally, there have been some concerns concerning the members of the new 
institution will have general knowledge and no specific knowledge on OSH. Indeed, the health 
and safety field is technical and requires specific knowledge and expertise. Thus, the workers 
might need extra help from external experts; this help will be possible but harder to obtain than 
previously. Indeed, even if the employer still covers some expertise expenses, the new CSE will 
now have to cover 20% of other costs. There is also now only one budget where before the 
separate institutions had three distinct funding frameworks. 
The independence of OHS matters will be thoroughly diluted considering that before, 
the CHSWC had its own legal persona and could sue an employer or start an action if necessary; 
now, even in the case of a CSSCT, the committee will need to obtain the approval of the CSE 
to initiate a judicial action. The problem is that the Work Council’s bargaining dynamic is to 
consider the economic aspect, which might overshadow the OHS interests in the agenda. 
LeRouge also highlights that the CHSWC used to be a pillar for working conditions and a 
“courroie de transmission” (“transmission belt”) between the shop floor and the management 
level. Having a single centralised workers’ institution might disconnect them from the OHS 
reality. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The study of the initial constructions of the OHS in France and the UK and the 
implementation of the Framework Directive in these two countries shows some similarities and 
differences in the influence that EU OHS might have on national OHS legal frameworks. First, 
there is a difference regarding the origin of the impulse to reform. In the UK, the impulse to 
reform was a political answer to the number of workplace accidents, whereas in France, it came 
 
 
525 see Guillas Cavan K., 2017.  Fusionner les instances representatives du personnel: une fausse bonne idée?, 
Institut de recherches économiques et sociales, Eclairages #006 pp.1-16 
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from workers’ protests supported by some TUs. In both cases, the 1970s was a period of change 
and reflection that was expressed in various reports. In the UK, only the Robens Report 
advocated for the development of a voluntary approach to OHS, arguing that the responsibility 
of taking action lies “with those who create the risks and those who work with them” (i.e., 
workers and the management or employer). 527 The report developed the idea of a general duty 
of prevention for the employer, as far as is reasonably practicable, and the fact that the workers 
are also responsible for their actions. The report also embodied the idea of communication 
between the workers and the employer on OHS with health and safety representatives. 
In France, there has been a series of reports underlining the importance of the human at 
the workplace and an approach to OHS with the development of humane working conditions. 
The idea is ostensibly the same: place the workers in the middle of the process and in charge of 
OHS at the workplace. In both cases, collective prevention was at the centre of the process, and 
both emphasised the importance of health and safety representatives. However, in the UK, it 
seems that the dynamic was more to make the workers responsible through the creation of 
duties, where in France, it was the recognition of a right of expression regarding working 
conditions. Indeed, in the UK and France, the period before 1989 was when both countries 
developed the basis of a national OHS framework: with the HSW Act 1974 in the UK 
(completed by the SRSC Reg 1977) and Auroux’s laws in France. Although the laws of both 
MS recognised the employer’s obligation to provide general prevention, the aspects regarding 
the obligation to provide information and consult with the workers’ or their representatives 
were slightly different. 
These well-developed legal frameworks set the background for the implementation of 
the Framework Directive in both France and the UK; however, the two MS did not welcome 
the implementation of the Directive in the same way. On one side, the UK estimated that it 
already had most of the principles of Directive 89/391/EEC in the HSW Act 1974 and reformed 
only what was strictly necessary. On the other side, although France already had a well-
developed OHS framework, the government took the opportunity of implementing Directive 
89/391/EEC to clarify and improve its legal framework. This difference in approach to 
implementation might be due to a difference of legal tradition as well as a political difference: 
 
 
527 Robens, A., 1972. Safety and health at work: report of the Committee, 1970-72 (Vol. 1). HM Stationery Office. 
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a Conservative Government implemented the directive in the UK, whereas a Socialist 
Government implemented the Directive in France. The positions of France and the UK were 
also different on a broader level regarding their relations with the EU.  
Nevertheless, we can conclude that after the implementation of the Framework 
Directive in France and the UK, there was a phenomenon of theoretical convergence; both 
countries had similar OHS standards, and both needed to reform their national legal frameworks 
to comply with the Directive. Interestingly, the UK had to develop the “workers’ rights” aspect, 
whereas France had to integrate the “workers duty” part — the point on which they initially 
diverged. A study of the jurisprudence in France and the UK shows that EU OHS standards 
have been used differently by the national courts. Additionally, although similar concepts exist 
in both countries, the methods of implementation and application are different (e.g., the 
obligation of consultation). This difference underlines a divergence in the practice of EU OHS 
standards. This observation shows the limits of the European influence on OHS; equivalent 
standards does not mean equal standards. The implementation of the Framework Directive in 
France and the UK well illustrates this point.528 
Finally, an examination of the recent reforms shows that there has been a tendency in 
both France and the UK not to reform the general principles— influenced by the EU directives, 
but to reform services, agencies, and bodies in charge of the functioning of the OHS framework 
(e.g., the Lis). The problem is that the laws adopted in the 1970s and 1980s relied on strong 
TUs with a fair balance of power in IR. In France and in the UK, there has been a decline in 
TUs, meaning that the legal framework may now be the only protection for workers, and it has 
to be applied by LIs (which is a national responsibility). Therefore, by reforming the LIs — and 
the CHSWC in France — there is a weakening of EU OHS standards due to their non-
application, even if they still legally exist. Considering that the likelihood of a new OHS 
directive at the EU level is low, it might be worth considering whether EU OHS standards can 
be improved by focusing on their application before the CJEU (Chapter 5) and enforcement by 
 
 
528 Both have a general obligation of prevention: one is conditional and concerns what is reasonably practicable; 
the other is more “absolute” and concerns the obligation of result. Both have an obligation of consultation on the 
working condition. In the UK, the obligation of consultation focuses on coordination with the health and safety 
representatives, whereas in France, the employer has to consult the CHSWC every time there is a change in 
working conditions. 
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LIs at the EU level (Chapter 6) to counteract the national tendencies, and to revitalise EU OHS 
concepts. 
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 CHAPTER 5  
Is Litigation Before the Court of Justice an Appropriate Path to Improve 
Occupational Health and Safety in the European Union? 
5.1. Introduction 
The OHS field is currently experiencing a period of double paralysis at the EU level. 
First, a legislative paralysis, illustrated by the lack of adoption of significant OHS directives 
between 2004 and 2014, when the directives were mainly adopted to revise or provide details 
on previous directives. Second, the paralysis of social dialogue with the latest EU OHS 
framework agreement adopted in 2009. This was a revision of the framework agreement on 
parental leave initially adopted in 1994. The result of this double paralysis is a stand-off position 
that can partly be explained by the political context. 
As described in a previous chapter, José Manuel Barroso, the head of the European 
Commission, led a “liberal turn” to the European orientation from 2004 to 2014, especially to 
the European social model.529 A key illustration of this change in orientation was the REFIT 
programme making “EU law simpler and less costly”.530 Until 2015, the goal was to reform and 
simplify the entire OHS EU legal framework. Therefore, up until now, it has been unlikely that 
the Commission will promote an agenda towards the expansion of the current OHS EU 
framework, either via the adoption of directives or by requiring social partners to start 
consultations. 531  This raises the question of whether the lack of commitment by public actors 
(i.e., the Commission) can and should be compensated by the actions of private actors (i.e., 
workers, TUs, and workers’ representatives). In a bid to ensure that individual cases are 
resolved in a manner that has a much wider impact than simply on the parties involved, could 
private actors usefully litigate their existing rights in the field of OHS standards before the 
CJEU? 
 
 
529 Ter Haar, B.P. and Copeland, P., 2010. What are the future prospects for the European social model? An 
analysis of EU equal opportunities and employment policy. European Law Journal, 16(3), pp.287-290; See 
Chapter 2 p.55 
530 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-
law-simpler-and-less-costly_en  
531 The dynamic might change in the future depending on the agenda and the actions of the new Van Der Leyen-
Commission.  
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Debates about the CJEU and the extent of its powers began in the 1980s and continue 
today. The first phase of the debate in the doctrine was to determine the level of autonomy of 
the Court and its relationship with the national court.532 The main focus was on the explanation 
and the scope of the doctrine of direct effect and the doctrine of supremacy. The role of the 
Court and its influence on European integration has also been raised.533 Two schools dominated 
the debate during the 9190s: neo-functionalism534 and intergovernmentalism.535 At the end of 
the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, the ideas of the two schools started to converge, and the 
debate shifted a bit.536 The independence and the impact of the Court were generally 
accepted,537 but it was regarded as subordinate to various factors; among them, national 
jurisdictions. 
From the start of the 2000s, new questions emerged in the debates. First, a clear 
distinction was made between the two procedures available before the Court: the preliminary 
ruling and the infringement procedure. While the infringement procedure is highly political and 
depends on the Commission’s “willingness” to sue MS, the preliminary ruling has significantly 
greater potential to affect the way European law is enforced and applied in MS. Thus, the 
importance of the national courts ceased to be questioned: they were recognised as being crucial 
to implementing the Court’s decisions and ruling in the national legal order. Indeed, due to its 
lack of administrative infrastructure, the effectiveness of the Court’s role in the enforcement of 
European law is contingent on the support of national judiciaries, and it may vary across 
national judicial cultures.538 However, the remaining question was why the national court 
should play according to the rules of the CJEU. It should be noted that not all courts have the 
same interest and incentive for applying the jurisprudence of the Court; for example, the lower 
national courts have a greater interest in bringing questions to the CJEU as a way of gaining a 
 
 
532 See Weiler, J.H., 1994. A quiet revolution: The European Court of Justice and its interlocutors. Comparative 
political studies, 26(4), pp.510-534; Golub, J., 1996. The politics of judicial discretion: Rethinking the interaction 
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534 See Burley, A.M. and Mattli, W., 1993. Europe before the Court: A political theory of legal 
integration. International Organization, 47(1), pp.41-76. 
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little independence from the higher national courts.539 For a long time, the higher national courts 
resisted the CJEU’s influence, but they are now theoretically forced to bring questions before 
the Court if requested. 540 
Moreover, the previous literature focused mainly on the two heads of the CJEU — 
infringement proceedings and preliminary rulings — the links between them, and their positions 
in the European legal system.541 Concerning the infringement procedures, some studies have 
analysed the evolution of commission activity over time.542 Some authors have attempted to 
explain this evolution as the inability of states to comply and state reluctance to conform. They 
have demonstrated that cross-national factors rather than national and individual aspects are 
responsible for non-compliance.543 Meanwhile, other studies have proposed hypotheses to 
understand the behaviour of the Commission and show that some connection can be drawn 
between the number and the nature of infringement proceedings and the political agenda of the 
Commission.544 
Regarding the preliminary rulings, debates concerned the ability of the Court to defend 
some general categories of rights, such as fundamental human rights545 and social rights. The 
debate then shifted to more precise fields. A small number of studies have been conducted to 
examine if the CJEU influenced the fields of non-discrimination law, disability rights, equal 
 
 
539 Alter, K.J., 1996. The European Court's political power. West European Politics, 19(3), p.466 
540 Article. 267 TFEU – “where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal or a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall 
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treatment (gender equality)546 or free movement.547 Additionally, research shows some 
connection between the two procedures and underlines that the Commission’s withdrawal from 
centralised enforcement led to an increase in private enforcement.548 However, few studies have 
investigated the CJEU’s influence in the specific field of the OHS, even if it is an important 
aspect of EU employment law. Moreover, the research that has been conducted only covers one 
part of the EU OHS scope: working time. 
This chapter seeks to address the question of whether or not, in a context of legal 
paralysis at the European level in the OHS field, litigation before the CJEU has the potential to 
improve workers’ occupational health and safety. The analysis proceeds as follows: the first 
section provides an overview of what has been done in terms of strategic litigation before the 
CJEU in the field of OHS in the form of infringement proceedings and preliminary rulings. 
Based on the CJEU’s database,549 an analysis of all of the Court’s decisions in which the main 
argument relied on one OHS directive confirms the politicised behaviour of the Commission to 
initiate infringement proceedings and the shift towards a decentralised channel to enforce EU 
OHS standards — with an argument based on individual rights for workers.550 
The second section of this chapter explores, from a more theoretical perspective, the 
hypothetical arguments that might be developed before the CJEU to expand the scope of the 
current OHS directives to new situations to compensate for the unlikelihood of the adoption of 
new directives. The section aims to show how it might be possible, under certain conditions, to 
develop the current OHS legal framework via a strategic litigation before the CJEU. To 
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illustrate this idea, this section raises the possibility of expanding the right to an adaptable 
workstation beyond the current scope of disability, based on Article 6.d of the Framework 
Directive, to cover the situation of injured or unwell workers returning to work after sick leave 
for occupational reasons. Currently, injured or unwell workers are excluded from the disability 
protection framework if the impairment cannot be qualified as “long-term”; therefore, their 
situations vary depending on the national legislation and approaches. Based on disability 
protection, the argument would be that the general obligation of employers to prevent OHS 
risks for their workers also applies when the workers are impaired, as prevention can prevent 
the impairment from becoming a long-term disability. One way would be to adapt the 
workstation when the workers return to work. However, this strategy has limits due to the 
admissibility test and the costs that represent such an action. Therefore, it is subsequently 
argued that such an idea can be developed before the CJEU only if Trade Unions take the 
initiative to raise such questions. 
An examination of the cases where TUs have been involved shows significant 
improvements in the application of the EU OHS framework; these examples underline that the 
TUs can and should be the actor in charge of initiating this kind of action. Of course, the 
ultimate limitation would be the philosophy of the CJEU, which can lead to a narrower 
understanding of the EU OHS framework rather than a broader one. Even if a favourable 
decision is held by the CJEU, there is no guarantee that the national courts will follow the 
recommendations of the CJEU. 
5.2. The CJEU as a witness to the Commission’s withdrawal of its responsibility 
for enforcing OHS and the shift towards increased responsibility of the individual 
It is true that the Commission justified its failure to adopt new directives by reasoning 
that priority and emphasis should be placed on the enforcement of the existing legal framework. 
The Barroso Commission emphasised its role as the “guardian of the Treaties” and the 
importance of appropriate and effective implementation of OHS directives by the MS.551 That 
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said, however, some studies show the arbitrary behaviour of the Commission in deciding when 
to start infringement proceedings.552 
One consequence of the Commission selecting cases is the (intentional or not) shift of 
the central enforcement (i.e., infringement proceedings) towards decentralised enforcement 
(i.e., preliminary rulings). Therefore, the primary aim of the analysis contained in this section 
is to consider the situation in terms of a balance between the centralised and decentralised way 
of applying and enforcing EU OHS standards before the CJEU. The second aim of this section 
is to highlight the impact of this shift on the CJEU’s jurisprudence dealing with the development 
of OHS in the EU. Therefore, the following analysis will be structured in two parts: first, the 
study of infringement proceedings and then preliminary rulings. 
5.2.1. The partial commitment of the Commission to enforcing OHS standards 
before the CJEU: A case study of the infringement proceedings 
The infringement procedure is a way for the Commission to control the way MS 
implement the EU directives. According to Art. 226 of the Treaty, infringement proceedings 
consists of three formal stages: the Commission’s initiation of a proceeding through a letter of 
formal notice, the Commission’s legal elaboration through a reasoned opinion, and the 
Commission’s referral of a case to the CJEU for a final decision. Considering the scope of this 
chapter, which focuses on the CJEU, only the last stage, involving the CJEU final decision, will 
be studied in what follows. 
The examination of the cases of infringement proceedings connected to OHS directives 
shows three aspects of the Commission’s behaviour as “guardian of the Treaties”. First, the 
evolution of the number of infringement decisions held by the CJEU might be an indication 
confirming the Commission’s arbitrary behaviour and the hypothesis of a link between the 
Commission’s policy agenda and the willingness to initiate an infringement proceeding against 
MS before the CJEU. Second, the analysis of the nature of the infringement proceeding — 
 
 
552 Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S., 2005. Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft 
law in the member states. Cambridge University Press. p.209 ; Kassim, H., Connolly, S., Dehousse, R., Rozenberg, 
O. and Bendjaballah, S., 2017. Managing the house: The presidency, agenda control and policy activism in the 
European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(5), p.666 
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either a substantive or a formal control — highlights either the lack of resources of the 
Commission, or the intention to sue the MS in a minimal way. 
5.2.1.1. The evolution of the number of Infringement Proceedings before the CJEU 
from 1984 to 2017 
Regarding the evolution of the number of infringement proceedings judged before the 
CJEU, some studies have shown that overall, the Commission initiates less and less formal 
infringement procedures over time.553 Hofmann observed that the number of court referrals 
reached its peak in 2006,554 but this number dropped considerably in 2017.555 For Hofmann, 
this decrease shows the first shift in the Commission’s approach to centralised enforcement.556 
For some authors, the willingness to bring some cases before the CJEU can be connected 
with the Commission’s agenda and should be understood in a broader strategic context.557 One 
study explicitly draws a connection between the decline in infringement proceedings and the 
restrained policy activism of the second Barroso Commission.558 Therefore, as underlined by 
Mbaye, an activist Commission may bring more cases before the Court, whereas a passive 
Commission may bring fewer cases,559 to the point where the infringement procedure is a 
“political tool at the Commission’s disposal”.560 
 
 
553 Hofmann, A., 2018. Is the Commission levelling the playing field? Rights enforcement in the European 
Union. Journal of European Integration, 40(6), pp.737-751 – However, the scope of this study was not limited to 
OHS. 
554 Ibid, p.739 - The Commission referred 254 infringement cases to the CJEU; dataset based on: Sweet, A. S., and 
T. L. Brunell. 2007. “The European Court and Enforcement Actions: Data Set with 
Codebook on Infringement Proceedings (Art. 226), 1958–2005. 
555 Ibid, p.739 - Only 41 cases 
556 Hofmann, A., 2018. Is the Commission levelling the playing field? Rights enforcement in the European 
Union. Journal of European Integration, 40(6), pp.739-740 
557 Steunenberg, B., 2010. Is Big Brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU 
directives. European Union Politics, 11(3), p.361; Audretsch, H.A., 1986. Supervision in European community 
law: Observance by the member states of their treaty obligations, a treatise on international and supra-national 
supervision. 2nd ed. North-Holland. p.35; Conant, L.J., 2002. Justice contained: law and politics in the European 
Union. Cornell University Press. pp.74-79; Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S., 2005. Complying 
with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the member states. Cambridge University Press. pp.219-221  
558 Kassim, H., Connolly, S., Dehousse, R., Rozenberg, O. and Bendjaballah, S., 2017. Managing the house: The 
presidency, agenda control and policy activism in the European Commission. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 24(5), p.666 
559 Mbaye, H.A., 2001. Why national states comply with supranational law: Explaining implementation 
infringements in the European Union, 1972-1993. European Union Politics, 2(3), pp.263-264 
560 Lenaerts, K. and Gutiérrez-Fons, J.A., 2011. The general system of EU environmental law 
enforcement. Yearbook of European Law, 30(1), p.4 
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In the OHS field, analysis of the infringement proceeding cases based on at least one of 
the OHS directives (Fig.2) shows an overall increase in the activity from 1995, peaking in 2004 
and then exhibiting a general decrease.561 There may be a plausible reason for the increase in 
activity from 1995. First, the adoption of Directive 89/391/EEC was a turning point in the EU 
OHS development; as explained previously, there were not many earlier OHS directives, and 
the nature of these directives made it challenging to enforce any rights before the CJEU. 
Additionally, the Framework Directive and the individual directives were followed by a period 
of implementation at the national level, meaning a difference of a few years between the 
adoption of EU OHS Directives and the moment when their implementations were suitable for 
an investigation by the Commission. These two elements might explain the low number of 
infringement proceedings before 1995. However, the increase beginning in 1995 and the 
decrease beginning in 2004 might have a different explanation, which goes beyond technical 
and legislative timing. 
The hypothesis is that the variation in the number of infringement proceedings cases 
can be linked to the OHS agendas of different European commissions. Three distinct stages are 
observable in Figure 2: (1) before 1995,562 (2) between 1995 and 2004,563 and (3) from 2004 
onward.564 When these periods are compared with the mandates of the different commissions, 
it is possible to draw some connections with the Commissions’ OHS agendas. Similar to what 
 
 
561 Observe the similar pattern between OHS and the overall picture with Fig. 2 of Hofmann, A., 2018. Is the 
Commission levelling the playing field? Rights enforcement in the European Union. Journal of European 
Integration, 40(6), pp.737-751. 
562 The time period corresponds to the Delors Commission 
563 The time period corresponds to the Santers, Marin, and Prodi Commissions 
564 The time period corresponds to the Barosso and Junker Commissions 
Figure 5- The number of infringement proceedings before the CJEU in OHS (1984-2017) 
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has been noticed by Kassim et al., the decrease in infringement proceedings noticeable from 
2004 corresponds to the nomination of Barroso as the president of the Commission. 565  As 
mentioned in a previous chapter, the Barroso Commissions prioritised flexibility and industry 
self-regulation to restart the competitiveness of companies, which led to characterising social 
rights, such as OHS, as a “burden”.566 The Barroso Commission published the “better 
regulation” strategy in the mid-2000s, which partially focused on simplifying the OHS 
directives and advocated for the simplification of the older provisions.567 
Meanwhile, the Barosso Commissions published two health and safety strategies568 that 
were criticised for their lack of clarity and pragmatism.569 Paradoxically, the Barosso 
Commission emphasised its role as “guardian of the Treaties” and said that it would not hesitate 
to sue MS that did not implement the OHS directives effectively. Based on the decline of the 
number of infringement proceedings, one might doubt the commitment of the Commission to 
control the implementation of the directives by MS. As for the periods before, it has been shown 
that most of the existing EU OHS directives were adopted under the Delors Commissions. As 
explained above, the time before 1995 corresponded with the implementation phase of these 
directives. Therefore, there have been no, or only a few, infringement proceedings because 
there was nothing to control while the MS were implementing the directives. 
Under the Prodi and the Santers Commissions, the emphasis was on non-legislative 
measures and resistance towards legislative procedures.570 This might be the reason for a 
relatively small increase from 1995. It is necessary to wait for the appointment of the Prodi 
Commission571 to notice a real increase in infringement proceedings. As mentioned in a 
previous chapter, the Prodi Commission re-centred its OHS action around the Framework 
Directive, which can also explain the motivation to control the implementation of the existing 
 
 
565 Kassim, H., Connolly, S., Dehousse, R., Rozenberg, O. and Bendjaballah, S., 2017. Managing the house: The 
presidency, agenda control and policy activism in the European Commission. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 24(5), p.666 
566 Vogel, L. 2010. Barroso I: A 5-year standstill on health and safety at work. HesaMag 2. pp.6-9 
567 See Vogel, L. and Van den Abeele, E., 2010. Better Regulation: a critical assessment. ETUI; Van den Abeele, 
E., 2010. The European Union's Better Regulation Agenda. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute. 
568 Improving quality and productivity at work: Community strategy 2007-2012 on health and safety at work, 
COM(2007) 62 final of 21.02.2007; EU Strategic Framework on Health and Safety at Work 2014-2020, 
COM(2014) 332 final of 06.06.2014 
569Del Castillo, A.P., 2016. Occupational safety and health in the EU: back to basics. Social policy in the European 
Union: state of play 2016, pp.141-146 
570 See Chapter 2, pp.46-49  
571 Between 1999 and 2004 
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legal framework.572 Therefore, this analysis possibly confirms that the political willingness of 
the Commission to enforce and ensure effective transposition of the directive before the CJEU 
shall be understood within a broader context of the Commission’s political agenda. The official 
agenda should also be considered in the context of the OHS field and influence the behaviour 
of the Commission in its action of infringement proceedings before the CJEU. 
5.2.1.2. The evolution of the nature of the control of the Commission before the CJEU 
from 1986 to 2017  
A close examination of the focus of the infringement proceeding gives complementary 
indications regarding the nature of the control of the Commission over the years. Previous 
studies have shown that a majority of infringement proceedings are due to non-notification (i.e., 
notification of the report of transposition if the directive in the national legal system by the MS 
to the Commission) of the MS rather than incorrect notification, resulting in the incorrect 
implementation of the directives into the national legal system.573 The authors explained this 
difference by arguing that the Commission’s resources determine its enforcement policy. 
Indeed, control of the notification by the MS can easily be achieved with a binary approach: 
has the MS notified the Commission or not? However, determining if an MS has correctly 
implemented the directive requires more resources, time, and expertise, and is more demanding 
of the Commission.574 
Other studies have also noticed that the Commission’s limited resources have an 
important impact on the limited number of infringements cases and prevent the Commission 
from adopting a systemic approach.575 Under these circumstances, the actual interventions are 
determined by the political preferences and agendas of the Commission.576 There are three 
consequences of this non-systemic approach: (1) it encourages bargaining between the 
 
 
572 See Chapter 2, pp.45-46 
573 Two-thirds of the infringement procedures studied dealt with non-notification according to Falkner, G., Treib, 
O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S., 2005. Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the member 
states. Cambridge University Press. p.220 
574 Ibid. p.202 
575 Steunenberg, B., 2010. Is Big Brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU 
directives. European Union Politics, 11(3), p.371 ; Tallberg, J., 2002. Paths to compliance: Enforcement, 
management, and the European Union. International organization, 56(3), p.626 
576 Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S., 2005. Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft 
law in the member states. Cambridge University Press. p.219 
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Commission and the MS to avoid going before the CJEU577 and is a less formal method of 
enforcement;578 (2) because the Commission may act strategically when selecting cases that are 
to go before the ECJ,579 the Commission may be less regarding about the way in which the MS 
implement the directives;580 (3) it creates a shift towards “domestic enforcement” and the 
development of preliminary rulings. 
 
In the OHS field, the evolution of control of the notification by the MS (i.e., control of 
the implementation timeline; Fig. 3) follows the general evolution of the number of 
infringement proceedings (Fig. 2). This shows that most of the Commission’s activity has 
revolved around the control of the delay in notifications by the MS.581 So far, the Commission 
has won all cases focusing on the notification period before the CJEU. The Court based its 
decisions on two main principles. First, the consideration for the appreciation of 
 
 
577 Tallberg, J., 2002. Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International 
Organization, 56(3), p.617 
578 See Hartlapp, M., 2008. Extended governance: Implementation of EU social policy in the member 
states. Innovative Governance in the European Union: The Politics of Multilevel Policymaking, pp.221-236. ; Van 
Voorst, S. and Mastenbroek, E., 2017. Enforcement tool or strategic instrument? The initiation of ex-post 
legislative evaluations by the European Commission. European Union Politics, 18(4), pp.640-657. 
579 Mbaye, H.A., 2001. Why national states comply with supranational law: Explaining implementation 
infringements in the European Union, 1972-1993. European Union Politics, 2(3), p.268 
580 Steunenberg, B., 2010. Is Big Brother watching? Commission oversight of the national implementation of EU 
directives. European Union Politics, 11(3), p.372 
581 It represents 68% of the infringement proceeding related to OHS directives; it confirms finding Tallberg, J., 
2002. Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International 
Organization, 56(3), p.625 
Figure 6 - The topic of infringement proceedings (1986-2017) 
  
 
145 
implementation or lack of implementation of the EU OHS in the national legal system means 
the situation at the end of the delay mentioned in the reasoned opinion, and subsequent 
modifications will not be taken into consideration.582 Thus, it does not matter if a national 
parliament is debating implementation at the moment of the Court’s decision; it is too late. The 
second principle on which the Court bases its decision is that an MS cannot justify the non-
implementation of EU directives by the structure of its internal organisation, such as 
federalism.583 
Meanwhile, a minor but meaningful part of the infringement proceeding controls the 
content of national implementation.584 The Commission has won 66% of the cases. On the 
occasions when the Commission has lost, the CJEU based its decisions on two arguments to 
reject the Commission’s claims. The first argument of the Court was to favour a flexible, 
“national friendly” understanding of EU OHS Directives, in opposition to a more restricted 
vision by the Commission. This was the case with the measures to select the health and safety 
representatives, where the Commission advocated for a detailed national law to frame the 
election process of these representatives.585 According to the Court, Directive 89/391/EEC does 
not contain any obligation for MS to organise the election of workers’ representatives in a 
particular way orientated towards the protection of OHS. There are various mechanisms to 
appoint these representatives, and the choice belongs to the MS. 
A similar idea is illustrated by one judgement of the Court that had an impact on the 
entire EU OHS field by providing details on the nature of the employer’s responsibility in the 
context of Directive 89/391/EEC and subsequent related directives. Indeed, in the case C-
127/05,586 the Commission defended a narrow interpretation of the employer’s responsibility 
that could be considered a “result obligation”,587 where the employer would have the strict 
obligation to keep his or her employees safe. This means that if there is an accident, or if an 
 
 
582 “It is settled law that the question whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined 
by reference to the situation in the Member State as it stood at the end of the period laid down in the reasoned 
opinion, and that the Court cannot take account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, C-361/95 Commission 
of the European Communities  v Spain [1997] ECR I-7351, paragraph 13)”. 
583 “ Par ailleurs, la Cour a itérativement jugé qu’un État membre ne saurait exciper de dispositions, de pratiques 
ou de situations de son ordre juridique interne, y compris celles découlant de son organisation fédérale, pour 
justifier l’inobservation des obligations et des délais prescrits par une directive”. 
584 It represents 32% of the infringement proceeding related to OHS directives. 
585 C-425/01, Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic. ECR 2003 I-06025 
586 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (2007) 
ECR I-04619 
587 Obligation de résultat 
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employee contracts an occupational disease, the employer is held responsible unless there is 
proof of the worker’s fault and responsibility. This vision is opposed to the obligation for the 
employer to prevent the risks when it is “reasonably practicable”,588 where the employer has 
to organise the prevention of the risks insofar as it is reasonably possible to do so. This means 
that if there is an accident, or if an employee contracts an occupational disease, employers will 
not be held responsible if they did their best. The Court determined that the directive provides 
only a general duty of employers to ensure the safety and health of workers, without detailing 
anything about the nature or the form of the responsibility. Consequently, as long as the MS 
implement the general obligation, they are free to choose the measures that suit them best. 
The Court commonly used a second argument when it surmised that the Commission 
did not demonstrate that the national laws implementing the directive were contrary to the EU 
legal order and sometimes did not establish the existence of a practice contrary to the 
directive.589 Cases where the Commission won involved the intervention of the Commission 
when the laws implementing the directives were not clear or detailed enough to ensure the full 
applicability of EU OHS standards.590 The action of the Commission before the Court led to 
improvements in terms of the scope of application of the OHS directives and ensured a general 
application regardless of the sector,591 the number of workers,592 and gender.593 It also led to a 
change of practices in the employment relationship concerning the application of working time 
and the guarantee that workers could benefit from their time and day off.594 This shows that 
some substantial improvements have been made through the Commission’s actions. 
However, the Commission’s commitment to controlling the implementation of the EU 
directives is limited. Considering the number of directives and the number of MS, it is 
surprising that national measures wrongly implemented EU OHS Directives in only twenty-
 
 
588 HSW Act 1974, s.2 
589C-188/84 ; C-428/04 ; C-459/04 ; C-252/13 ; C-87/14  
590 For the implementation of Directive 89/391/EEC, concerning the risk assessment see cases C-49/00 and C-
5/00, and for the hierarchy of the employer’s duties, see cases C-49/00 and C-428/04; for the implementation of 
Directive 85/501/EEC, see cases C-190/90 and C-336/97; for the implementation of Directive 96/82, see case C-
392/08; for the implementation of Directive 90/270, see case C-455/00.  
591 For the application of Directive 89/391/EEC, see cases C-226/06, C-132/04 and C-428/04; for the application 
of Directive 2003/88, see case C-180/14; for the application of Directive 86/686/EEC, see case C-103/01. 
592 For the application of Directive 89/391/EEC, see cases C-5/00 and C-428/04; For the application of Directive 
92/57, see case C-504/06. 
593 For the application of Directive 76/207/EEC, see case C-203/03. 
594 For the application of Directive 93/104/EEC, see case C-484/04  
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two cases.595 Although the decisions before the CJEU represent only the last stage of the 
infringement proceedings and most of the cases never reach the CJEU,596 the existing cases for 
incorrect implementation of EU OHS standards represent only 2,6% of all possible cases.597 
Without advocating for action by all MS on all the OHS directives, we may question whether 
the Commission is appropriately investigating the content of the national implementation laws 
according to its role as “guardian of the Treaty”. 
5.2.1.3. Conclusion  
To conclude, analysis of the evolution of the number of infringement proceedings cases 
relating to OHS confirms conclusions drawn in the literature which suggest that the political 
willingness of the Commission to enforce and ensure proper transposition of the OHS directive 
before the CJEU should be understood within a broader context and that the official 
Commission’s agenda should be considered. Additionally, the examination of the focus and the 
nature of the control of the Commissions also confirms that most of the Commission’s activity 
revolved around the control of the delay of transpositions. Only a minority of cases concerned 
the nature of the implementation. Further investigations would be required to link these results 
to the question of the Commission’s resources to conduct such actions, but it might be a 
plausible explanation. These results also support the hypothesis that the Commission acted to 
encourage the decentralisation of enforcement of OHS directive, i.e. via preliminary rulings. 
Overall, the analysis of the infringement proceeding in the OHS field shows a weakness of the 
Commission when it comes to the enforcement of EU OHS standards. It is unlikely that the 
Commission will change its approach in the coming years. Therefore, preliminary rulings 
should be considered further as a suitable alternative method to enforce and apply EU OHS 
standards. 
 
 
595 If we take in consideration that there are 30 European OSH directives, and 28 member states; it means that 
there are 840 possible controls of the implementation of the EU OHS directives. Therefore 22 cases of infringement 
proceeding represent 2.6% of these opportunities, and 65 cases of infringement proceeding represent 7.7% of the 
opportunities.  
596 Mbaye, H.A., 2001. Why national states comply with supranational law: Explaining implementation 
infringements in the European Union, 1972-1993. European Union Politics, 2(3), p.267 
597 This study only looks at the judgement by the ECJ, not the referral to the ECJ, the reasoned opinion or the 
Letter of Formal Notice — as shown in Falkner, G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S., 2005. Complying with 
Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the member states. Cambridge University Press. p.209, the judgement 
by the ECJ represent only a small percentage of the infringement procedures initiated by the Commission  
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5.2.2. Preliminary rulings as a last resort to effectively enforce EU OHS 
standards 
According to Art. 267(2) TFEU, the CJEU has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning the interpretation of the Treaties and the validity and interpretation of acts by 
institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union — including directives. As early as 1963, 
the Court in Van Gen and Loos598 ruled that the rights conferred directly on the individuals 
should be protected and enforced even against the interests of their own state.599 
The preliminary ruling is considered to be a pillar of the Community legal order,600  
central to the legal integration of Europe because it allows national courts to enforce EU law 
over national law.601 Indeed, the most important legal decisions of the Court have been made 
in preliminary ruling proceedings.602 In contrast to infringement proceedings, in cases of 
preliminary rulings, the costs of supervision rely on individuals and national courts. According 
to Tallberg, it is a way for individuals to secure their rights under EU law more directly and 
with a higher chance of judgements being respected compared to infringement proceedings.603 
An examination of all preliminary rulings concerning OHS directives reveals three 
points of interest. First, the evolution in the number of preliminary rulings heard by the CJEU 
might provide some indication confirming a shift from a centralised to a decentralised method 
of enforcing EU OHS standards. Second, the analysis of the nature of the preliminary rulings 
confirms that OHS claims are based on individual rights provided by the directives, which are 
few in number given the reflexive nature of OHS directives. Finally, an examination of the 
origins of the referrals for a preliminary ruling shows interesting differences among the MS, 
with some countries being more active than others. 
 
 
598 Case 26/62  
599 Woodworth, R.L., 1966. The Court of Justice of the European Communities: The Request for a Preliminary 
Ruling and the Protection of Individual Rights Under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome. Syracuse L. Rev., 18, 
p.604 
600 Dauses, M.A., 1986. Practical considerations regarding the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 of 
the EEC Treaty. Fordham Int'l LJ, 10, p.539 
601 Carrubba, C.J. and Murrah, L., 2005. Legal integration and use of the preliminary ruling process in the European 
Union. International Organization, 59(2), p.399 
602 Dauses, M.A., 1986. Practical considerations regarding the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 of 
the EEC Treaty. Fordham Int'l LJ, 10, p.539 
603 Tallberg, J., 2002. Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International 
Organization, 56(3), p.622 
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5.2.2.1. The evolution of the number of Preliminary Rulings before the CJEU from 1984 
to 2017 
The intensity of litigation related to OHS before the CJEU related to OHS changed 
considerably over time.604 According to Hofmann, the number of private rights claims with 
preliminary references before the CJEU reached a new record in 2017, with 533 newly 
registered cases.605 Hofmann observes that references for preliminary rulings now make up 
almost three-quarters of the CJEU’s caseload. For him, there is a clear connection between the 
increasing number of preliminary rulings and the decreasing number of infringement 
proceedings by the Commission. Therefore, private enforcement can be seen as a potential 
substitute for infringement proceedings: in effect, a form of de-centralised infringement 
procedure. 
In OHS, although there is confirmation of an increase, it is certainly not of the same 
degree as the global trend observed by Hofmann. There is indeed an increase from 1995 
onward; however, the most plausible explanation is the increase in the quantity and significance 
of EU legislation dealing with OHS. As emphasised previously, before Directive 89/391/EEC, 
 
 
604 See Figure 7. 
605 Hofmann, A., 2018. Is the Commission levelling the playing field? Rights enforcement in the European 
Union. Journal of European Integration, 40(6), p.741 
Figure 7 - The number of preliminary rulings compared to infringement proceedings before the CJEU on OHS (1984-2017- 
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there were only a few OHS directives, which had a limited impact.606 Although the directives 
were mandatory, they only provided recommended thresholds of limit values on occupational 
exposure to chemical substances. Therefore, their enforcement before the courts was rare. The 
European legislative activity related to OHS increased after the adoption of Directive 
89/391/EEC. Most of the current EU OHS Directives were adopted between 1992 and 1996. 
Additionally, we must also consider the time required for the directives to be transposed 
into the national legal orders, to confer rights to workers, and to be challenged before the 
national courts. Only thereafter was it possible to require the opinion of the CJEU. Thus, as for 
the infringement proceedings, the delay and the start of the litigation activity only from 1995 
onwards. However, contrary to the infringement proceedings, there was an overall increase in 
the use of preliminary rulings — despite the variations from one year to another. According to 
Fig. 4, from 2009, the number of preliminary rulings becomes more important than the number 
of infringement proceedings. Of course, the two procedures are different, but it might illustrate, 
to a certain extent, the shift from a centralised to a decentralised method of controlling the 
application of the EU legal framework in the OHS field. 
5.2.2.2. The nature of Preliminary Rulings before the CJEU  
 
 
606 See Chapter 2, pp.27-32 
Figure 8 - The topic of preliminary rulings cases 
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Following the nature of preliminary ruling claims before the CJEU, analysis of the 
subjects brought before the Court is an essential key element to understanding the current trends 
in litigation. According to Fig. 5, three areas stand out in the OHS field: working time, equal 
treatment, and pregnant workers.607 The equal treatment directive608 has been used to protect 
pregnant workers either before the enforcement of the pregnancy directive609,610 or as a 
complement to it.611 A similar combination between directives can be seen with the directive 
for equal opportunities at work612 and the directive on pregnant workers.613 Therefore, the main 
subjects about which an action has been brought before the CJEU are working time directives 
and pregnant workers directives. These two fields differ from the rest of the EU OHS Directives 
in that they provide individual rights to workers and offering a resolution of cases with 
monetary compensation. Other OHS directives embody some individual rights, such as the 
directives on parental leave,614 working with display and screen equipment,615 and the risks 
related to noise.616 The cases based on these directives do not represent a majority of the cases; 
however, when they are challenged before the CJEU, the large majority is through a preliminary 
ruling action. This suggests that they present a potential for further actions in the future. 
The other fields where the preliminary rulings are less prevalent and where infringement 
proceedings are more common, cover directives in which there are no individual rights and 
mostly consist of obligations of the employer, the project supervisor, the operator, or the MS 
directly. Additionally, the OHS directives that have not led to preliminary rulings are mostly 
 
 
607 Interestingly, these two topics have also been highlighted in a study focusing on infringement proceedings. The 
authors suggested that these directives raised conflict between the supranational and the national level. See Falkner, 
G., Treib, O., Hartlapp, M. and Leiber, S., 2005. Complying with Europe: EU harmonisation and soft law in the 
member states. Cambridge University Press. p.210  
608 And particularly, Directive 76/207/EEC 
609 Directive 92/85/EEC 
610 C-179/88, Birthe Vibeke Hertz vs. Aldi Marked K/S; C-421/92, Gabriele Habermann – Beltermann vs. 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb./ Opf.e.V 
611 C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb vs. EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd; C-400/95, Helle Elisabeth Larsson vs. Føtex 
Supermarked A/S; C-394/96, Mary Brow vs. Rentokil Ltd; C-66/96, Berit Høj Pedersen & Kvickly Skive vs. 
Bettina Andersen, Jørgen Bagner vs. Tina Pedersen, Jørgen Rasmissen vs. Pia Sørensen & Hvitfledt Guld of Sølv 
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directives that can be considered reflexive law. It has been argued that the theory of reflexive 
law has consequences on regulatory design and implies a shift from substantive to procedural 
law.617 Thus, it encourages the self-regulation mechanism, which is the aim of most of the OHS 
directives. Therefore, much freedom in the method of application is given to the MS and the 
industrial partners. Hence, it is not suitable for preliminary ruling actions, or it is harder to prove 
the non-compliance of national rules with the EU legal requirements. 
These observations might confirm the hypothesis that some rights and OHS provisions 
are more suitable than others to be the object of an action before the courts, either national or 
European. This does not mean that the European obligations regarding OHS are not 
enforceable, but that the CJEU might not be the appropriate channel for it. Therefore, the 
improvement of workers’ OHS would have to be developed through these individual rights, 
rather than the enforcement of organisational obligations. 
5.2.2.3. The variations of the Member States’ willingness to ask the CJEU via 
Preliminary Rulings 
Regarding the variation of preliminary rulings depending on the country, Carrubba and 
Murrah noticed an overall increase in the number of preliminary references over three 
decades.618 They underlined that this overall increase is not uniform among the MS. They raise 
a series of hypotheses to explain the differences between the MS, including the variation in 
transnational economic activity, variation in legal culture, variation in legal doctrine (i.e., 
monism vs dualism), variation in public support for integration, and variation in political 
information.619 Additionally, another study also noticed the activity in terms of preliminary 
rulings varies among the MS; they argue that the difference might be due to the resources of 
the institution and that courts in bigger and highly judicialized countries send more references 
to the CJEU.620 
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Regarding the difference among countries’ use of preliminary rulings before the Court 
in OHS cases, three countries stand out: Spain, Germany, and the UK. The current study does 
not provide any explanation for their behaviour but raises hypotheses that could be verified by 
additional studies. There are two main hypotheses: first, that the socio-cultural background of 
MS influences their willingness to ask questions of the CJEU. Indeed, some comparative 
research has proven that there are differences in the frequency of preliminary references 
originating from courts in MS.621 For example, the authors of the study have shown that judges 
in majoritarian democracy (e.g., Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the UK) countries seem to be 
less willing to challenge the national laws adopted according to a democratic process and to 
submit to the control of European judges that have not been elected.622 On the other side, judges 
from constitutional democracy are more willing to refer questions to the CJEU.623 This theory 
applies partially here; Spain, Germany, and Italy are indeed more active than Sweden, Finland, 
and Denmark (see Fig. 6). However, this does not explain why this path is not the same for 
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Figure 9 - Member States with courts referring to the CJEU with preliminary questions 
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other countries, such as Portugal or Austria. This point requires further investigation on the 
number of times a national court is asked to communicate a question to the CJEU (related to 
OHS), and the reactions of the courts depending on the MS. Further study would allow the 
habits of preliminary ruling processes across the EU to be mapped. 
Second, the differences between the countries might be due to national interest — or 
lack of interest — in bringing OHS issues before the courts in general. This depends on the 
willingness of the parties to bring the case at a European level. Indeed, these procedures require 
more preparation, financial resources, and time. All the differences cannot be explained in this 
chapter; however, it is essential to know that they exist, as they should be taken into 
consideration when developing potential proposals for a litigation strategy based on the EU 
OHS legal framework. These proposals will not find the same application all over Europe and 
will need to be adapted depending on the national context. Moreover, further studies need to be 
done on the importance given to OHS at the national level and if it is a matter that is contested 
before the courts. 
5.2.2.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, the analysis of the evolution in the number of preliminary rulings 
concerning OHS directives confirms the previous literature on a shift from a centralised to a 
decentralised method of controlling the implementation and ensuring the correct application of 
EU OHS standards. Additionally, a close examination of the topics of the argument affirms that 
to be possible and successful, these claims have to be based on rights granted individually to 
workers, which is rare in OHS given the reflexive nature of the provisions embodied in the 
directives. Finally, the information on the MS in which the claims originate shows that at the 
national level, either the courts are not equally willing to request the opinion of the CJEU 
regarding the national laws or the workers are not willing to challenge their OHS rights before 
the courts. However, this demonstrates that the use of preliminary rulings and requests might 
be a suitable way to ensure the correct application of EU OHS standards in cases concerning 
individual workers’ rights. 
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5.2.3. The potential limits of future litigation before the CJEU as a strategy to 
develop OHS 
The results discussed above provide an overall picture of the situation, and some 
hypotheses were proposed to explain it; however, it is important to acknowledge the limitations 
of the method used and the need for further investigations. In this respect, it is important to 
clarify precisely what this section did and did not do. It looked at CJEU jurisprudence, where 
an OHS directive is mentioned as the source of the legal argument. It did not look at national 
jurisprudence where an OHS directive has been mentioned as the basis of the legal argument 
without raising a question before the CJEU. A study of this kind would be necessary to make 
the distinction between two situations: (1) when national courts do not refer at all to EU OHS 
Directives (which can express a rejection of the European legal activity in that field), and (2) 
when national courts do refer to EU OHS Directives but do not raise question (which can 
express a recognition of the EU OHS legal action but a refusal to challenge the national law 
adopted through a democratic process with the opinion of non-elected European judges). At the 
same time, this study examined the preliminary ruling requests that got through the 
admissibility test. It did not examine those requests that were found to be inadmissible. It would 
be interesting to study these numbers and the reasons for rejection. This would provide data 
that could illustrate the difference between legal apathy at the national level regarding EU OHS 
Directives and a silent dynamic that is stifled by the procedural rules. 
It is also important to relativize and be aware of the limits of the CJEU’s powers for the 
cases mentioned connected to OHS and in general. Indeed, some authors have underlined the 
importance of the national context in connection with the CJEU rulings and the influence of the 
MS.624 Additionally, it is fundamental to remember that the CJEU has the power that the 
national courts give it.625 Indeed, only the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty of the EU law is 
binding, but this is not the case for the opinions on particular cases, which represent most of 
the OSH preliminary rulings.626 Thus, the effectiveness of a decision of the Court depends on 
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the support of the national judges and authorities, and it might vary considerably from MS to 
MS.627 In the current context of mistrust towards European institutions, at a time where 
nationalist parties are gaining power in the European Union, it is important for the Court to “be 
aware that the ultimate success of EU law depends on national judicial support, and that 
excessive bossiness and doctrinal overreach could be counterproductive”.628 Thus, the 
challenge involved in developing further litigation before the CJEU is to find legal provisions 
that the CJEU can expand and apply and that the national jurisdictions and MS will accept. 
5.3. Developing the Protection of Workers’ OHS Before the CJEU Through 
Preliminary Proceedings 
Based on the previous section, a pattern for successful cases may be discerned. Despite 
important successes before the Court, it is possible to highlight situations that have not yet been 
challenged via preliminary rulings, such as the protection of workers in case of occupational 
disease or workplace accident. Given that the situation of the workers affected by disease or a 
workplace accident has only been examined through the lens of non-discrimination and the 
concept of disability, at the EU level, individuals who suffer from limited impairment are 
excluded from the protective scope of Directive 2000/78/EC, such as art.5. 
Throughout its jurisprudence, the CJEU has defined disability as a long-term limitation 
that results from physical, mental, or psychological impairment and hinders participation in 
professional life. However, this definition does not cover workers suffering from impairment 
at the early stage of the limitation. To address this legal gap, the current study investigates if 
there are legal provisions in the existing framework that can apply to injured or unwell workers 
returning to work after a workplace accident or an occupational disease, and how these 
provisions can be structured in the context of a strategic litigation before the CJEU. As 
underlined by Alter and Vargas, litigation at EU level offers advantages that a domestic legal 
strategy does not offer. The preliminary ruling process creates a way to avoid opposition at the 
national level while allowing strategic litigation to succeed with the support of only a few lower 
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level courts.629 Developing an argument for a European legal strategy before the CJEU would 
also have the advantage of having a very broad impact with one successful ruling. 
The aim of this section — using the example of injured or unwell workers — it to 
explore the possibilities to expand the boundaries of the existing EU OHS law before the CJEU 
to cover new aspects of workers’ OHS protection. It begins by reviewing the current European 
legislative framework and jurisprudence regarding the adaptation of the workplace of disabled 
workers. This overview highlights the restrictive approach of the concept of disability and why 
injured or unwell workers are not covered – at least at the early stage. The reason is that 
currently, the origin of the disability is not taken into consideration; only the effect is analysed. 
This approach is challenged on the basis that the origin of the impairment is important because 
it is the employer’s responsibility under the Directive 89/391/EEC to prevent the risk to the 
health and safety of the workers. Therefore, if the worker is injured or unwell due to their work, 
the employer should prevent any further deterioration due to the worker’s conditions. 
This section investigates the possibility of an extensive application of the obligation of 
prevention under Article 6.2.d. of Directive 89/391/EEC. The first conclusion is that while the 
jurisprudence on disability at work does not provide workers with appropriate protection at the 
early stage of impairment, by focusing on the occupational origin of the impairment, it is 
possible to develop a complementary litigation strategy advocating for an injured or unwell  
individual’s right of workplace adaptation before the CJEU based on Directive 89/391/EEC. 
This hypothetical argument provides an example of a situation or legal question on which the 
CJEU could give an opinion that would contribute to the improvement of the EU OHS legal 
framework. Indeed, if the CJEU recognises that not having a right of adaptation of the 
workstation for injured or unwell workers is contrary to the Framework Directive and the 
obligation of prevention, this decision would have an impact on all the national jurisdictions of 
the MS. However, this argument has limits and some elements need to be taken into 
consideration. One of them is the cost that action before the CJEU represents. Therefore, in a 
second part, this section reviews the previous action of TUs in the development of the 
application of OHS standards before the CJEU to assess whether they are suitable actors to 
coordinate or support such litigation in the future. In a third and last section, more theoretical 
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considerations regarding the feasibility of raising such a question before the CJEU are 
addressed, i.e., the role of the national judges in the preliminary ruling process, and the power 
of the CJEU as a “law-maker”.  
5.3.1. The right to reasonable accommodation in the workplace: A case study of 
disability jurisprudence 
5.3.1.1. The current state of the CJEU jurisprudence: Disability and illness 
So far, the problematic situation of workers affected by a disease or a workplace 
accident has only been examined through the perspective of non-discrimination and its 
connection with the concept of disability. Disability started to be a matter of interest and 
concern at the European level in 1996, and more specifically, when the CJEU’s interpreted 
Directive 2000/78/EC.630 At that moment, the Court took up the role of developing the principle 
of equal treatment and non-discrimination as a general principle of Community law. The CJEU 
cases in that field suggest the equality directive because they are a specific formulation of the 
general principle of equality and have a direct horizontal effect.631 However, the understanding 
of this concept is restricted and narrow.632 This understanding has been challenged several 
times, for example, in the case of the purported relationship between disability and obesity,633 
a link that has been rejected. Some studies of the CJEU jurisprudence and its potential extension 
have already been investigated and underline the various “missed opportunities”, and the 
extension to sickness and workplace accidents have been rejected too.634 A study that underlines 
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the consequence is the exclusion of individuals who perhaps have only a limited impairment 
from protection under the law.635 
At the national level, the concept of non-discrimination and the relationship between 
sickness and disability is not clear either. Some academics have investigated how the standards 
of non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation set by EU law have been embraced by 
different national legal systems. Only a few countries have a social model of disability, in which 
the perception by and the interaction with the surrounding environment plays a role in the 
classification of disability. Others have a more medically orientated definition.636 Regarding 
the social model of disability, a distinction has to be made. It is possible to dismiss someone 
during a sick leave if there is a fair reason. However, it is not possible to base the dismissal on 
the health status of the worker. Health status is a protected characteristic. There is a clear 
distinction with the concept of disability, but health status is protected (either for professional 
reasons or non-professional ones). Belgian law637 and French law638 are two examples. 
Concerning the medically orientated definition of disability, the UK offers a good 
example. Under the UK legislation, health status is excluded from the criteria of non-
discrimination. As evidence, the Equality Act 2010 mentions exactly the same protected 
characteristics as the EU directive. However, there have been some debates around the concept 
of disability and its relationship to illness, especially psychosocial risks and mental health.639 
Although illness is not a protected characteristic, the government underlines that the employer 
should “look for ways to support [the worker] – e.g. Considering whether the job itself is making 
you sick and needs changing, and also give you reasonable time to recover from your illness” 
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before taking any actions when a worker has a persistent or a long-term illness that makes it 
impossible for the worker to do his or her job.640 
The current stage of jurisprudence stresses that the approach tends to extend the concept 
of disability to the “early stages” of workers affected by an occupational disease or victim of a 
workplace accident. This is not efficient for the simple reason that it is not the aim of the 
directive. Therefore, the solution to cover these situations might be to combine the disability 
provisions within the broader context and scope of obligations provided by the Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC. 
5.3.1.2. A potential way to develop workers’ OHS protection before the CJEU through 
a new combination of OHS directives 
The main argument would be to develop an approach before the CJEU that combine the 
individuals’ right directives and the obligations of Directive 89/391/EEC to create “new rights” 
for the workers. So far, the CJEU stated that the protection of the status of pregnant workers 
does not apply to absences due to an illness attributable to pregnancy or confinement.641 
However, Directive 76/207/EEC does protect and apply to absences due to incapacity for work 
caused by illness resulting from that pregnancy only during the pregnancy.642 These cases 
underline that it was not the origin of the illness that was taken into consideration, but only the 
timing of the absences. 
Then, the CJEU had to comment on the relationship between the concepts of disability 
and sickness in a working context. It started with the Chacón Navas case; this was a step forward 
for the protection against discriminatory dismissal, and a step back for the protection of the sick 
workers. 643 Indeed, the Court recognised that dismissal on the grounds of disability is protected 
by Directive 2000/78. However, the definition of disability is expressively separated from 
illness. The illness can be considered a disability only if it is a “limitation which results in 
particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which hinders the 
participation of the person concerned in professional life”.644 Here, the CJEU emphasised the 
 
 
640 https://www.gov.uk/dismissal/reasons-you-can-be-dismissed  
641 C-179/88 Birthe Vibeke Hertz vs. Aldi Marked K/S (1990) 
642 C-394/96 BROWN (1998) 
643 C-13/05 (2006), Sonia Chacón Navas c/ Eurest Colectividades SA  
644 Ibid, point 43 
  
 
161 
consequence of the worker health status and not the origin. Meaning, the CJEU did not have to 
decide on an occupational disease that led to a dismissal. Maybe if the illness fulfils this 
definition, it can be considered a disability. 
It should be said that, in the Chacón Navas case, the Spanish employer recognised that 
a dismissal for no reason (and most likely due to the sick leave of the employee) was unlawful. 
Also, the origin of the sickness was not focused on, which probably would not have made a 
difference. However, it can be suggested that the fact that the employer did not do everything 
he should have to keep the worker in employment — in terms of adapting the workplace —led 
to a different outcome. 
Later, the CJEU had to refine its definition in HK Danmark.645 On this occasion, the 
CJEU extended its concept of disability by recognising and referring to the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Moreover, the Court detailed the provisions of Directive 
2000/78/EC, regarding reasonable accommodation and indirect discrimination based on 
disability. According to the advocate general, the origin — illness or not — does not matter; 
the only decisive factor is whether the limitation lasts for a long time. As soon as there is a 
limitation in functional capacities where the person is not capable of working full-time, it should 
be regarded as a disability within the meaning of Directive 2000/78. The Court of Justice 
followed most of the legal reasoning of the Advocate General and confirmed that the origins of 
the disability do not seem to be important, nor is the fact that the person concerned can work 
only to a limited extent. Since disability is an evolving concept, the Court opened the coverage 
of Directive 2000/78/EC to the illnesses that give rise to long-term limitations, not only 
accidents. Additionally, the concept of disability is connected with a hindrance to the exercise 
of a professional activity and is not limited to situations where the exercising of such activity 
is impossible. This underlines the fact that indirect discrimination is an effect-related concept. 
Overall, this case was a step forward for the sick workers, but only in the extent of a 
long-term illness. From this basis, it might be argued that if there is an overall obligation to 
adapt workstations for disabled people — no matter the origin and even if the employer is not 
responsible — might it be possible to require the same obligation when there is a workplace 
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accident or an occupational disease? Moreover, even if the “long-term” criterion is not fulfilled, 
the fact that the employer was the cause of the accident or illness ought to be taken into 
consideration. The legal basis can be found in Art. 6 of Directive 89/391/EEC explained further 
below. 
After this promising advancement, the CJEU went back on its understanding or at least 
the legal value of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities with the 
controversial Z. case.646 In this case, a woman was not able to carry a child, and she saw her 
demand of paid leave equivalent to maternity or adoption leave denied on the grounds that she 
qualified for neither and the law did not provide for paid leave following the birth of a child 
through surrogacy. The Court emphasised that the concept of disability not only refers to the 
impossibility of exercising a professional activity but also to “a hindrance to the exercise of 
such an activity”.647 Here, the “simple” impairment is not enough and has to impact her ability 
to work. With this approach, the Court confirmed its medical and individual model of disability. 
This position has been criticised because if Mrs Z. was disabled, the impact of her impairment 
would have a consequence on her access to employment-related benefits.648 Additionally, the 
Court stated that “the validity of that directive cannot be assessed in the light of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but that directive must, as far 
as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with that Convention”.649 The Court 
took a step back from the broad understanding of the Convention and stuck to its narrow 
understanding. 
Finally, in the Daouidi case, Mr Daouidi was the victim of a workplace accident that 
led him to an undetermined working incapacity and that impact his ability to work. 650  One 
could suppose that Directive 2000/78/EC should cover this. The Court stated that 
The fact that the person concerned finds himself or herself in a situation of temporary 
incapacity for work, as defined in national law, for an indeterminate amount of time, as 
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the result of an accident at work, does not mean, in itself, that the limitation of that 
person’s capacity can be classified as being “long-term”.651 
This was also the occasion for the advocate general to pronounce that 
Disability is an objective concept and it is therefore irrelevant to take account of the 
subjective views of the employer as to whether the inability to work of the applicant in 
the main proceedings was sufficiently long-term or not.652 
This statement points out the crucial fact that there is a purpose for disability protection, and it 
is not to protect the right to physical integrity and health of workers. The current legislative 
configuration leads to situations that are covered by nothing: where a working incapacity is 
long enough to justify or to motivate a dismissal, but not-long-enough to be protected by 
Directive 2000/78. This illustrates the necessity to develop EU OHS protection alongside the 
non-discrimination based on disability. The Daouidi case is the perfect example of where 
claims should not have been based only on disability but also on the Framework Directive, 
raising the fact that it was the obligation of the employer to take care of his workers — and so, 
in case of a workplace accident, he should have demonstrated that he tried everything to keep 
the worker before dismissing him. 
To summarise, the CJEU developed the concept of disability and non-discrimination in 
the workplace as a long-term physical, mental, or psychological impairment that is an obstacle 
to professional life. This definition does not consider the origin of the disability and the 
response of the employer. However, when it comes to the protection of workers’ OHS, 
especially in the context of occupational disease or workplace accident, these two elements are 
fundamental. On that basis, one can argue that another right disconnected from disability (but 
inspired by it) should be defended before the Court: the general right to a reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace when the employer is responsible for a serious alteration of 
the worker’s health. The argument is not that the notion of “disability” in the context of 
Directive 89/391/EEC should be expanded to cover workers who suffer from limited 
impairment and are, therefore, excluded from the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC. The only aim 
of the previous examination of the jurisprudence based on Directive 2000/78/EC was to show 
 
 
651 Ibid Final conclusion  
652 Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-395/15, Mohamed Daouidi v Bootes Plus SL, Fondo de Garantía 
Salarial, Ministerio Fiscal. 26 May 2016, paragraph 48 
  
 
164 
the “limits” of the jurisprudence to address the situation of workers who are not “impaired 
enough” to be covered by the Directive 2000/78/EC, but who are “impaired enough” to not 
perform their work as usual.653 Therefore, the argument is to have a dynamic and modern 
reading of the Directive 89/391/EEC to address situations that are excluded by the Directive 
2000/78/EEC. In no case is the argument developed in the coming paragraph intended to cover 
disabled people. It is only for impaired workers returning to work after a work accident or an 
occupational disease.”  
Currently, there are some concepts in the existing corpus of OHS directives that support 
the idea of an individual right to the adaptation of the workplace after the recognition of an 
occupational disease or being the victim of a workplace accident. The OHS prevention can be 
found within Article 3 of the European Social Charter. It states that “all workers have the right 
to safe and healthy working conditions”, while specifying that it has to be done by “improving 
OSH and to prevent accidents and injury to health arising out of, linked with or occurring in 
the course of work, particularly by minimising the causes of hazards inherent in the working 
environment”.654 The same idea of prevention is expressed in Art. 6.1 of the Framework 
Directive, 89/391/EEC.655 However, it is argued that Art. 6(d) should also apply once the 
damage is caused. 
Presently, the major gap of Directive 89/391/EEC is that it settles obligations for the 
prevention, but from an organisational point of view, the EU OHS legal framework does not 
provide for what happens after. The right to safe and healthy working conditions should not 
only concern the prevention but also the protection of health through the adaptation of working 
conditions when a disease is contracted, or an injury to health has occurred in the course of 
work. It seems to be the natural consequence of the obligation of employers to protect the health 
and the safety of workers. If a worker needs sick leave for occupational reasons (either an 
occupational disease or a workplace accident), it might mean that the employer did not comply 
with the aim of the Framework Directive. One can oppose the CJEU’s jurisprudence regarding 
 
 
653 Waddington, L.B., 2015. 'Not Disabled Enough’: How European Courts Filter Non-Discrimination Claims 
Through a Narrow View of Disability, European journal of human rights, 15(1), p.14 
654 European Social Charter, art.3.  
655 « The employer shall implement the measures referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 on the basis 
of the following general principles of prevention: (a)Avoiding risks; (b) Evaluating the risks which cannot be 
avoided; (c) Combatting the risks at source, (d) adapting the work to the individual, especially as regards the 
design of work places, the choice of work equipment and the choice of working production methods, with a view, 
in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work at a predetermined work-rate and to reducing their effect 
on health. » 
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the nature of the employer’s liability. However, the argument is based on the aim of the directive 
and the logical consequence of these provisions in terms of rights for the employer to avoid a 
situation in which a worker is dismissed because of the alteration of his or her health for 
occupational reasons. This would be limited to cases where the employer can be considered 
responsible for the sickness or accident. The only problem in practice would be that suing an 
employer to prove his or her responsibility might decrease the chance of having the worker still 
work at the company, and therefore eliminate the need for adaptation. Thus, it is necessary for 
this approach to be supported by TUs or workers’ representatives who can integrate it into a 
more general “litigation strategy”. Only then, having an employer condemned to adapt to the 
workplace in such circumstances, can the future situation be impacted, even if the worker 
initially concerned is not impacted directly. 
In order to increase the likelihood of admissibility of the argument by the CJEU, the 
right to have the workplace adapt to the health conditions in the case of occupational alterations 
should follow the same wording as Art. 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC. Hence, 
employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to 
enable a person with an occupational disease or victim of a workplace accident, to have 
access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such 
measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall 
not be disproportionate.656 
Another example of the obligation to adapt the workstation (but with a different legal base) can 
be found in Art. 5.1 of Directive 92/85/EEC.657 In both cases, the employers shall adapt the 
workplace to the extent of what is necessary and practicable so workers can continue to perform 
their jobs. 
An alternative or complementary approach for developing an obligation for the 
employer to adapt the workstation/working conditions to the needs of the impaired worker 
returning to work after a work accident or an occupational disease could be to contextualise it 
in the existing obligation for the employer to assess the risk.658 However, to have a chance to 
 
 
656 Illustrated by joint case C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark (Jette Ring) c/ Dansl almennyttight Boligselskab 
(C-335/11) and HK Danmark (Lone Skouboe Werge) c/ Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening (Pro Display A/S) 
657 Ilustrated by C-471/08, Sanna Maria Parviainen v. Finnair Oyj, 17 December 2009 
658 Art. 6.3 of the Directive 89/391/EEC. 
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be accepted by the CJEU, the argument cannot rely only on the breach of an employer’s 
obligation but a worker’s right (i.e., in this situation, the individual right to compensation). As 
underlined by the previous examination of the CJEU’s jurisprudence, the cases that led to an 
improvement in the OHS field concerned individual rights. The only potential way to aim at an 
improvement of the situation of impaired workers returning to work after a work accident or an 
occupational disease would be to prove that the breach to assess the risk accurately – and/or to 
prevent it - caused damage (e.g., aggravation of the impairment) and that the national law does 
not implement art.6.3 of the Directive 89/391/EEC. 
5.3.2. Development of the proceeding to empower collective actors and defend 
collective interests during litigation 
The role of TUs and the justifiability of collective interest have been debated beyond 
the limits of the OHS field. Some studies have investigated the entitlement to take legal action 
for individual members (and their interests), and the justifiability of collective interests. The 
notion that only the individual directly affected by action that might also damage the collective 
interest can take action before a court can be challenged.659 In that case, the individual can act 
only to obtain monetary compensation for damages, which, according to Cappelletti, is not 
enough to protect the collective interest.660 Cappelletti previously advocated for an extension 
of the entitlement to take legal action to private bodies (individuals or associations) that were 
not directly affected. He called it the “revolutionary of the concept of entitlement to act”.661  
In the British debate, and according to Ewing, Trade Unions have five functions.662  One 
of them is a representative function. He observed a dilution of that function and the regulatory 
function to the benefit of the service, governmental, and public administration functions. The 
functions of TUs can be connected to the changing nature of trade unionism. According to 
Ewing, the workplace representation function means that the TU will represent the interests of 
 
 
659 See Cappelletti, M., 1975. La protection d'intérêts collectifs et de groupe dans le procès civil (Métamorphoses 
de la procédure civile). Revue internationale de droit comparé, 27(3), pp.571-597.  
660 He mentions the example of consumers against big distribution chains; one consumer won’t sue a big chain 
because the gain will be small in comparison to the fight and paying the monetary compensation of one person 
will not have a greater effect. However, if someone represents the interest of a group of consumers, then it will be 
different and can have an impact.  
661 Cappelletti, M., 1975. La protection d'intérêts collectifs et de groupe dans le procès civil (Métamorphoses de 
la procédure civile). Revue internationale de droit comparé, 27(3), p.580 
662 See Ewing, K.D., 2005. The function of trade unions. Industrial Law Journal, 34(1), pp.1-22. 
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the employee in the workplace. This representation function has both an individual and a 
collective dimension. Additionally, the potential for unions to play a role in enforcing statutory 
employment rights has been investigated within the UK legal system.663 Colling found a 
sustained commitment to strategic legal challenges, but also some substantial obstacles to the 
broader use of the law to mobilise workers and potential members. Colling then further 
developed the union initiatives, which aimed to use legal provisions and entitlements to 
mobilise members around key issues in the workplace. Meanwhile, in France, the weaknesses 
of the litigation by individuals have been underlined, emphasising the need for alternative forms 
of litigation action; the commitment of TUs in litigation is one of them.664 Hence, Willemez 
underlined the evolution and growing function of the TU in the litigation field, either to defend 
the individual rights of members or its own collective interests.665 Willemez stresses that TUs 
have the power to engage in legal proceedings, but they need to have the legitimacy to do it 
(entitlement to take legal action). 
Based on the existing literature, the potential role of TUs seems to be a key element in 
the development of strategic litigation. Thus, the goal of this section is to analyse the extent to 
which these developments apply EU OHS rights. If they do, then the question is, how can they 
be implemented, and how would the potential litigation function of TUs apply in the case of 
EU OHS rights? 
The litigation actions of TUs have two main aspects: (1) the substitution proceedings 
where the TUs act in place or in support of one of their members, and (2) when the TUs are 
defending their own collective interest. Firstly, within the current jurisprudence, there are seven 
cases where TUs acted on behalf of their members to defend their individual rights related to 
OHS. 666 A close examination of the cases shows that there is not a large emphasis on the TU 
representation in the text, but in practice. This might mean that the unions are writing the 
 
 
663 See Colling, T., 2006. What space for unions on the floor of rights? Trade unions and the enforcement of 
statutory individual employment rights. Industrial Law Journal, 35(2), pp.140-160.  
664 See Guiomard, F., 2003. Syndicats: Evolutions et limites des stratégies collectives d'action 
juridique. Mouvements, (4), pp.47-54. 
665 See Willemez, L., 2003. Quand les syndicats se saisissent du droit. Sociétés Contemporaines, (4), pp.17-38. 
666 C-179/88 HERTZ, (1990); C-400/95 LARSSON, (1997); C-66/96 HØJ PEDERSEN E.A.,  (1998);, C-109/00 
TELE DENMARK (2001); C-14/04 DELLAS E.A.,  (2005); C-335/11 HK DENMARK (2013); C-512/11 & C-
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conclusions and probably paying for the lawyer. Yet, the preparatory work and the financial 
aspects are fundamental prerequisites for a successful case. 
There is also a noticeable difference regarding the origin of the TUs who are active: the 
Handels-og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (HK) is present in five cases out of 
seven. Whereas, the French and Finnish TUs are present only once each. Beyond the fact that 
some national TUs are less active, all the countries not mentioned here are fully absent. This 
difference might be due to legal and cultural differences, and some studies should investigate 
this aspect further. There is also the confirmation that the rights defended are mainly individual 
rights: five cases related to the pregnant worker directive, one case on non-discrimination and 
disability directive, and one case on working time. In terms of impact, most of the actions where 
TUs acted on behalf of their members were successful.667 These cases influenced the 
jurisprudence considerably: HK Danmark changed the overall definition of disability, Høj 
Pederson secured the wage of all pregnant workers and their position during the time before 
giving birth, Tele Danmark enlarged the protection of pregnant workers in short term contract, 
and Dellas modified the understanding of what should qualify as working time in France. 
Overall, these cases led to major improvements that had implications beyond the individual 
cases. 
Second, the situation where a TUs or workers’ representative is defending its own 
collective interest related to an OHS directive has been illustrated eight times in the CJEU 
jurisprudence.668 Another detailed study of these cases underlines that there is a difference 
between the national origin of the actions; however, the active MS are different from those 
mentioned previously. Here, three cases were conducted by Spanish TUs, two by German work 
councils, one by the French TUs, and one by the British TUs. Additionally, the nature or level 
of the TUs differs; local unions seem to defend their own interests while national TUs take 
action on behalf of individuals. It is proven once again that strategic litigation is based on 
individual rights: all the cases concerned the working time directives. Moreover, four cases 
contested collective agreements, and the other cases challenged national law directly (in the 
 
 
667 Five cases were successful out of seven. 
668 C-303/98 SIMAP, (2000) ; C-241/99 CIG, (2001) ; C-173/99 BECTU,  (2001) ; C-52/04 ; Personalarat der 
Feuerwehr Hamburg (2005) ; C-486/08 Zentralbetriebsrat der Landerskrankenhauser Tirols, (2010), , C-428/09 
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BECTU case, it is a transposition law). For one case — Zentralbetriebsrat — the Work Council 
used a European framework agreement to challenge a national law. 
In terms of impact, it is indisputable that these cases influenced and broaden the scope 
and application of the working time directives considerably and found an application beyond 
the initial situation. To conclude, the actions led by TUs or workers’ representatives have led 
to significant steps towards better protection of workers’ OHS but are considerably underused. 
Therefore, it is suggested that TUs focus on strategic litigation when defending an approach 
based on a new combination of directives. 
5.3.3. Factors influencing the impact of future litigation before the CJEU as a 
strategy to develop OHS  
The argument that it may be possible to develop a complementary litigation strategy 
advocating for an injured or unwell individual’s right of workplace adaptation before the CJEU 
based on Directive 89/391/EEC relies on two conditions: (1) the existence of an appropriate 
factual matrix, allowing for a question to be raised concerning the interpretation of the Directive 
89/391/EEC and the national judges referring the question to the CJEU, (2) the CJEU ruling in 
favour of an expansive interpretation of the Directive to cover such a situation, which might be 
qualified as “activist” behaviour. However, some elements need to be taken into consideration 
regarding both of these conditions.  
First, a national court may request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU where a decision 
is necessary for a national court to give judgement, or where there is no judicial remedy under 
national law. The decision to make a request for a preliminary ruling is exercised exclusively 
on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, regardless of whether or not the parties to 
the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court.669 In 
other words, it falls to the discretion of the national judges to communicate or not a question to 
the CJEU. In principle, however, where any such question is raised in a case pending before a 
court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under 
national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.670 Where there is 
no judicial remedy under national law, these courts have to communicate a question regarding 
 
 
669 Recommendations to national courts and tribunals, in relation to initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, 
25 November 2016, Official Journal of the European Union, C-439/1, n°3 
670 Art. 267 TFEU 
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the interpretation or the validity of EU law – this obligation is also clearly stated in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU.671  
There are two exceptions to the obligation of last-instance courts to refer a preliminary 
ruling: first, where the CJEU has already ruled on the point of law in question in a previous 
case (so-called Acte éclairé);672 secondly, where the CJEU has not answered the question but 
the answer is “without doubt and obvious” (so-called Acte clair).673 The CJEU can also refuse 
to hear a case if it is not admissible – e.g., not enough description of the facts. Additionally, 
before raising a question before the CJEU, the national court or tribunal has to determine, in 
the light of each case, both the need for a request for a preliminary ruling to deliver its judgment 
and the relevance (i.e., the interpretation can affect the outcome of the national case) of the 
questions which it submits to the Court.674 The need and the relevance are assessed only by the 
national tribunal or court, not by the CJEU. Moreover, it has to be noted that the tribunal or the 
court can do it at any stage of the litigation, even at first instance.675 In theory, the CJEU is 
bound by the assessment of the national court, and the questions submitted benefit from a 
presumption of relevance.676 
Therefore, it is necessary to emphasise that the development of potential strategic 
litigation will depend on the willingness and the discretion of national courts to refer questions 
to the CJEU – even if a case can be made before the highest courts. As underlined previously 
in this Chapter, the behaviour of the national judges might vary from one Member State to 
another.677 This explains why further studies need to be conducted to determine which country, 
and sometimes which court or tribunal, has been more willing to request the interpretation of 
the CJEU on OSH matters. If strategic litigation is to be conducted by a TU in the future, it 
would be necessary to focus on these jurisdictions – considering that other national courts might 
disregard such reasoning. 
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Secondly, from a more principled perspective, extension of the OHS protective 
framework by the CJEU might be understood to constitute a form of “judicial activism”. 
Previous research has underlined that the CJEU has defended une certaine idée de l’Europe, by 
giving a specific interpretation of Community law.678 One way of doing so is:  
“to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes before it, the Court 
will establish the doctrine as a general principle but suggest that it is subject to various 
qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it should not be applied to the 
particular facts of the case. The principle, however, is now established. If there are not 
too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the qualification can then be 
whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine revealed.”679 
By strengthening the application of the European rule of law, the Court plays an important role 
in policymaking and law-making in the EU.680 As underlined by Leczykiewic, “every 
judgement involves some interpretation of the rule it applies, and therefore it adds to the legal 
material that can be used to establish the meaning of the rule in future cases.”681 The 
independence, autonomy, and the freedom of the Court in some of its rulings led some to 
question the “activism” of the Court.682 According to Eeckhout, the CJEU is not “usurping the 
role of the legislature” provided it does not depart from the wording of the Directive and does 
not act contrary to the intentions of Community law.683 For example, the CJEU adopted a strong 
position with its decision in the case of Defrenne, which influenced equal pay and was the first 
in a series of judgments that fundamentally strengthened the position of women in the Member 
States.684 It has been recognised that in some areas (e.g., social rights), the CJEU created rules 
that can be considered as new substantive law.685  
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682 It is important to note that the defintion of « activism » is broad and take many forms. See De Witte, B., Muir, 
E. and Dawson, M. eds., 2013. Judicial activism at the European Court of Justice. Edward Elgar Publishing 
683 Eeckhout, P., 1998. The European Court of Justice and the legislature. Yearbook of European Law, 18(1), p.17 
684 Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 
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Whether the CJEU should have the function of policy and law maker, and under which 
circumstances, is outside of the scope of this thesis. However, the argument that the CJEU 
might in the future interpret article 6 of the Directive 89/391/EEC broadly is based on an EU 
Directive, and the overall aim of improving workers’ health and safety is stated in art. 3 of the 
European Social Charter and art.153 of the TFEU.686 Therefore, such an interpretation is not 
excluded and might be possible. Of course, there is no guarantee, and such a result cannot be 
predicted in advance and will depend on the discretion of the CJEU. 
5.4. Conclusion 
In the context of legal paralysis at the European level in the OHS field, litigation before 
the CJEU might be an appropriate path to improve some specific aspects of the workers’ OHS. 
Indeed, an overview of the current jurisprudence suggests that litigation by the Commission in 
the form of infringement proceeding might be an unlikely route to such improvement 
considering the highly political nature of the decision to start such a procedure, as well as the 
potential limits of resources to conduct an examination into the way the OHS directives are 
applied at the national level. The findings of this chapter also confirm the shift from a 
centralised to a decentralised method of controlling the application of EU OHS standards, with 
an increasing number of preliminary rulings. Therefore, proposals for strategic litigation should 
focus on the individual parties and the mechanism of the preliminary ruling. This approach has 
been effective and has led to significant improvements in workers’ rights, especially in fields 
such as working time and the protection of pregnant workers.  
The idea that preliminary rulings might be an effective way to improve the application 
of the existing EU OHS framework, is illustrated with the example of the return to work of 
injured or unwell workers who have been victims of a workplace accident or occupational 
disease. Currently, workers who are at an early stage of impairment — up to the recognition of 
the disability — are not covered at the EU level. Although health status is a protected element 
in certain national legislation, there is a dramatic gap at the EU level. By exploring the 
possibility of combining the general obligations of the Framework Directive, 89/391/EEC, with 
the individual protection provided by the protective framework applicable to disabled workers, 
it might be possible to argue for a recognition of a right for the workers to have a reasonable 
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accommodation in their workplaces when they are victims of a workplace accident or an 
occupational disease, and when the employer is responsible. 
This chapter has shown that the existing boundaries of the EU OHS legal framework 
could and should be challenged before the CJEU. Obviously, no one can predict with certainty 
the decision that the CJEU would reach in any given case. This argument does not aim to change 
the situation of the workers that are the party of any case before the CJEU but to push the CJEU 
to give a decision that would apply to similar future situations all over the EU. According to 
the hypothetical construction of this argument, it is fundamental that TUs and workers’ 
representatives be in charge of developing and applying this idea when they witness cases that 
might be suitable for such an action before the Court. Additionally, it is important to point out 
that this litigation strategy will not be applied in the same way and will not be welcome in all 
MS. The cultural and legal differences have to be taken into consideration. Hence, further 
studies should map TU litigation actions in MS. Also, research on the behaviour of national 
judges regarding the CJEU would help to determine where the chances of getting through the 
judiciary process are the highest. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
The Fragile Equilibrium Between the National and European Level 
Enforcement of the OHS Standards 
6.1. Introduction 
The building of Europe created a new employment dynamic with the increase in cross-
border employment opportunities. According to the Commission, there are 12 million EU 
citizens who are either working, seeking a job, or being posted in another MS. The free 
movement of workers and the freedom to provide services depends upon well-functioning 
cross-border labour mobility in respect of EU employment rules. Compliance at the national 
level is difficult because there is an inequality of scopes: the free movement of services has a 
European scope, and the scope of competences of the enforcement authorities are limited to the 
territory of the MS. 
According to the Treaties, the LIs are bound to ensure that common EU social standards 
are met.687 Despite the adoption of an extensive body of legislation, the EU OHS policy has 
suffered from important implementation problems.688 In addition to the potential problem of 
implementation by MS, the problem of enforcement is also due to practical and institutional 
barriers arising from national differences in inspection services.  Indeed, even if the Framework 
Directive provides the legal basis for the scope of the labour inspection, and if the EU MS have 
a similar set of powers on OHS that are broadly in line with those laid down in Articles 12 and 
13 of the ILO Convention 81,689 the organisation and the management of labour inspection 
authorities remains the MS’ individual responsibility.690 
Historically, labour regulation has been a matter of domestic law and control, and labour 
movements have largely operated and been defined within a national scope. It is assumed that 
the EU will not interfere and enforcement will stay a national matter.691 As underlined by 
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Richthofen, the labour inspection services, as part of a public administration system, require an 
institutional framework based on law and regulations enacted by the MS.692 However, the 
question of the enforcement of OHS standards in the EU by the LIs can only be understood in 
the larger context of the functioning of the EU, especially the relationship between the 
economic and the social fields. 
Moreover, the enforcement of EU OHS standards falls into the general scope of the 
social policy,693 in respect of which competence is shared.694 Therefore, the competence of the 
EU on OHS is governed by the principles of subsidiarity695 and proportionality.696 The 
coordination of action between the national and European levels is fundamental. This means 
that the EU complements the MS actions to enforce OHS standards. Alongside these 
institutional principles, considering the context of cross-border employment relationships, there 
is also the problem of the so-called “coordination rules” at the EU level. These rules are based 
on the principle that one jurisdiction applies at any one time in cases of employment outside a 
worker’s country of origin. This means that a person moving within the EU is subject to the 
social security provisions of only one MS. As a general rule, the legislation of the MS in which 
the person pursues his or her activity as an employed or self-employed person applies.697 This 
element adds some complexity to the mission of the national LIs when they have to deal with 
a workplace accident or occupational disease of workers under a cross-border employment 
relationship.  
The increasing number of cross-border employment relationships is only one of the 
challenges LIs have to face. It follows that there is a need to rethink the share of competence 
between the European and national levels within the existing institutional scope regarding the 
enforcement of EU OHS standards, especially considering the cross-border dimension. We 
should consider whether the EU could act in place of the national LIs while empowering them 
to improve the enforcement of EU OHS standards. The aim of the Chapter is to assess and to 
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examine the current situation, and to clarify what is the role of the actors involved in the 
monitoring and enforcement of OSH standards (i.e., Labour Inspectorates, EU Committees, and 
Agencies), and the interconnections between the different levels (i.e., National and EU). The 
situation of competence at the EU level limited to areas in which there is a clear need for 
European-wide coordination, such as the position of cross-border workers, is examined only as 
part of the function of the future European Labour Authority (ELA). The aim of studying the 
competences of the ELA is not to make a recommendation, but to assess how this new agency 
will interact with the existing actors. Neither this Chapter, nor the thesis, intends to give 
recommendations in favour or against the possibility of an EU agency that would seek to 
develop stricter oversight of the competence of national enforcement authorities in situations 
wich do not have any cross-border element. Such recommendations are outside the scope of 
this thesis and would need to be developed in future research. 
To address the question of whether the EU should have competence to act in place of 
the national LIs while empowering them to improve the enforcement of EU OHS standards, it 
is it necessary to have a general understanding of the current setting. Thus, this chapter aims at 
providing an overview and is structured into three parts. First, referring to the most recent EPSU 
Reports and COWI evaluation of EU OHS standards, it is possible to provide an overview of 
the similarities and differences in the national methods of enforcement by LIs. Next, the chapter 
examines how the existing institutions at the EU level (i.e., SLIC, ACSH, Eurofound, and the 
European Agency for Health and Safety at Work [EU-OSHA]) function and to what extent they 
contribute to the improvement of the enforcement of EU OHS standards. At the end of these 
two first analyses, a significant gap appears between the differences and common challenges 
faced by the LI at the national level and the limited powers and competencies of the EU actors. 
Therefore, the last part of the chapter focuses on the recently created ELA and assesses the 
extent to which this authority might fill the gap. 
The conclusion of this chapter is that the ELA provides an illustration of the current 
limitations to improving EU OHS standards. Some options that could lead to real improvement 
at the EU level are discussed but because of the choice of some stakeholders to hold on to the 
“sovereignty” of their authority — so maintaining the imbalance of scope between the 
enforcement of EU OHS and market freedoms — the ELA is an upgraded version of the existing 
mechanisms, such as networking and mediations, but without real novelty or innovation. This 
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example shows that ways of improving the enforcement of OHS in the EU do not only depend 
on what is legally possible but also on the political will of the main actors, starting with the MS. 
6.2. The Heterogeneous Situation at the National Level 
As underlined by the literature, the enforcement systems differ from one MS to 
another.698 The factors explaining the difference of structure and operation of labour inspection 
systems at the national level include a generalist inspectorate or specialised health and safety 
inspectorate, a single system or multiple participants, and coverage of all employed workers or 
only select workers. 699 
The specialist inspectorate model has been developed according to an Anglo-
Scandinavian system where the inspectors are mainly responsible for securing compliance with 
requirements concerning health, safety, and welfare at work. In the generalist inspectorate 
model, the inspectors are responsible for the enforcement of all labour standards.700 
Nevertheless, it has also been said that the national administration enforcing the standards might 
change towards more cooperation701 to counterbalance or remove the substantial weaknesses 
of LIs at the national level.702 
To address whether the EU should act in place of the national LIs while empowering 
them to improve the enforcement of EU OHS standards, it is necessary to examine how the 
national LIs enforce OHS standards to identify points of convergence and divergence. Thus, it 
is possible to highlight where further cooperation might be possible and where a European 
action might be necessary to ensure some coherence in the way EU OHS standards are enforced. 
Therefore, this section, mainly based on country reports, summarises the main differences and 
the similar obstacles to enforcing OHS standards that the national LIs are facing and how the 
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cross-countries situations add to these.703 The analysis of the country reports was complemented 
with a review of more theoretical literature and studies on LIs. The main observation is that 
differences regarding enforcement revolve around the central concept of sanctions and may be 
divided into three sub-categories: the nature of the sanctions, the proportionality of the 
sanctions, and the balance between legally and non-legally binding sanctions and methods of 
enforcement. This analysis confirms the previous literature on LIs regarding the enforcement 
of labour law standards applied to OHS but also confirms some theoretical ideas applied to 
OHS.704 The analysis of the common obstacles revolves around the idea of ‘lacking’: the lack 
of human and material resources as well as the lack of support and cooperation that led to non-
enforcement at the national level (challenged even more due to the common market). 
This section emphasises that one way of improving the enforcement of EU OHS 
standards is to ensure some coherence regarding the way sanctions are applied. Indeed, the 
differences among MS regarding the legal nature of the sanction, the amount of the fine, and 
the combination with soft enforcement can lead not only to inconsistency but also to a non-
effectiveness of EU OHS standards on the national ground. This lack of a consistent way of 
applying the rules can affect the competitiveness of the MS. This section also underlines 
common dysfunction at the national level and highlights the potential need for European action 
to provide support for the lack of support and resources, especially with respect to cross-border 
employment. 
6.2.1. The deep national divergences in enforcing EU OHS Standards 
The national reports underline significant differences when it comes to the sanctions 
available to enforce OHS standards.705 There are three subdivisions where important 
divergences are noticeable: the nature of the sanction, the degree of the sanction, and the 
balance between hard and soft enforcement. 
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6.2.1.1. The nature of the sanction 
The first main difference concerns the nature of the sanction in case of infringements of 
the OHS legal requirements. In legal theory, according to Austin, sanctions are essential to the 
idea of a legal obligation; it is the existence of the sanction and its threat that gives the law its 
normative force, and so its authority.706 Although Hart considerably challenges Austin’s 
vision,707 some scholars, such as Schauer, argue that Austin’s account is more relevant today 
by underlining the coercive dimension of the OHS legal framework.708  This vision has been 
confirmed outside of the legal theory field; some labour law scholars have stressed that the 
probability and the severity of a punishment are crucial to explaining the compliance with the 
law.709 Hartlapp even stated that enforcement could be considered “as a necessity for 
guaranteeing a proper implementation at the workplace”. Additionally, the importance of 
sanctions in times of economic crisis has been proven by Martinsen and Vollard; according to 
them, when economic strain and costs pressure the voluntary aspect of the application of social 
standards, the need for external control increases. 710 Therefore, it appears that sanctions are 
crucial to enforcing OHS standards. However, from a purely legal perspective, there are 
different bases for imposing sanctions in the case of the breach of the OHS standards: criminal, 
administrative, and civil. However, these different bases do not exist in an equal manner in the 
MS. It is fundamental because, depending on the basis chosen, the sanctions are more or less 
likely to be applied effectively. 
As an example, in Belgium, criminal proceedings are possible only if the victim has no 
insurance.711 Similarly, in the Netherlands, criminal sanctions are only possible if the employer 
knew that there was a life-threatening risk for the workers, or if he ignored or refused orders 
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from the inspectorates to shut down operations.712 In Cyprus, there are no administrative 
sanctions applicable to non-compliance with the OHS legislation.713 In Bulgaria, some 
stakeholders report that there is no case regarding OHS prevention because there are no 
complaints about working conditions.714 Only the cases involving an accident are brought 
before the Court, and it is a matter of compensation, not of prevention. According to the law, a 
worker cannot make any claims concerning OHS irregularities. 
These few examples provided by the EPSU reports confirm the differences underlined 
by the literature, regarding not only the different sanctions but also the different nature of the 
sanctions in the case of non-respect of OHS standards. As a result, there is a heterogeneous way 
of enforcing OHS standards that goes beyond the national specificities and might become an 
obstacle to enforcement of the EU OHS legal framework. 
Although it might not be possible in the current institutional context, it seems that giving 
some guidance regarding European expectations is necessary. There is a possibility of making 
the punishment of infringements of EU OHS standards mandatory on an administrative ground 
with the possibility of adding criminal or tort responsibilities in case of severe injuries, fatal 
accidents, or occupational diseases causing death. The degree of the sanctions could then 
depend on the national legislation, but it would bring some coherence to the way OHS standards 
are enforced. 
6.2.1.2. Severity of the sanctions 
The second difference concerns the severity of the sanctions. Smith argued that if the 
penalty is too severe, it will be counterproductive, but if it is too weak, then the expected penalty 
for violating the regulation may fall below the cost of complying.715 Garoupa later expanded 
this theory of optimal law enforcement.716 According to him, the sanction leading to the optimal 
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impact in terms of enforcement might not be the maximal amount.717 Along the same lines, 
Rasmusen provided evidence that it is easier to deter less harmful crimes than more harmful 
crimes.718 Thus, the severity of the sanction should depend on the consequence of the crime. 
According to Scholz, the severity should vary depending on the firm’s behaviour so 
“enforcement agencies need to be reasonable toward cooperative firms, vengeful toward 
cheaters, unrelenting in pursuit of chronic evaders, but conciliatory towards repentant 
firms”.719 Similarly, some arguments based on economic rationality support the idea that fines 
should depend on individuals’ wealth.720 If we transpose this idea to companies, it will imply 
that fines should depend on the size of the company. To summarise, some flexibility and a range 
of sanctions depending on circumstances might lead to better enforcement of the OHS 
standards. 
This idea has been partly illustrated at the national level. For example, in the Danish 
system, there is a concept of proportional penalty.721 There is a basic penalty fine for the 
violation itself, and this sum doubles if it has caused an accident with serious injury or death. 
This is an innovative way to combine prevention and repression. There are also rules for 
calculating the fines according to the size of the enterprise, which is also a way to increase the 
responsibility of large companies. 722 This means that a small company that has not completed 
a risk assessment will pay less than a big company that might have a legal department in charge 
of it. There is also an additional raise in case of aggravating circumstances.723 The distinction 
between the size of the company is essential; it was a point of criticism regarding the LIs’ 
practice in Romania, where LIs have criticised the lack of flexibility.724 In France, the size of 
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the company is not formally taken into consideration but the recidivism of the non-respect of 
the OHS norms, especially if it led to a workplace accident, can aggravate the sanction.725 
The Greek system offers a mix and broad illustration of the trends seen in other 
countries. Indeed, the level of fines escalates according to four criteria: (1) the number of 
workers affected, (2) the severity of the consequence of the infringement, (3) the risk level of 
the sector the enterprise belongs to, and (4) the recidivism of the specific employer.726  
To conclude, it seems that flexibility would lead to better enforcement of OHS 
standards. However, because flexibility depends on the situation, it seems unlikely there will 
be a hard, legal intervention by the EU in that respect. However, developing the idea of 
mediation and collaboration or guidelines to encourage countries to adopt a more flexible 
approach might be an improvement, especially in MS that have a rigid approach, like Romania. 
6.2.1.3. The balance of enforcement 
The third main difference relates to the balance of enforcement through hard sanctions 
and guidance. Based on a distinction between the ‘deterrence based’ and ‘Latin model’ 
workplace regulation, Piore and Schrank found than the deterrence model aimed at changing 
employer behaviour by raising the expected penalties for non-compliance.727 In contrast is the 
Latin model, which aimed at changing it by allowing employers to adapt their work systems to 
meet the compliance problems. The latter approach of inspection is based on a balance between 
a hard and soft approach, rather than a strict application of legal sanctions. Including an aspect 
of collaboration might introduce a degree of fairness in the way OHS standards are enforced. 
Part of the literature shows that if individuals perceive the rules being enforced in a just and 
moral way, it positively influences the degree of compliance.728 This would mean that some 
flexibility in applying the rule of law would increase voluntary compliance by the actors who 
perceive it as fair. Furthermore, Tyler’s study shows that the perception of legitimacy is closely 
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linked to people’s views of the fairness of the procedures used by the authorities.729 Thus, 
indirectly, if the LIs collaboratively apply the standards, it appears fairer, and their actions more 
legitimate. The efficiency of soft law compared to pure hard law has also been shown.730 
However, Teague specifies that soft law needs to be complemented by hard law and will not be 
efficient on its own. The importance of the collaboration to build a climate of compliance is 
illustrated in the following examples. 
In the Greek system, the level of fines can decrease depending on the degree of 
collaboration that the employer demonstrates.731 This practice introduces a good incentive for 
the employer to resolve the situation rather than just “pay the bill” — unlike the Bulgarian 
system.732 Indeed, some flexibility is essential; it has been shown that where the controls are 
very rigid, there is a lack of prevention incentive, like in Romania where the LIs give fines 
without offering the possibility for remedies.733 Thus, employers are generally reluctant to fulfil 
their OHS obligations and, therefore, refuse to invest their time and resources to develop proper 
OHS management and, consequently, refuse to cooperate with the LI to have proper guidance. 
In Germany, the LIs emphasised the importance of actual enforcement even if they do 
not use it: “enforcement without the abstract threat of sanctions would be like a toothless 
tiger”.734 The ability to sanction is the difference between impactful advice or de facto advice 
that will not be applied. Indeed, deterrence is related to the perception that the expected costs 
are high enough to lead companies to comply voluntarily.735 Therefore, the existence of 
significant sanctions will be an incentive to comply or to cooperate to avoid it. 
However, in some cases, the advice is not the complementary side of hard enforcement 
but is the only enforcement possible. For example, in Austria, the LI is in charge of the controls, 
but since he hardly has the ability to impose sanctions, he instead advises and ask for measures 
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to be implemented, but then the impact of the controls is limited.736 This also leads to the issue 
of credible sanctions.737 De Baets illustrates this idea with the example of the UK where the 
existence of severe penalties with high conviction rates does not lead to proper enforcement if 
the lower courts oppose them. According to De Baets, prison sentences are rarely imposed, and 
the same applies to remedial orders and disqualifications of managers. A similar situation 
happens in France, where 25% of the cases are abandoned, and 15% lead to simple warnings.738 
6.2.1.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, these few examples underline that if sanctions are applied too strictly, 
there is no incentive for the employers to comply with the OHS standards. On the other hand, 
they would be more inclined to try if they knew that the LI would help them if they show some 
good faith. However, a more flexible way to control the application of OHS would lead to better 
self-compliance and cooperation only if it complemented by strict, legally binding rules that 
will act as a threat. Here, the EU might play a role by framing the strict rules better and 
providing guidance and training on how to support and mediate. Of course, the behaviour of 
the national courts and the interactions with national LIs are outside of the EU competence. All 
the examples mentioned above illustrate that the concept of sanctions and its various aspects 
are fundamental to ensuring the enforcement of OHS standards in the MS. However, the 
differences among MS regarding the legal nature of sanctions, the amount of the fine, and the 
combination with soft enforcement, can lead not only to inconsistency but also to non-
effectiveness of EU OHS standards on the national ground. This lack of a consistent way of 
applying the rules can affect the competitiveness of the MS. 
As shown previously, action by the EU institutions might help achieve a more consistent 
application of EU OHS standards. First of all, the EU could specify the legal nature of the 
sanctions in case of infringement of EU OHS standards, e.g., administrative, criminal, and civil. 
The MS would still have the freedom to adapt these requirements to their national functioning, 
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but it would avoid risking an administrative fine in one MS and a criminal proceeding for the 
same offence in another MS. 
Regarding the size of the fine, the EU could proceed with its role of coordinator by 
communicating the example of the other MS not only to the LI but also the governments so 
they can be inspired. The EU could have a role in ensuring real enforcement of the OHS 
standards by looking at the ways in which these standards are enforced; if there is only soft 
enforcement there is no deterrence. The legal enforcement and role of the EU must be 
completed to ensure that the administrations at the national level are functioning or, if it does 
not want to intervene, then the EU needs to act by itself in at least the part of enforcement that 
would lead to distortion in the single market. Another aspect that can justify an EU action in 
the way EU OHS Standards are enforced is the similarities in the obstacles that the LIs are 
facing. 
6.2.2. The common European wide obstacles faced by national LIs  
The country reports reveal not only differences but also common dysfunctions and 
obstacles that the LIs face when it comes to enforcing OHS standards. There are two main 
problems that the labour authorities face at the national level: the dysfunction of the national 
organisations and more challenging contexts and working settings. 
6.2.2.1. Lack of resources and dysfunction of the labour inspectorates 
In its 2006 report on labour inspection, the ILO reminds us that 
In order to carry out its functions effectively, a labour inspectorate does not only need an 
adequate number of staff, with appropriate conditions for hiring, training and service; these 
staff must also be given the necessary resources to perform their tasks and to ensure that 
their role and the importance of their work is appropriately recognized. In this regard, the 
labour inspection Conventions provide that it is the responsibility of the competent 
authority to make the necessary arrangements.739 
However, as underlined by Weil, the ILO expressed some concerns that labour 
inspection services in many countries are not able to carry out their roles and functions because 
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they are often understaffed, underequipped, under-trained, and underpaid.740 Unfortunately, this 
statement was still valid in 2012, as illustrated by the EPSU reports. 
 In 2012, more than half of the European MS did not meet the ILO threshold of a 
maximum of 10.000 workers per inspector.741 The lack of staff has been mentioned as one of 
the most significant problems in Belgium, Germany, Greece, and Spain.742 In Belgium, besides 
the lack of staff, the problem of ageing staff and insufficient anticipation of new recruits has 
also been raised. The qualification and level of expertise of the LIs have been identified as 
reasons for the lack of staff in Germany. In Greece, Italy, Spain, and Hungary, the low wages, 
and the lack of career prospects has been mentioned to explain the situation. The understaffing 
issue could also be due to austerity policies conducted across the EU since 2008. There have 
been two noticeable reactions by MS to the austerity measures: either the MS reduces the 
number of LIs, or it increases them to deal with the other effects of the crises, such as economic 
redundancy (e.g., France).  
 The problem of the lack of resources and support can be divided into two categories. 
First, there is a lack of financial support that most of the national stakeholders complain about 
and share.743 Secondly, there is also a lack of material resources that can have broad 
consequences. As an illustration, the weaknesses of the LIs concerning staff training, equipment 
and administrative support have often been mentioned by Greek LIs. As a result, enforcement 
and guidance are not homogenous across the country. In Italy, the lack of material resources is 
illustrated by the fact that LIs have to pay personally for professional expenses. They also 
mention a lack of training in general. The lack of technical support as a barrier in Sweden and 
the Nordic countries has also been acknowledged.744 
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Moreover, the lack of support is a considerable obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
LI’s functions. On that point, Sutinen argues that “those who accept an authority’s legitimacy 
are expected to comply with its dictates even when the dictates are contrary to an individual’s 
self-interest”.745 In other words, the employers would comply with the OHS standards if they 
consider the action of the LI to be legitimate, even if it is contrary to their personal interests.  
However, in that respect, some LIs experience a lack of cooperation and coordination 
that can take various forms. As an illustration, the Romanian and the Italian inspectorates do 
not benefit from any cooperation with employers, and they are often victims of physical and 
psychological intimidation. In France, the physical threats towards LIs led to a major incident 
in 2004 where two LIs were killed during an inspection. Since then, concerns about their 
security have been raised. The legitimacy of LIs is a vital prerequisite for the acceptation of 
their decisions. Their legitimacy is mostly built on recognition by the other key authorities, such 
as police forces or political stakeholders, governments, and public authorities. Problems arise 
when there is no support from these authorities, leading to a weakening of the LIs’ legitimacy. 
In Romania, the LIs suffer from a lack of support from the political sphere and the media, which 
present them as corrupt and dishonest. In Poland, the LIs also lack support from principal actors, 
such as the police, public prosecutors, and the courts. 
Another kind of lack of support, which involves not referring matters to the courts, has 
been noticed in France746 and Spain. It creates the habit of reporting for nothing and does not 
prompt the LI to open an official case. The literature has recognised this lack of support in 
research showing that a court case rarely follows compliance reports by LIs in many MS and 
most violations detected and reported by inspectors nevertheless go unpunished.747 These 
elements undermine the authority of the LI and make enforcement of OHS standards more 
difficult. 
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6.2.2.2. The complexity of the new forms of work 
According to Weil and Yarmolyuk-Kröck, various factors could explain the increasing 
complexity of the tasks of the LI. 748 The ILO recognises that 
The […] fragmentation of the labour market; the rapid growth in foreign and migrant 
workers; the rise in deregulation and privatization; the new forms of subcontracting or 
outsourcing; the increase in atypical working arrangements and relationships; […] the 
rapid and complex developments in technology […] have had a considerable impact on 
the traditional concept of labour protection.749 
Therefore, calls for structural changes — like centralising supervision and control of 
inspectorates and increasing collaboration between LIs and other institutions with overlapping 
mandates — have been made.750 The need for further collaboration is strengthened by national 
examples, showing the lack of cooperation between the different actors and institutions dealing 
with OHS and employment situations. In Belgium, the insufficient cooperation between the 
institutions is considered a daily obstacle by some stakeholders. Similar obstacles have been 
identified in Greece, where there is a lack of coordination between the different public 
administrations with no connection or cooperation between the institutions. 
6.2.2.2.1. Increasing workload and complexity  
One other obstacle is the increasing workload and the high complexity of administrative 
papers. In Belgium, the bureaucracy and the administrative tasks are described as extremely 
time-consuming for the LIs. The more time they spend on it, the less time they have for visits 
and controls. The same issues have been reported in the UK and Italy. In Poland, LIs require a 
simplification of the documentation that they have to complete after an inspection. In France, 
which is one of the rare countries that has increased the number of the LIs in a context of 
austerity, the LIs reported that they are overloaded and that there are not enough of them to 
cover all the required tasks. 
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The French LI is a general body in charge of enforcing all the labour law regulations; 
in time of economic crisis, there are more collective redundancies or economic dismissals that 
they have to take care of. 751 This legal complexity is also noticed in Germany, where the dual 
structure of the authority in charge of evaluating risks and the different approach to 
implementation makes coordination between different Länder752  difficult. The fragmentation 
of inspection tasks between the different levels reduces the impact of state control. The 
competence for OHS is divided among an excessive number of regional subdivisions within 
each Land. Additionally, the diversity of computing systems used by different structures is a 
source of difficulty in communication and information. On the positive side, most of the country 
uses the European orientations and strategies in the establishment of their own strategies.753 
6.2.2.2.2. New forms of work 
In Greece, there is also a problem related to labour relations. There is a spread of flexible 
forms of employment and overtime flexibilities in the legislative framework. Thus, the ability 
and the capacity of the LIs to control both the working time and employment is diminished. In 
Italy, there is a high number of SMEs, which means that each LI controls a significant number 
of enterprises. In Poland, there has been an increase in the accident rate, and the LIs have 
stressed the need to intensify the preventive and promotional activities relating to labour 
security in rural areas. However, from a legal perspective, the framework is not supportive of 
the LIs’ tasks. Some Polish LIs state that many labour laws are vague, incoherent, and cause 
much uncertainty. One of their primary concerns is OHS. Similarly, in Spain, the current 
legislation makes it difficult to control the working time, and this legislation needs to be 
reformed. 
 
 
751 This increasing complexity of the administrative process but also the law has been underlined by Von 
Richthofen: “In many other counties, one still notes an extraordinary development and increasing complexity of 
labour legislation. For example, the French Labour Code has over 2 000 articles, and besides that there are many 
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legislation appears continuously to accumulate new provisions concerning the protection of workers. Thus, OHS 
prevention is not prevention and not covered as it should be” (p.58). 
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6.2.2.2.4. International and cross-border complexity 
As pointed out by the ILO, the increasing number of international and cross-border 
situations adds complexity to the functions of the national LIs. As emphasised by Singh and 
Zammit, globalisation is one of the most serious challenges for LIs because it creates a “race 
to the bottom” in labour standards, affecting the effective functioning of labour inspection.754 
For instance, concerning OHS, globalisation contributes to increasing work-related 
causalities.755 This fact is supported by evidence where, in Belgium, for example, the increasing 
number of foreign workers and enterprises makes the work of the LIs more complicated. They 
need to know more about the national legislation of other EU MS. This concern has been shared 
by other MS, such as Spain, where there is insufficient regulation of transnational enterprises. 
Some stakeholders emphasise that the lack of means to coordinate activity between MS 
increases the complexity of international situations. Teague also raised the question of whether 
traditional strategies to ensure compliance with labour standards can adequately address the 
rise of economic vulnerability that has emerged through globalisation, structural change, and 
the rapid diffusion of new technologies.756 The concerns regarding globalised and cross-border 
employment relationships underline the need for action at the EU level. 
6.2.2.2.5. Conclusion  
Not all the national LIs have the same problem, and the obstacles are not uniform, but 
a similar pattern emerges among some MS. As Yarmolyuk-Kröck summarises, “what is more 
important, the legal scope of a labour inspector’s rights […] is not the same everywhere, 
creates obstacles for the effective functioning of this institution”.757 Additionally, some 
research has also proved that some factors which complicate the situation758 are due to 
 
 
754 See Singh, A. and Zammit, A., 2004. Labour standards and the ‘Race to the Bottom’: Rethinking globalization 
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important changes in legal and institutional arrangements regulating labour markets within the 
EU MS.759 Therefore, both the SLIC and the Commission have called for solutions to the cross-
border enforcement of administrative fines and penalties (SLIC 2012). 
The problem is that the activities of the national LIs, which are relevant for cross-border 
labour mobility, end at the border because the mandate of the control and enforcement 
institutions is limited to the national territory. Ergo, joint activities beyond national borders 
need more legal backing.760 Thus, if arrangements regulating labour markets have been the 
cause of the complication of the functioning of the LI, they can also be the solution by regulating 
differently. This means that there is a need for European action to support the national LIs, 
maybe by regulating the legal scope of LIs’ rights. 
6.3. Multiplicity of Actors in the European Union: Duplicates and Complements 
The difficulties of implementing the European OHS legal framework led to a series of 
overlapping responses from the EU institutions, which have pushed the Community’s 
regulatory framework towards the development of network governance.761 One of them was the 
creation of European networks of national health and safety inspectorates and European 
agencies. The aim is to compensate for the weak implementation of OHS directives by 
collecting and disseminating information, supporting cooperation and exchanges of experience 
among MS and European institutions. At the EU level, there are two agencies and two 
committees related to OHS: the SLIC, the Advisory Committee for Safety and Health at Work 
(ACSH), the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
and the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work. The existing literature has studied 
these European actors involved in OHS either by providing a broad overview762 or by 
examining the contribution of one actor — such as the SLIC — to a specific problem, e.g., 
 
 
759 Walters, D., Wadsworth, E.J.K. and Quinlan, M., 2013. Analysis of the determinants of workplace occupational 
safety and health practice in a selection of EU Member States. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work 
p.60 
760 Senior Labour Inspoector’s Committee (2012) Consensus Paper on Cross-border Enforcement (CIBELES 
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transnational cooperation,763 the safety of machines,764 or posted workers.765 However, so far, 
no study has examined these actors while drawing connections with the national level and 
considering the recent and future ELA. Therefore, this part is structured in two sections: (1) a 
concise overview of the two committees and two agencies, and (2) a detailed examination of 
the SLIC’s work. The aim is to develop a better understanding of the existing European 
stakeholders and how they are currently supporting — or not — the national LIs in their role of 
enforcing the OHS labour standards. 
6.3.1. Existing structures to improve OHS in the European Union 
6.3.1.1. Committees 
At first, the creation of the SLIC was “natural” in the sense that a “group of senior labour 
inspectors” began to meet informally in 1982. These meetings and the role of the group were 
formalised with the Commission Decision of 12 July 1995, which established the Senior Labour 
Inspectors Committee (SLIC). At the creation of the Committee, there was an explicit reference 
to the principle of subsidiarity. It was also clearly stated that the “identification, analysis and 
resolution of practical problems related to implementing, and monitoring the enforcement of 
secondary Community legislation on health and safety at work fall mainly within the 
competence of national labour inspection services”.766  
The SLIC is a committee of the European Commission (DG EMPL) with a mandate to 
give its opinion to the Commission on all problems relating to the enforcement of Community 
law on OHS by the MS.767 The opinion can be extended to matters covering other areas of 
Community social legislation that have an impact on OHS.768 The role of the SLIC is mainly a 
role of coordination. For instance, the objectives of the SLIC are defining the common 
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Review, 13(4) pp.92-93; Fasani, M., 2011. Labour inspection in Italy. ILO. pp.11-12 
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principles of labour inspection in the field of OHS; promoting improved knowledge, mutual 
understanding, a labour exchange programme, and cooperation; exchanging information; and 
studying the possible impact of other Community policies on inspection activities connected to 
OHS. These objectives — and the powers that go with them — can be qualified as “soft” or 
“non-legally binding”. Thus, there is no doubt that the role of the SLIC is to assist the 
Commission.769 
Also, the Committee shall propose any initiative to the Commission that it considers 
appropriate to encourage the effective enforcement of Community law on OHS. This means 
that the Commission is the only institution deciding to pursue initiatives on OHS. The SLIC is 
composed of the Commission and one representative of the labour inspection services of each 
EU MS. It assembles for a meeting every six months in the EU MS holding the EU 
presidency.770 It is the principal committee and actor dealing with the enforcement of EU OHS 
standards. 
The Advisory Committee for Safety and Health at Work (ACSH) is a tripartite body 
set-up in 2003 by a Council Decision (2003/C 218/01) to streamline the consultation process in 
the field of OHS and rationalize the bodies created in this area by previous Council 
decisions.771 The committee is composed of three full members per MS, representing national 
governments, TUs, and employers’ organisations. The Committee meets twice a year in a 
plenary. Its activities are coordinated by a bureau composed of two representatives from the 
Commission and the spokespersons and coordinators designated by the interest groups. The 
Commission chairs the committee. The bureau prepares the committee’s annual work 
programme for adoption by the committee. Some working parties are established within the 
committee to deal with specific technical issues and to prepare draft opinions for adoption by 
the committee. Here we can see the strong influence of the Commission on the ACSH activity. 
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6.3.1.2. Agencies 
To complete the activities of the committees, there are also two agencies covering the 
OHS field. The first agency is Eurofound, also called the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.772 It aims to “contribute to the planning and 
establishment of better living and working conditions through actions designed to increase and 
disseminate knowledge”.773 It is the tripartite EU agency providing knowledge to assist in the 
development of better social, employment, and work-related policies. It provides research-
based findings and knowledge to help develop social and work-related policies. The ultimate 
aim is to help plan and design better living and working conditions in Europe.774 Its work is 
used to provide an evidence base for policy, such as in the recent European initiatives on youth 
unemployment and the youth guarantee, mainly monitoring the working conditions across the 
EU. 
The second agency is the EU-OSHA, also named European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work. It was created in 1994, and only 67 people work there. It is based in Bilbao, 
Spain. The role of the EU-OSHA is to provide the Commission, the MS, the social partners, 
and those involved in the OHS field with useful technical, scientific, and economic information. 
To carry out its mission, the agency collects, analyses, and disseminates information for those 
involved in safety and health at work. It aims to increase awareness, identify new and emerging 
risks, and establish and maintain networks with stakeholders and other interested parties.775 The 
EU-OSHA works to make European workplaces safer, healthier, and more productive for the 
benefit of businesses, employees, and governments. The agency promotes a culture of risk 
prevention to improve working conditions in Europe. 
6.3.1.3. The Commission as common reference point to the OHS European bodies  
Overall, the European actors mentioned above do not have the executive power to take 
direct action to enforce EU OHS standards; they provide support to the Commission, which is 
the institution that can take action. Additionally, these actors have relatively limited resources 
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to achieve their goals. Committees (the SLIC and ACSH) meet only twice a year under the 
supervision of the Commission. Their role is to support and provide information to the 
Commission — one through a consultation process at the EU level, and the other by enforcing 
existing EU OHS standards. Meanwhile, the agencies focus on the research and publication of 
data. It seems that their roles and themes covered are complementary and might overlap. The 
main problem is the light coordination between these actors.776 Indeed, in 2012 the SLIC stated 
in its position on the EU strategy for 2013–2020 that they “also feel that there is a scope for 
better coordination of the activities of European (and other) agencies including for example 
EU-OSHA, SLIC, ACSHW and EUROFOUND”.777 
Their work appears to be useful in monitoring and mapping the situation and supporting 
decision-making. However, some scholars, such as Smismans, have illustrated the weak 
influence of the EU-OSHA on the European Commission’s decision-making.778 According to 
him, the information collected by the EU-OSHA does not match the Commission’s policy 
priorities, and the coordination between them is insufficient. In his research, Smismans also 
argues that the information collected by the EU-OSHA might not be reliable. The information 
is provided by the national authorities, which might have an interest in presenting only the best 
aspects of their work, which might not reflect reality. This concern can be extended to all the 
agencies and committee working on OHS in coordination with the Commission. 
To fulfil their functions with limited resources, the agencies and the committees have 
to rely on the national authorities to provide the necessary data to map the situation in the EU. 
However, if they provide information that shows weak or non-compliance, there is a risk that 
the Commission will use this information against the MS. Therefore, there is no incentive for 
the MS to provide a true picture. The existing actors might suffer from the lack of independence 
from the commissions, and, therefore, cannot build a solid relationship with the MS. This limit 
has also been underlined by Cremers, who argues that 
 
 
776 Cremers, J., 2017. The enhanced inspection of collctively agreed working conditions: An assessment of the 
compliance files, based on the Social Pact 2013. p.5 
777 EU strategy Priorities, 2013–2020. A submission from the SLIC. Point 31 
778 See Smismans, S., 2004. Law, legitimacy and European governance: functional participation in social 
regulation. Oxford University Press. pp.260-290 
  
 
196 
these bodies are facing constraints in their ability to provide support to national 
authorities due to lack of executive and operational powers. There is little direct 
involvement in the operational work that is needed.779 
6.3.2. The SLIC: Torn between national and European concerns and realities 
The SLIC is the principal committee and actor that deals with the enforcement of EU 
OHS standards. Thus, an analysis of the previous work done by the SLIC between 2010 and 
2017 provides useful insights into the current EU position on the enforcement of EU OHS 
standards. 780 Two (sometimes contradictory) themes emerge from the SLIC publications 
regarding the suitability of actions at the European level to ensure the enforcement of OHS 
standards. On one side, the SLIC expressed its intention to give priority to the national level to 
enforce OHS standards. On the other side, in some of its work during its campaigns, the SLIC 
defended a more “European orientated” action plan. 781 
6.3.2.1. The importance of the national over the European level 
As indicated above, the SLIC is a committee that aims to coordinate the national LIs 
and assist the Commission; it is a mediator between the national and the European levels 
regarding the enforcement of OHS standards. To fulfil its role of coordinator through the 
exchange of information, the SLIC has developed networking activities that have been central 
to horizontal cooperation between the national LIs since the 1980s.782 However, as underlined 
by Hartlapp, these activities seek to implement binding EU social policies through the 
improvement of national enforcement capacity.783 
The approach of the SLIC can be qualified as bottom-up, in opposition to top-down, 
which would be a European action applied to the MS. This focus on the national level is 
confirmed by the SLIC’s evaluation team, which emphasises that sharing experiences among 
LIs is of the utmost importance for the correct and effective performance of inspection and 
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enforcement activities.784 This position has also been held in the integrated and strategic 
response to the Commission work programme provided by the SLIC in 2012, enhancing OHS 
governance, improving implementation, and promoting health and safety at the workplace: the 
EU Strategic priorities 2013-2020; a submission from the SLIC.785 At that time, the 
Commission wanted to reduce the number of pieces of legislation. The SLIC emphasised that 
this reduction should not be at the cost of reducing standards in the workplace. It suggested that 
the EU legislation should focus more on defining its goals than prescribing “one size fits all” 
solutions. 
In the SLIC submission, the SLIC stated that three tests should be applied when new 
directives are under consideration: the possibility to use means other than regulation, a cost–
benefit analysis, and a practical assessment of the means for compliance by duty holders and 
enforcement. This emphasised the wish to use primarily soft law to support the national level 
before adopting a new directive at the European level. The SLIC also mentioned that the EU 
strategy should acknowledge “that measures and targets may be better to be set within the 
supporting action plans prepared by each Member State, rather than being uniformly imposed”. 
Therefore, the approach of EU OHS enforcement by the SLIC can be described as a bottom-up 
dynamic. The following statement confirms this approach: 
A strategy should focus on a modest number of priorities of wide concern and significant 
potential harm, rather than try to be comprehensive. We suggest […] a broad goal is 
set so as to describe the outcome required, that Member States can then plan to achieve 
in ways that reflect their individual priorities or circumstances. We would make the 
general point here that problems are not uniform across countries, nor are the means 
we each use to monitor and evaluate progress; nor is such uniformity essential to 
collective progress. However, we are not advocating that the priorities be optional; MS 
should appropriately address each but with flexibility as their approach, reflecting 
national circumstances.786 
In terms of impact, it seems that the SLIC reports have influenced the national level. 
For example, in Sweden, there have been moves to rate employers using qualitative checks and 
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publish the results in response to one of the SLIC reports.787 In Portugal, the national authorities 
have taken initiatives to address the issues of safety of machinery in the workplace based on 
the Machex network set-up by SLIC.788 Moreover, the Council of the EU officially recognised 
that it considers the opinion given by the SLIC.789 It seems that the current approach is actively 
contributing to improving the enforcement of EU OHS standards. 
However, the position that “problems are not uniform across countries” should be 
discussed. This Commission recognises that new mechanisms have become necessary to allow 
national enforcement systems to remain functioning in a changing environment.790 It has also 
been shown that national administrations put topics on the SLIC agenda whenever they feel a 
loss or a challenge of national authority and need the cooperation of other national 
administrations.791 Therefore, while recognising the economic and cultural differences between 
the MS, there are some common structural problems,792 and the EU should be active in ensuring 
better coordination regarding the enforcement of OHS standards. Interestingly, the need for 
European action seems partially recognised by the SLIC itself. 
6.3.2.2. The recognition of a European action to complement national level  
In 2014, the working group (WG) “Impact of the Crisis on LI” was set up to carry out 
a study of the evolution of EU LI in recent years, including a study on the resources available 
to each national LI. They found that the most common measures adopted were budget cuts, 
downsizing of LI, salary reduction, no promotions, no recruitment, reduction in the number of 
cars and offices, reorganisation at the national and regional level, and redirecting activities. The 
study ran between 2008 and 2014 and confirmed the common obstacles mentioned previously. 
It also emphasised the change in the statement of the SLIC regarding the national situation of 
the LI. Here we can see that the SLIC has been divided between the necessity to align, even 
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partially, with the Commission’s vision that emphasised national enforcement, and the results 
of its campaigns that require actions at the European level. 
During its campaigns, the SLIC held a more European-orientated vision and recognised 
the weaknesses of national enforcement. 793 In a 2008 campaign report, the SLIC concluded 
that there was a high level of non-compliance with Directive 90/269/EEC: more than 80% of 
companies inspected in transport and healthcare had some intervention.794 The WG also noticed 
that fatal and severe workplace accidents were continuing to occur throughout Europe. 
Additionally, some general problems were stressed by the report, such as cross-border 
problems, that the national companies in international transport have to deal with because of 
the logistic health unawareness of other countries. Cross-border challenges also come from the 
risk assessment on manual handling that is not common in several countries. 
The report also mentioned that there is still a Europe-wide gap in the interpretation of 
the directive.795 This illustrates that, on some topics, the MS are facing the same problems due 
to divergences in national approaches. It proves the need to develop a common framework and 
guidance for the implementation of the directive while respecting the national specificities. 
Also, in the campaign report on risks of chemicals in the workplace, the SLIC added that one 
objective was to push for some degree of harmonisation of enforcement of the related 
legislation.796 Cross-border enforcement has been an issue of cooperation in the SLIC since its 
founding.797 One answer to the cross-border issue has been to develop the exchange of 
knowledge. Information is exchanged via annual reports that describe not only the structure and 
organisation of labour inspection but also the activities, types of inspection, and strategies 
implemented.798 
In 1997, common principles were adopted to help the systematisation of the exchange 
of information. For example, the WG Machex proposed starting a group that would develop a 
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European database for the exchange of national requirements and results of the inspection of 
work equipment. Additionally, the SLIC published a handbook on labour inspection and more 
specific recommendations. There is an E-handbook, Cross-border Enforcement on 
Occupational Safety and Health by SLIC Inspectorates, completed by National Answers, of all 
the MS (2015–2016). In 2012, one of the SLIC working groups, Machex, submitted a proposal 
for a common European guide establishing the minimum requirements to ensure the 
competency of persons who conduct the periodic examinations of the tower and mobile crane 
assembly. 
Meanwhile, in order to increase awareness of the differences between national 
enforcement, the SLIC developed an inspector exchange scheme. These exchanges aim to 
promote at least one of the following activities: (1) facilitation of cooperation between LIs, (2) 
promotion of joint action with regards to specific sectors or risk, (3) encouragement of training 
programmes on innovative approaches and good practices to achieving compliance. In 2009, 
there were twenty-two, one-week exchange visits presented as offering a unique opportunity 
for individual inspectors to gain knowledge and direct practical experience of the inspection 
practices and techniques of another MS. However, it seems evident that the number of 
inspectors benefiting from these exchanges cannot have a systemic impact in all the MS against 
the challenge of cross-border enforcement.799 Therefore, the idea of developing joint 
inspections has moved more prominently onto the agenda as increasing numbers of workers are 
crossing borders since the adoption of the directives on the posting of workers and service 
liberalisation.800 Thus, substantial attention has been devoted to the cross-border enforcement 
of EU OHS in sectors that are strongly exposed to the movement of workers and services. 
6.3.3. Conclusion 
To summarise, the existing European actors which have a mandate related to OHS do 
not have executive power and are all mainly supporting, in one way or another, the Commission, 
which is the sole institution to have executive power. However, as shown in the second chapter 
of the thesis, the action of the Commission is highly politicised. Additionally, the examination 
of publications by the SLIC in recent years underlines the duality of the visions and calls for 
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improvement of the enforcement of EU OHS standards. On the one hand, we have the 
confirmation that the SLIC and the Commission will maintain their roles as coordinators and 
try to respect the sovereignty of the MS. However, on the other hand, it seems that there is an 
increasing awareness of the current challenge — especially the cross-border work relationships. 
To address these specific challenges, it is necessary to have an independent authority at the EU 
level, ideally with executive power, that could act in place of the MS. In 2017, after years of 
debates, the Commission finally announced the creation of such an authority: the ELA. 
6.4. The European Labour Authority: New Hope or Missed Opportunity? 
In September 2017, President Juncker of the European Commission announced the 
creation of the ELA, a new European inspection and enforcement body for ensuring fairness in 
the single market. The Commission also created a European Advisory Group for the ELA with 
the mission to facilitate cooperation among national authorities and stakeholders and advise the 
Commission on the swift establishment and future operational functioning of the ELA.801 
Current literature focusing on the ELA either mentions it within the broader context of the 
EPSR or mentions that the authority represented a potential improvement in the field of social 
policy, 802 especially regarding the debates around the Posted Workers Directive (PWD).803 One 
author, Jan Cremers, has published in-depth analyses and work of the ELA, addressing how the 
ELA would answer current challenges.804 However, heretofore, no work has looked at what the 
ELA will be and what it could have been, drawing connections to the challenges facing the 
 
 
801Commission decision (EU) 2018/402; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3596&news=1 
802 See Kilpatrick, C. and De Witte, B., 2019. A tangible human face for social Europe. RSCAS Policy Papers 
2019/02. p.3; Bonciu, F., 2018. The European Pillar of Social Rights: Too Little, Too Late. Romanian J. Eur. 
Aff., 18, p.64; Dhéret, C., 2018. European Pillar of Social Rights: Member states must shoulder the responsibility 
of delivery. EPC Commentary, 16 March 2018; Duarte, F., 2019. The Politics of Austerity and Social Citizenship 
Rights: A Case Study of the Impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the Welfare State in Portugal (Doctoral 
dissertation, Carleton University) p.226; Vanhercke, B., Ghailani D. and Sabato S., 2018. Social policy in the 
European Union: state of play 2018. ETUI. pp.84-86; Hay, C. and Bailey, D., 2019. Diverging Capitalisms. 
Springer International Publishing, p.190; see Karlson, N. and Wennerberg, F., 2018. The European Social Pillar: 
A Threat to Welfare and Prosperity? (No. 314). The Ratio Institute; Pelkmans, J., 2019. A fair single market for 
EU prosperity, RSCAS Policy Papers 2019/03 p.7 
803 See Barslund, M., Busse, M. and De Wispelaere, F., 2017. Posted workers–for some it matters. CEPS Policy 
Insights, (2017/37). p.8; Bublitz, E., 2018. The European Single Market at 25. Intereconomics 53, p.342; Milanese, 
N., 2019. Democratizing Europe’s Economy. Carnegie Europe p.2; Lindstrom, N., 2019. What's Left for ‘Social 
Europe’? Brexit and Transnational Labour Market Regulation in the UK-1 and the EU-27. New Political 
Economy, 24(2), p.287 
804 See Cremers, J., 2017. The enhanced inspection of collectively agreed working conditions: An assessment of 
the compliance files, based on the Social Pact 2013. 
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national LIs in enforcing EU OHS standards and addressing how the ELA can address these 
obstacles. 
This section is based on an in-depth analysis of the official publication from the 
Commission on the ELA: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a European Labour Authority COM(2018) 131.805 There 
are three main parts. First, there is an analysis of the current political context, which provides a 
better understanding of the rationale behind the creation of the ELA. Then, there is an analysis 
of the legal basis for EU intervention, which is crucial to identify the possible scope of action 
of the ELA. Finally, there is an overview of the various possibilities regarding the functions, 
the role, and the delivery options. This section ends with the conclusion that the ELA could 
have had the potential to address the obstacles faced by the national LIs effectively and to lead 
to a real improvement in the enforcement of OHS standards. Unfortunately, the option chosen 
was to create an upgraded version of the existing actors. It is, therefore, likely that ELA’s future 
impact will be limited. 
6.4.1. The context of social crisis and the urge for a commitment by the EU 
Regarding the more general issue of enforcement in social Europe, an academic study 
found two points that would need to be improved. 806 First, the researcher emphasised that to 
achieve an equivalent implementation, it would be necessary to improve the coordination with 
and within MS with weak national enforcement systems. Second, cooperation at the EU level 
would have to be improved to enforce the application of binding EU social policies that exist 
in cross-border situations. A variety of stakeholders and institutions have previously expressed 
a similar sentiment. In 2013, the Commissioner in charge of the internal market, Michel 
Barnier, asked for the creation of a European “control agency to coordinate and strengthen the 
mandate of labour inspectors”.807 Then in 2016, in the report against social dumping, the 
Eurodeputy, Guillaume Balas, openly advocated for the creation of a European body of cross-
 
 
805 The Commission Staff working documents: “Stakeholder Consultation – Synompsis Report”, “Impact 
Assessment” SWD(2018)69 final, and the “Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment” SWD(2018)68 final 
806 See Hartlapp, M., 2014. Enforcing social Europe through labour inspectorates: Changes in capacity and 
cooperation across Europe. West European Politics, 37(4), pp.805-824. 
807 “Barnier propose une agence européenne d’inspection du travail” Reuters, 3 December 2013. In recent years, 
the Jacques Delos Institute supported this idea: see Rinalid D.(2016) A new Start for Social Europe, Jacques 
Delors Institute, February 2016. 
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border LIs.808 The same year, the EP followed up on his idea in a resolution by underlining the 
need to ensure proper implementation of EU legislation on cross-border labour mobility, asking 
for the reinforcement of controls and coordination between and by MS. The aim would be to 
promote standardisation and cooperation,809 including through the strengthening of information 
exchanges between LIs.810 The EP recommendations are formulated to address the more general 
problems faced by LIs in the EU.811 The EP previously provided policy recommendations to 
promote cross-border cooperation between national authorities, combined with legal initiatives 
to strengthen the role of labour inspections. Aware of the limited competency of inspectorates 
in cross-border situations, the EP called on the Commission and the MS to ensure that labour 
inspections can be appropriately conducted in cross-border situations, regardless of a 
company’s place of establishment.812 
The need for coordination has previously been expressed at a different level, and before 
the ELA, nothing had been done because there were problems at the national and the European 
level.813 At the national level, there was inadequate cooperation between national authorities on 
rule enforcement because of internal struggles, but also because they had difficulty working 
together. These difficulties could be due to the profound cross-country differences in staff and 
roles on competent authorities or the lack of information due to differences in linguistic and 
digital resources. Here, there is a failure at the European level to compensate or support the 
MS. Currently, the set-up at the EU level is fragmented, with several EU committees and 
networks operating on the basis of different legal acts and scopes of action. Additionally, as 
mentioned previously, none of them has decision-making or operational power or has very little. 
The EU should provide a framework and tools for administrative cooperation between MS. 
Currently, there are weak, not to say absent, mechanisms for joint cross-border enforcement 
activities.  
 
 
808 Ballas, G. DRAFT REPORT on social dumping in the European Union (2015/2255(INI)) Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs p.4  
809 European Parliament resolution of 14 September 2016, on social dumping in the European Union 
(2015/2255(INI)) 
810 European Parliament resolution of 14 January 2014, on effective labour inspections as a strategy to improve 
working conditions in Europe (2013/2112(INI)) 
811 See details of the problem faced by LIs in the first section of this chapter 
812 Fernandes S. (2018) What is our ambition for the European Labour Authority? Notre Europe. p.9  
813 “There is scarcely any complaint or redress mechanism in the social field concerning the internal market rules 
that regulate the economic freedoms”.  
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To address these issues, European Commission President Juncker announced the 
creation of the ELA during the “Social Summit” on the 17 November 2017. The discussions 
between heads of state or government at the summit showed much common ground on the need 
for Europe to be equipped with a strong and tangible social dimension.814 This summit featured 
the launch of the European Pillar of Social Right (EPSR), which was one of the ten priorities 
presented by Juncker before the EP.815 The EPSR drives the EU’s social agenda at all levels 
and aims to help the EU move towards upward social convergence in the single market. It is 
about delivering new and more effective rights to citizens to ensure equal opportunities and 
access to the labour market, fair working conditions, and social protection and inclusion. It was 
designed as a compass for a renewed process of convergence towards better working and living 
conditions across the Union.816 
The EPSR has been described as a recent and rare initiative that aims to support, rather 
than deregulate labour market and welfare systems.817 Some researchers underlined that the 
EPSR on its own does not necessarily change much but can have a meaningful impact if the 
stakeholders allow.818 It is a tool, and its impact depends on how it is used. The support from 
all the key stakeholders will be crucial, starting with the MS and continuing with the EU 
institutions and European social partners. The same logic applies to the ELA. This future 
authority is linked to the EPSR as part of the “Social Fairness Package”. Some commentators 
have indicated that although the package demonstrates a strong social commitment at the EU 
level, it will fail to provide effective delivery of the EPSR’s goals without a shared commitment 
at the national level.819 
 
 
814 European Commission – Press release. Europe’s social dimension: President Juncker and Prime Minister 
Löfven present way forward after the Social Summit, 28 November 2017. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-4973_en.htm 
815 Junker, J.C. 2014. A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. 
Political Guidelines for the next European Commission, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary 
Session pp.6-7 
816 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final 
817 Rasnača, Z., 2017. Bridging the gaps or falling short? The European Pillar of Social Rights and what it can 
bring to EU-level policymaking. Working Paper 2017.05, ETUI, Brussels. p.5 
818 Ibid. p.8 
819 Dhéret, C., 2018. European Pillar of Social Rights: Member states must shoulder the responsibility of delivery. 
EPC Commentary, 16 March 2018. 
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After the announcement of the creation of the ELA in September 2017, former 
Eurodeputy Balas, who mentioned the idea of such an authority in early 2016, reacted by saying 
that the ELA should be able to adopt “decisions” when companies or national authorities do not 
apply rules and take sanctions against national authorities.820 Some commentators questioned 
the feasibility of such an authority considering that, until now, there had been a fragile 
institutional framework for coordinating LIs across the Union.821 For them, going from a nearly 
non-existent European institutional role to a common authority that would “carry out cross-
border inspections to fight abuse of workers and potentially settle disputes between national 
labour watchdogs” was difficult to justify on either policy or political grounds.822 Other 
commentators underlined that the discussions conducted in 2019 were crucial to guarantee that 
the future authority would bring a real added value within the EU functioning.823  
Indeed, the creation of the ELA might have to face strong resistance by national 
governments over the principle of subsidiarity, mainly because the enforcement of labour 
mobility touches a national competence.824 Fernandes underlined the risk of having a “minimal” 
agreement between the MS that would miss the point. To avoid this scenario, Fernandes 
emphasised that it will be imperative to insist on the dual argument in favour of the creation of 
the ELA, recall the cost of the non-creation of the ELA, and follow an incremental approach in 
setting up the ELA. However, he also underlined the potential of such an authority to help fulfil 
the EU’s objective of being a social market economy. Cremers published an extensive report 
on the ELA in which he highlighted that some crucial questions regarding the details of the 
functioning of the ELA also need to be addressed in the discussion in 2019.825 
 
 
 820 Stupp, C., 2017.Commission wants new EU labour authority to crack down on worker abuse. Euractiv – 
accessible : https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/commission-wants-new-eu-labour-authority-
to-crack-down-on-worker-abuse/ 
821 Beblavý, M., 2017. Is Juncker’s enthusiasm for a common labour authority premature? CEPS Commentary, 18 
September 2017. 
 822 Stupp, C., 2017.Commission wants new EU labour authority to crack down on worker abuse. Euractiv – 
accessible : https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/commission-wants-new-eu-labour-authority-
to-crack-down-on-worker-abuse/ 
823 Fernandes S. 2018. What is our ambition for the European Labour Authority? Notre Europe. Policy Paper n°219 
p.2  
824Barslund, M., Busse, M. and De Wispelaere, F., 2017. Posted workers–for some it matters. CEPS Policy 
Insights, (2017/37) p.8 
825 Such as: which relevant stakeholder can ask for activation of the authority? What happens in the event of non-
compliance with binding decisions? Should the ELA have executive power with direct punitive authority?- See 
Cremers, J., 2018. Reflections on a European labour authority: Mandate, main tasks and open questions. Brussels: 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p.14; see also Cremers, J., 2017. The enhanced inspection of collectively agreed working 
conditions: An assessment of the compliance files, based on the Social Pact 2013. pp.6-7 
  
 
206 
Between the 6th of November 2017 and the 7th of January 2018, the European 
Commission launched a double consultation to explore the views of citizens (the open public 
consultation; OPC) and stakeholders (the targeted consultation) on the establishment of an 
ELA. The majority of OPC respondents agreed that the existing cooperation between national 
authorities was insufficient to ensure the effective implementation of EU employment and 
social security rules in cross-border situations. 826 They also raised concerns about the lack of 
common EU standards for cross-border cooperation on employment and social security matters 
and the associated administrative costs. Thus, it appears that public opinion is aware of the 
problems mentioned above and, therefore, the need to take action. 
Regarding the future function of the ELA, the OPC respondents were overall in favour 
of all the options suggested by the Commission.827 Among the respondents who provided 
further explanations, they expressed their belief that the ELA could improve data collection and 
communication with added value in terms of law enforcement, dispute resolution, social 
dumping prevention, and support of national authorities posting workers.828 Overall, it seemed 
that European citizens were in favour of the proposal of the Commission, which is different 
from the position of the targeted stakeholders. 829 
The targeted stakeholders were practitioners, including MS, public authorities, and 
social partners. Many of them recognised that differences in administrative capacity between 
the MS act as a barrier to effective cooperation.830 Indeed, specific and complex national 
administrative landscapes and the lack of streamlined procedures, often with implications for 
institutional capacity, impede effective cooperation. In its common position, the PES Network 
added that challenges to cross-border mobility and social security coordination remain as 
systems in the EU are still not harmonised. They also acknowledge the fragmentation of efforts 
to address cross-border mobility issues and the problem of having a weak or absent mechanism 
for joint cross-border investigations and dispute settlements. Although the majority of 
 
 
826 Commission Staff Working Document. Stakeholder Consulation – Synopsis Report. Accompanying the 
document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour 
Authority COM(2018) 131 final. p.2 - 67% in total: 33% Agree, 34% Strongly agree  
827 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final p.7 
828 Ibid. pp.7-8 
829 To the extent of the people who replied to the consultation. 
830 Ibid p.4 
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stakeholders agree on the nature of the problems and the need to address them, there are deep 
divergences on the ways to do so. 
 One possible solution to the problem of having a weak or absent mechanism for 
dispute settlement would be to acknowledge it, prompting the initiative to create a better 
system. Here, there are significant divergences regarding the nature of these potential 
mechanisms. Some stakeholders (like Business Europe) are sceptical of the idea of giving the 
ELA a dispute resolution function due to the potential interference with the CJEU. Surprisingly, 
the ETUC is also against legally binding mechanisms to resolve the disputes and is in favour 
of “out-of-court” solutions. However, the legally binding nature of the decision of the future 
ELA is crucial for its effectiveness. 
A study suggested that ELA could intervene when dialogue between the national 
stakeholders failed. Then, it would be appropriate to provide the ELA with the possibility of 
appealing directly to the CJEU for a decision, if the ELA is unable to reconcile the viewpoints 
or find a solution.831 It would also mean that if the ELA can adopt some binding decisions, the 
MS should have the right to appeal to the CJEU.832 In the current political context and given 
the fragility of the CJEU’s authority, it is not guaranteed that a compromise will be found 
among the MS in favour of an extension of the CJEU’s authority over a national matter, even 
if giving up on that part might weaken the entire aim of the ELA. 
Interestingly (and contrary to the opinion expressed via the OPC) a smaller share of the 
respondents to the targeted consultation was in favour of an ELA with advanced functions that 
would imply greater responsibility for inspection and enforcement activities. This position 
towards the ELA illustrates a broader dynamic from the MS regarding the development of the 
so-called “social Europe”. Indeed, there has been a previous attempt by the EU to act in the 
social field, but some MS saw this as an intrusion in the national welfare systems.833 Often, the 
MS argue that there is a need to preserve the national labour law and social models from 
European influence.834 There is a strong paradox: on one side, there is an admitted need for 
 
 
831 Fernandes S. What is our ambition for the European Labour Authority ? Notre Europe. p.12 
832 Ibid. p.13 
833 Rasnača, Z., 2017. Bridging the gaps or falling short? The European Pillar of Social Rights and what it can 
bring to EU-level policymaking. Working Paper 2017.05, ETUI, Brussels. p.7 
834 See Lamping W., 2010. Mission Impossible? Limits and Perils of Institutionalizing Post- National Social 
Policy, in Ross M. and Borgmann-Prebil Y. (eds.) Promoting Solidarity in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp.46–72  
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some EU-level social policy, but on the other side, there are protective tendencies concerning 
national systems. The result is a fragmented, incomplete, and ineffective legal framework that 
is partly subordinate to the market. Therefore, the positions of some stakeholders (i.e., MS) 
might have been an obstacle to an interesting European initiative from the Commission that has 
the support of European citizens. 
6.4.2. The legal basis for the establishment of the European Labour Authority 
Even though the ELA is part of the “Social Fairness Package”, its legal basis is not 
provided by the social part of the European Treaties. Considering that it covers the issue of 
labour mobility, it can be broadly connected to working conditions in general, and the social 
security it might have instinctively fallen under the scope of the social provisions of the TFEU, 
meaning Art. 151, Art. 153, and Art.156. However, this would strongly limit the ambition and 
potential of an EU initiative. Indeed, according to the provisions mentioned above, the Union 
shall support and complement the activities of the MS by encouraging the cooperation between 
MS through initiatives aimed at improving knowledge, developing exchanges of information 
and best practices, promoting innovative approaches, and evaluating experiences.835 The Union 
shall also encourage cooperation and the coordination of national action by making studies, 
delivering opinions, and preparing the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and 
evaluation. 
The Union is already doing this with the actors mentioned in the previous section: the 
SLIC, EU-OSHA, Eurofound, and ACSH. Their actions are useful and appropriate in the 
institutional context, but they have little or no executive power. Moreover, their actions are not 
suitable to address the challenges raised by cross-border situations, and to a certain extent, the 
problem faced at the national level by LIs. Additionally, if the Union had based the ELA on 
this basis, it should have acted by means of directives, which are minimum requirements. 
Furthermore, because of the scope of action that would cover the “social security and social 
protection of workers”, the Council shall act unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure after consulting the EP and the European Social Committee.836 
 
 
835 Art. 153(1) of the TFEU 
836 Art. 153 of the TFEU 
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Considering the divergence on the political picture mentioned above, it would have been 
unlikely to reach a unanimous vote on such a proposal. 
Therefore, the Commission has chosen a different approach with the legal basis for the 
ELA as it pertains to the free movement of persons and services and the right to 
establishment.837 Indeed, the ELA’s main task could be restricted to infringements related to 
labour mobility or cross-border recruitment, which find their origins in the functioning and 
application of the EU’s economic freedoms.838 Thus, the articles applicable are Articles 46, 48, 
53(1), 62, and 91(1) TFEU. These articles have the advantage of being more “fitting” to the 
specific and narrow context of cross-border situations. Additionally, based on these articles, the 
EP and the Council can act in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. This means 
that if the Commission issues a positive opinion on the reviewed proposal, the Council decides 
based on qualified majority voting, which would be necessary in the current political context. 
Additionally, in this setting, it is possible for the EU to issue directives or make 
regulations setting out the necessary measures. The fact that the Commission wants to act with 
a regulation has the advantage of being legally binding in every MS and would enter into force 
without the need for national implementation. It will most likely increase its effectiveness. 
Therefore, basing the creation of the ELA on economic freedoms increases its potential for 
effectiveness. However, it also subordinates the social step of the construction of the European 
model to the economic umbrella and might limit its ambitions in the long-term. Also, the ELA 
proposal does not fall under the exclusive competence of the EU. Thus, the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality apply.839 The Commission justified its proposal, emphasising 
that the objectives of the ELA cannot be sufficiently achieved by the MS at a national, regional, 
or local level and can be better achieved at Union level. The reason is that the cross-border 
situation needs to be coordinated at the Union level, and so no MS can act alone. 
Moreover, to ensure legal certainty for administrations and individuals, it is necessary 
to develop a coordinated and joint approach at the Union level rather than relying on a complex 
 
 
837 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final p.23  
838 Fernandes S. What is our ambition for the European Labour Authority? Notre Europe. p.12  
839 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
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network of bilateral or multilateral agreements. Regarding the proportionality principle, the 
Commission stresses that the proposal is a proportional response to the need for operational 
support and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this goal. According to the 
Commission, the ELA would not impose new obligations on MS, individuals, or employers. It 
is likely the ELA will not impose direct new obligations (it will simply enforce existing rules) 
but might need to create some indirectly in order to ensure its functioning and effective 
cooperation and coordination between the MS. 
In the risk assessment, the Commission underlined that the proposal does not trespass 
on national competences or enforcement activities. This part and the details on the functioning 
of the ELA will be crucial. To ensure its effectivity, the Commission might have to search for 
the extreme limit of the proportionality principle. 
6.4.3. Possible futures of the European Labour Authority 
6.4.3.1. The possible functions of the European Labour Authority 
In the risk assessment, the Commission explicitly stated the options that have been 
discarded at an early stage.840 It is clear that the ELA will not justify a transfer of new 
competencies from the national to the European level. Therefore, the rule of enforcement and 
inspection responsibilities are the competencies of national authorities. Respecting the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, these competencies will not be transferred in any 
way to the Union level. This implies a rejection of the creation of a European LI or more 
competencies and powers granted to the European Commission. All the institutional 
stakeholders and social partners oppose this solution. However, to achieve the initial aim of the 
ELA — especially in terms of coordination and cooperation — standardisation of inspections 
and the LI will be necessary. This will still be the responsibility of the MS, but further actions 
by the Union might be required. The ELA may not be the opportunity to create a European LI, 
but it might be the occasion to re-frame the national inspectorates to allow them to work 
together. 
 
 
840 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
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Meanwhile, the various policy options for the ELA and its tasks are explained in 
detail.841 In order to address the identified challenges and achieve effective cross-border labour 
mobility, seven general tasks are envisaged at the EU level. These include labour mobility 
services and information for individuals and businesses, cooperation and exchange of 
information between national authorities, support for joint inspection, cross-border labour 
mobility analyses and risk assessment, capacity building, mediation between national 
authorities, and facilitation of cooperation in cases of labour market disruption. Three policy 
options have been considered (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Synoptic Overview of Policy Options in Relation to Tasks842 
Tasks Policy Option 1 
(Support Option) 
Policy Option 2 
(Operational Option) 
Policy Option 3 
(Supervisory Option) 
1. Labour mobility 
information and 
services for 
individuals and 
businesses 
Definition of user 
needs and business 
requirements of the 
EURES Portal. 
Cooperation with 
relevant initiatives, 
tools and bodies at 
EU and the national 
level (e.g., Your 
Europe, Border Focal 
Point, national 
services). 
Coordination and 
enhancement of the 
EURES network. 
Technical support to 
MS for the provision 
of services at the 
national level, 
including 
compliance with 
relevant obligations 
(e.g., SDG and 
enforcement 
directive on posting).  
Establishment of 
standards for the 
provision of services 
at the national level 
based on EU rules. 
Establishment of a 
single physical 
national contact 
point on labour 
mobility.  
2. Cooperation and 
exchange of 
information between 
national authorities  
Coordination of role 
and liaison point 
between existing 
bodies.  
Active support and 
expertise to 
competent 
authorities, ensuring 
cooperation and 
promoting the 
exchange of 
information through 
the use of relevant IT 
tools (ESSI, IMI).  
Establishment of 
mandatory 
requirements on 
information 
exchange, where not 
provided for by 
current EU 
legislation. 
Development and 
inventory of user-
friendly templates to 
enhance the 
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comparability of 
national procedures.  
3. Support for joint 
inspections  
Support for member 
states in coordinating 
joint inspections, i.e., 
organisation of 
coordination 
meetings and 
development of 
model agreements.  
Pro-active proposals 
for joint inspections, 
logistical support, 
monitoring and 
follow-up.  
Possibility to launch 
(joint) inspections on 
its own initiative. 
Management of 
European Inspection 
Corps (drawing on 
member states’ 
inspectorates).  
4. Cross-border 
labour mobility 
analyses and risk 
assessment  
Sharing of studies 
and analyses by 
relevant EU bodies.  
Analyses, risk 
assessment, data 
collection, peer 
reviews and follow-
up 
recommendations.  
In-depth assessments 
of member states. 
5. Capacity building  Coordination of 
mutual learning 
activities across all 
mobility areas.  
Set-up of 
comprehensive 
mutual learning, 
training and 
technical assistance 
programmes, 
exchange of best 
practices.  
Development of pilot 
code for labour 
inspections.  
6. Mediation 
between national 
authorities  
Provision of expert 
opinion upon request 
on all mobility areas.  
Facilitation of 
dispute settlement 
across all areas by 
mediation, including 
the possibility to 
adopt 
recommendations.  
Development of pilot 
on out-of-court 
dispute settlement.  
7. Facilitation of 
cooperation in cross-
border labour 
disruptions 
Awareness-raising 
among stakeholders 
about the EU Quality 
Framework for 
Anticipation of 
Change and 
Restructuring (QFR) 
and of relevant EU 
legislation and 
financial 
instruments.  
Upon request, set-up 
of ad hoc support to 
national authorities 
and stakeholders to 
facilitate 
administrative 
cooperation, 
information sharing, 
and coordination in 
the event of cross-
border events of 
company 
restructuring.  
Issuing of 
recommendations as 
regards to the 
management of 
cross-border 
restructuring, and to 
the implementation 
of relevant EU 
legislation, including 
business insolvency 
and information and 
consultation of 
workers.  
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The first option would be a “support” function for the ELA, where the EU level would 
expand or coordinate existing activities or programmes or extend these from one specific area 
to all other mobility areas.843 This option would not change much of the current setting and 
would not strongly impact the enforcement of OHS standards. Therefore, it will not be 
investigated further in this chapter. 
This study focuses in detail on the “operational” and “supervisory” options, especially 
on the joint inspection and the conciliation mechanisms. The operational option would extend 
the scope of EU activities by adding some operational activities to the tasks mentioned in option 
1 (Table 1). The significant change would be (depending on the agreement with the involved 
MS) to assume the role of launching and providing coordination and logistical support to joint 
cross-border inspections, including action to ensure their follow-up. 
On that point, the supervisory option goes further and aims to achieve a more thorough 
EU-level integration of certain functions, which are not foreseen in the current framework yet 
are within the limits of EU competence. Regarding the joint inspections, the EU level would 
retain the right of initiative and would set-up a specialised European Inspection Corps 
composed of detached national experts. The EU level would also have the capacity to launch 
in-depth assessments of MS capacities for a thorough analysis of potential weaknesses and 
shortcomings. 
The first reaction of the institutional stakeholders was to underline the importance of 
respecting national competencies, particularly in the area of labour inspections, which should 
remain a national matter. They made it clear that the joint investigations should not be entrusted 
to national authorities. Also, the ELA should not interfere in the functioning of national labour 
inspections. However, some of them recognised the value of the ELA supporting national 
authorities in conducting joint cross-border investigations. Yet the role of the ELA should be 
limited to a complementary role in cross-border cases, providing technical and logistical 
support. 
 
 
843 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
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Regarding mediation in cross-border disputes, the operational option would build on the 
existing conciliation mechanism by formalising it with a mediation mechanism that would 
provide recommendations to the involved MS on how to solve issues identified. The 
supervisory option would go a step further by having a pilot out-of-court arbitration system for 
certain cases. In that case, the EU would not only provide guidance on available EU resources 
but also recommendations to national authorities and stakeholders on the effective application 
of relevant EU legislation. There is a divided position of the targeted stakeholders concerning 
the ELA being able to carry out dispute resolution mechanisms in cross-border and social 
security matters. They are split on whether the decisions should be binding or whether the 
process should be voluntary and decisions non-binding. 
In the risk assessment, the Commission ran a comparison of the different policy 
options.844 The comparison of the three policies was based on four criteria: effectiveness, i.e., 
meeting three specific objectives of the initiative; efficiency, i.e., the extent to which objectives 
can be achieved for a given cost (cost-effectiveness); and coherence, i.e., the coherence and 
contribution in meeting Union’s objectives and implementing relevant policy initiatives notably 
in the areas of the single market, justice, and fundamental rights. 
 
Table 2 - Comparison of Policy Options845 
 Policy Option 1 
(Support) 
Policy Option 2 
(Operational) 
Policy Option 3 
(Supervisory) 
Effectiveness 
(meeting objectives)  
0/+ ++ +++ 
Improved 
transparency and 
access to information 
0/+ ++ +++ 
Improved 
operational 
cooperation  
0/+ ++ ++/+++ 
 
 
844 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final pp.42-43  
845 Ibid p.43 
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Mediation in cross-
border disputes 
0/+ ++ +++ 
Efficiency 0/+ ++ - - 
Coherence 
(including 
fundamental rights) 
+ ++ ++ 
Note: For the purpose of comparing the impacts of options with the baseline scenario, all criteria have equal weight 
and a seven-stage qualitative grading scale is used: significant positive impact/gains (+++) medium (++), small 
(+), no impact (0), small negative impact/cost (-), medium (- -), significant (- - - ). 
 
It appears that the operational policy is preferred. According to the Commission, it 
achieves the best balance in meeting objectives; ensuring benefits (positive impacts) for 
national authorities, workers, and businesses without significantly increasing costs; and has the 
strong support of stakeholders.846 It has been judged that the supervisory option goes beyond 
what is needed in the current context, especially in activities related to joint inspections and 
labour mobility services for individuals and businesses. Indeed, the possibility of launching 
inspections on the ELA’s own initiative would limit the scope for national decision. Also, the 
idea of a European Inspection Corps could be a useful enhancement of national inspection 
capacity, but the establishment of such a system seems disproportionate compared to the size 
problem identified in the framework of this report. 
Thus, the question is whether the operational option might answer the problem that the 
national LIs are facing in the enforcement of OHS standards, considering that the ELA seems 
to be the only tangible Union answer. The first common problem noticed in the previous section 
was the lack of staff, as the LI workforces are overloaded in Europe. In that respect, the 
operational option does not help, and the supervisory option with the creation of a European 
Inspection Corps could be a relief for the national level, at least for cross-border inspections. 
The fact that the ELA would not have the initiative to launch the joint inspection places the 
responsibility to start the process at the national level. Considering that the national LIs are 
already facing difficulty in that area, it is unlikely that they will voluntarily start an additional 
process that might seem complex. However, in that respect the operational option supposedly 
 
 
846Ibid p.43  
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offers “logistical support, monitoring and follow-up”; depending on the details of these points, 
these might be of help for the national LIs. 
The real problem of the lack of staff is not resolved here — almost the contrary. 
Regarding the lack of resources and support, it seems clear that there is a rejection by the 
institutional stakeholders to evoke this topic at the Union level, considering that it is a national 
matter. This is why the supervisory option, with the establishment of physical national contact 
points on labour mobility (the European Inspection Corps) at the charge of the Union, could 
indirectly help the functioning of the national LIs. 847 It is disappointing that, at the moment, 
the Union does not even consider this a problem, hiding behind the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles. 
Concerning the issues raised in terms of lack of cooperation and coordination, and the 
increasing number of international and cross-border situations, the operational option seems to 
centralise, focus, and extend the approach already applied by the current European OHS actors 
(SLIC, EU-OSHA, Eurofound and ACSH) to cross-border situations with the publication of 
analyses, data collection, and peer reviews, promoting the exchange of information. This 
approach is showing limits and might not be strong enough to address the problem faced by the 
national LIs. Meanwhile, the supervisory option offers to establish standards for the provision 
of services at the national level based on EU rules and mandatory requirements on information 
exchange and to develop an inventory of user-friendly templates to compare the national 
procedures. This latter option would standardise — not harmonise — the documents used and 
could bring clarity and transparency to the national LIs. It might also address the problem of 
the high complexity of administrative papers at the national level. 
Also, it has been mentioned that in some MS, the organisation and legal framework 
might be a problem for the national LIs. If this is already a problem at the national level, it 
might also be the case for cross-border disputes where vastly different legal systems have to 
find a common situation. In that respect, the mediation offered with the operational option is a 
good start but might not be enough. However, one can raise the question of what would happen 
if mediation fails. Thus, the development of a pilot for out-of-court dispute settlements 
 
 
847 Even if it would financially impact the MS.  
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suggested in the supervisory option could be a good opportunity to resolve this problem, 
especially in the context of cross-border disputes. 
6.4.3.2. Possible delivery options 
Although the scope of action of the future ELA is something that has not been covered 
(at least not substantially) by existing EU actors (the Committee and agencies), it will cover 
their mandates to some extent. During the stakeholder consultation, some of them raised 
concerns about the risk of duplication or overlapping resulting from the co-existence of the 
ELA and other EU-level bodies. Thus, it has been clear that the creation of such an agency 
should not increase administrative complexity. 
Most of the responses from the OPC emphasised its coordinating role to improve 
existing EU tools and EU networks rather than create a new body with broader scope 
substituting already existing organisations. A small number of respondents asked for the 
establishment of a centralised EU body incorporating existing EU tools and network. This 
opposition regarding the creation of a new agency seems contradictory according to the OPC 
results on the existing problem and the agreement that further action should be taken. This 
incongruity might be due to a misunderstanding of the function and power of the current actors. 
Similarly, participants of the targeted consultation insisted that the role of the future 
authority should be limited to coordinating the work of MS bodies and existing EU-level bodies 
or mechanisms dealing with cross-border mobility. 848 The fact that the creation of the ELA 
should not imply a transfer of competencies away from the MS is a crucial point. The MS would 
rather improve the existing EU level structures than creating a new EU body as subsidiarity 
needs to be respected. Thus, the preferred option for several stakeholders is stronger 
cooperation between relevant existing EU bodies to address cross-border challenges without 
increasing their capacity or changing the way they are governed. Again, this seems inconsistent 
with the acknowledgement of the current issues and a need to act at the Union level. 
 
 
848 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final p.48 
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The current EU bodies are already showing some limits due to institutional limitation. 
Their investigations and recommendations are detailed and helpful, but not enough to address 
the current challenges. The requests of some institutional stakeholders to maintain the status 
quo, opposing the Commission’s initiative to create a new authority, appear to be slightly 
irresponsible. This illustrates a bigger problem in terms of the functioning of the EU; there is 
an urgent need to have a European answer to social concerns, and the institutional stakeholders 
are holding back to maintain control at the national level. Moreover, among the stakeholders 
that would be in favour of the creation of a new body, it is only to the extent that it will be a 
supportive network and will not have an authoritative role. The rationale is still to safeguard 
the competencies of national authorities. The positions expressed during the consultation 
indicate that the forthcoming discussions regarding the adoption of regulation for the creation 
of an ELA will be complicated in the current political context, even though there is a factual 
need for it. 
In its risk assessment, the Commission presented three delivery options: (1) a European 
Network will be established to coordinate existing EU labour mobility bodies, and the 
Commission will take on new operational tasks; (2) a new ELA will be established to perform 
operational tasks, building on existing labour mobility bodies; and (3) a new ELA will be 
established, building on an existing EU agency in the area of employment. 849 The network 
suggested that the first option would be composed of representatives from the existing EU 
bodies in the area of labour mobility and social security coordination. With this option, no new 
dedicated body would be created, and the existing EU bodies would remain unchanged; 
therefore, this option will not be investigated in further detail.850 However, both the second and 
third options lead to the creation of a new ELA. 
Under the second delivery option, the ELA is established as a new agency, following 
the Common Approach on EU decentralised agencies.851 This ELA would benefit from an 
independent legal status, would not be tripartite, and would focus on supporting the application 
 
 
849 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final pp.45-48 
850 See Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final p.45 for further details 
851Ibid p.46 
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of Union law based on an internal market legal basis. Its operational tasks would focus on 
supporting cooperation between competent authorities in cross-border matters. Also, the ELA 
would not be able to adopt binding decisions, would have to rely on the Commission and the 
MS, and would be addressed in the context of existing committees and networks, as currently 
applicable. In that case, the ELA would take over the role of seven existing bodies.852 It has 
been explicitly said that this option would not directly address certain aspects, such as 
improvement of the working environment or working conditions. 
Under the third delivery option, the ELA would be established through a merger with 
one of the existing EU agencies in the field of employment, namely Eurofound, Cedefop, or 
EU-OSHA. Here, the impact would be radically different, considering that two out of the three 
agencies considered are dealing with working conditions and one directly with OSH. The host 
agency would change its mandate to incorporate the new operational tasks of the ELA detailed 
above while continuing to deliver on its existing tasks. This option would be a two-steps-at-
once approach by having a specialised and dedicated staff while seeking synergies with the 
expertise and management of an existing agency. However, considering that none of these 
agencies has a cross-border mandate, and they are more research-orientated rather than 
operative, there would be an obligation to amend one of the existing agencies’ founding 
regulations.853 
Moreover, the labour mobility issues fall outside the current scopes of expertise of the 
agencies (except Eurofound, partially). This might mean that, in the short term, the 
effectiveness of the ELA will not match the current expectation. However, building on existing 
agencies — especially EU-OSHA and Eurofound — could have a beneficial impact in the long-
term. Indeed, that would give strength to the current agencies that already have strong expertise 
in employment (and so cross-border issues) and are already working with the other actors and 
 
 
852 (i) The EURES European Coordination Office, in order to deliver the task of coordinating information, 
guidance, and assistance services to individuals and businesses facilitating the exercise of the right to work in 
another EU country; (ii) the Conciliation Board from the AC, with a view on extending its scope beyond social 
security coordination matters to all labour mobility areas, as well as the (iii) Audit Board and the (iv) Technical 
Commission of the AC, due to their operational nature; (v) the European Platform to tackle Undeclared Work with 
a view to streamlining operational activities, notably on capacity-building, analysis, and joint inspections; (vi) the 
Expert committee on the Posting of Workers; and (vii) the Technical Committee on the Free Movement of 
Workers, on the grounds of their technical nature (exchange of information between public authorities). The is no 
mention of the SLIC. 
853 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
69 final p.54  
  
 
220 
EU bodies. That would facilitate the integration of the ELA. Moreover, building on existing 
staff and expertise could lead to interesting transdisciplinary progress, especially in OHS. It 
might be an indirect way to have an authority with a power of action in the OHS field. 
 
Table 3 - Comparison of Delivery Options 854 
 Delivery Option 1 
(European Network) 
Delivery Option 2 
(New Agency 
Building on Existing 
Bodies) 
Delivery Option 3 
(ELA Builds on 
Agency) 
Effectiveness 
(meeting objective) 
+ +++ +++ 
Transparency and 
access to information 
+ +++ +++ 
Improved 
operational 
cooperation 
+ +++ +++ 
Mediation between 
member states 
0 +++ +++ 
Efficiency 0 ++ + 
Coherence + +++ + 
Notes: For the purpose of comparison a seven-stage grading scale is used: significant positive impact/gains (+++), 
medium (++), small (+), no impact (0), small negative impact/cost (-), medium (- - ), significant ( - - - ). 
 
The Commission compared the various delivery options according to their 
effectiveness, efficiency (cost-effectiveness), and coherence (with the Union’s objectives in the 
areas of employment and social policy and concerning the general policy of the Union’s 
budgetary and organisational objectives). According to the Commission, the preferred option 
would be option 2, which also seems to be the most suitable in terms of proportionality. Once 
again, the Commission felt that the third option goes beyond what is necessary. The third option 
would involve an entirely different reform agenda in the mobility agenda. In the bigger picture, 
the third option might be an appropriate answer to bigger structural problems. However, even 
 
 
854 Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – SWD(2018) 
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221 
if it is what is necessary in theory, the position of the institutional stakeholders does not make 
this option suitable to the current political setting. 
To conclude, the Commission felt that the preferred option was to establish an ELA 
with an operational role, building on EU bodies in the area of labour mobility.855 This new 
authority will also develop further cooperation with existing agencies in the employment area, 
ensuring complementarities and adapting to their future evolution. Thus, the impact on the 
enforcement of OHS standards in cross-border employment situations will be small, and there 
will be no impact on the problem that the national LIs are facing. 
The supervisory policy option and the third delivery option could have at least left some 
opportunity for future evolution. In terms of improvement of the OHS standards, the current 
plan for the ELA started with potential but ended up being a missed opportunity. This illustrates 
the broader political crisis when it comes to building a social Europe today. 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to address the need to rethink the division of competences 
between the European and national level within the existing institutional scope regarding the 
enforcement of EU OHS standards — especially in the light of the cross-border dimension of 
OHS. The main question was whether the European Union can act in place of the national LIs, 
while empowering them to improve the enforcement of EU OHS standards. 
To address this question, an overview of the similarities and differences in the national 
way of enforcement by the LIs was provided. All the examples mentioned illustrate that the 
concept of sanctions and its various aspects are fundamental to ensure the enforcement of OHS 
standards in the MS. However, the differences between MS regarding the legal nature of 
sanctions, the amount of the fine, and the combination with soft enforcement can lead not only 
to inconsistency but also to a non-effectiveness of EU OHS standards within MS. This lack of 
a consistent method of applying the rules can affect the competitiveness of the MS. As shown 
 
 
855 See full details Commission impact assessment – Accompanying the document, Proposal for a Regulatory of 
the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority – COM (2018) 131 final – 
SWD(2018) 69 final pp.58-63 
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previously, action by the EU institutions might be possible to achieve a more consistent 
application of EU OHS standards. 
Additionally, not all the national LIs have the same problem, and the obstacles are not 
uniform, but it is possible to see a similar pattern among some MS. The problem is that the 
activities of the national LIs which are relevant for cross-border labour mobility end at the 
border because the mandate of the control and enforcement institutions is limited to the national 
territory. Ergo, joint activities beyond national borders need more legal backing.856 Thus, one 
can raise the idea that if arrangements regulating labour markets have been the cause of the 
complication of the functioning of the LIs, they can also be the solution by regulating 
differently, especially considering the functions and powers of the existing actors having a 
mandate on OHS at the European level (i.e., SLIC, ACSH, Eurofound, and EU-OSHA). 
Indeed, they do not have the executive power to take direct action to enforce EU OHS 
standards; they provide support to the Commission, which is the institution that can take action. 
Additionally, these actors have relatively limited resources to achieve their goals. Their roles 
are to support and provide information to the Commission — one through the consultation 
process at the EU level and the other by enforcing the existing EU OHS standards. Meanwhile, 
the agencies focus both on the research and publication of data. 
Examination of the publications by the SLIC in recent years underlines the duality of 
the visions and calls for action on how to improve the enforcement of EU OHS standards. On 
one side, there is confirmation that the SLIC and the Commission are holding on to their roles 
as coordinators and trying to respect the sovereignty of the MS. However, on the other side, it 
seems that there is an increasing awareness of the current challenge, especially the cross-border 
work relationships. To address these specific challenges, it is necessary to have an independent 
authority, ideally with executive power at the EU level, that could act in the name or place of 
the MS.  
After years of debates, the Commission finally announced the creation of such an 
authority with the ELA. However, after an analysis of the different possible options, the 
 
 
856 Senior Labour Inspector’s Committee (2012). Consensus Paper on Cross-border Enforcement (CIBELES 
Project), European Commission: Brussels.  
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Commission felt that the preferred option would be to establish an ELA with an operational 
role, building on EU bodies in the area of labour mobility. This new authority will also develop 
further cooperation with existing agencies in the employment area, ensuring complementarities 
and adapting to their future evolution. Thus, the impact on enforcing the OHS standards in 
cross-border employment situations will be small, and there will be no impact on the problem 
that the national LI are facing. The supervisory policy option and the third delivery option could 
have at least allowed for some future evolution. 
In terms of improvement of the OHS standards, the current plan for the ELA started 
with potential but ended up being a missed opportunity that illustrates the broader political 
crisis when it comes to building a social Europe today. Overall, the ELA is an illustration of 
current limitations in terms of improvement of EU OHS standards. Some options that could 
have led to a real improvement at the EU level has been discussed but because of the choice of 
some stakeholders to hold on to the sovereignty of their authority (and so maintain the 
imbalance of scope between the enforcement of EU OHS and the market freedoms), the ELA 
will be an upgraded version of the existing mechanisms, such as networking and mediations, 
but without real novelty or innovation. This example shows that ways to improve the 
enforcement of OHS in the EU do not depend exclusively on what is legally possible, but on 
the political will of the main actors, starting with the MS. 
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 CHAPTER 7  
Conclusion 
“What would have been desirable and what was reasonable are two different things. It 
is necessary to be reasonable and realistic.”857 
Although the above statement was intended to describe the development of the EU OHS 
legal framework in the 1970s, it seems that it is still applicable today. In contrast, rationales and 
approaches which led to the development of the existing EU OHS legal framework are no 
longer suitable for adopting new directives in 2019. The main body of the existing EU OHS 
legal framework was adopted between 1989 and 2000,858 and since then, the situation can be 
described as a stand-off. While legally, there has not been any major step forward, the nature 
of work has changed considerably over the past twenty years. Various studies have shown the 
deep impact of work on workers’ mental health with more attention given to psychosocial risks 
and how the latest use of technology impacts workers’ lives via the increase of so-called 
technostress. The structural evolution of the labour market and the nature of the contract for 
work must also be taken into consideration: the increasing number of precarious self-employed 
workers who cannot benefit from the existing legal protections.  
Reports published by the agencies and bodies in charge of OHS at the EU level 
demonstrates a degree of awareness of these issues. So, why have the psychosocial risks been 
addressed with a framework agreement and not a directive? Why, despite the institutional 
possibility to adopt a directive with a qualified majority, does the EU not push harder to adopt 
new directives? Especially when there is an increased need for cross-border action: the 
enforcement of EU OHS standards is still national while the labour market has a European 
scope with workers free to move rapidly from one MS to another. So, is it so complicated to 
move the boundaries of the national and the European competencies if there is a need to do so? 
Considering the long period of stagnation, one might even ask whether the EU is the appropriate 
level and has the appropriate institutions and powers to address these new challenges. 
 
 
857Berlin, Alexandre. Interview, March 01, 2018. Archives, University of Glasgow p.9 
858 Vogel, L., 2015. The machinery of occupational safety and health policy in the European Union. History, 
institutions, actors, Brussels, ETUI. p.44 
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It was with the intention to contribute to the debate on the future of EU OHS that this 
thesis provided an overview of ways to overcome this period of stagnation and continue the 
improvement of workers’ health and safety.  Its main conclusion was that the improvement of 
workers’ health and safety might not be possible by adopting new EU OHS directives but rather 
by applying differently and ensuring the enforcement of the existing EU OHS legal framework. 
Indeed, I argued that the adoption of new EU OHS directives is currently unlikely because the 
initial adoption of the existing EU OHS legal framework was possible due to a set of 
circumstances which no longer pertains. Additionally, the informal rationales which have 
shaped the development of the EU OHS framework in the “golden age” of the Delors 
Commissions (i.e. reaching a consensus and a compromise) are not applicable at the current 
time. Therefore, the possible ways to improve workers’ health and safety at the EU level are (i) 
by initiating a European coordination of the way the LIs enforce existing standards at the 
national level, and (ii) by challenging the application of EU OHS rights before the CJEU to 
cover existing gaps and develop “new” rights, e.g. the right to reasonable accommodation in 
the workplace for injured or unwell  workers.   
7.1. The legislative route to improving EU OHS standards is politically blocked  
7.1.1. The limits of the rationales which built the existing EU OHS legal 
framework  
In the evolution of the EU OHS legal framework, the Commission always had a role of 
coordinator of the national positions with the aim to find a compromise and a consensus. The 
coordinating role of the Commission might have been a factor which helped the adoption of 
EU OHS Directives in the 1990s, but it might also be the reason why the adoption of a new 
significant EU OHS Directive is unlikely in 2019.  Even the institutional changes such as the 
introduction of qualified majority voting in 1986, or changes in the approach of the OHS such 
as the change towards qualitative duties and rights with Framework Directive 89/391/EEC, did 
not change these rationales of compromising and finding a consensus.   
The importance and the informal aspect of OHS, and the importance of finding a 
compromise and a consensus between the MS was confirmed both by interviews conducted for 
this PhD project and by the existing literature on the institutional decision-making dynamics. It 
appears that even when the directives where adopted by a qualified majority, informal 
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compromises were reached, and a consensus was found to facilitate the application at the 
national level. In the first part of the thesis, I concluded that finding a common approach through 
compromise and consensus might not any more be appropriate or possible, for two reasons. 
First, it was easier in earlier decades to find a compromise because the MS had, for the most 
part, similar expectations regarding the role and functions of the EU. The dynamic changed 
considerably with the integration of new countries at the end of the 1990s and during the 2000s 
because these new MS had to meet the standards of EU OHS Directives – and EU acquis 
communautaires in general. In that context, adopting additional norms became politically 
difficult and technically complicated.  
Secondly, during the time-period corresponding with the ‘golden age’ of OHS at the 
European level (i.e. during the 1990s), there was still something of a balance of power between 
the social partners. This balance does not exist any more and, due to deregulation at the national 
level, all across Europe and financialization (and its crisis) the TUs have been significantly 
weakened. However, history shows that it is not the first time that EU OHS decision-making 
has reached some institutional limits. The Single European Act was developed as a way to 
overcome the difficulties raised by the need for unanimity, which blocked the first wave of 
directives in the 1970s.  This means that in the current context, where we are reaching the limits 
again, it would be necessary to have an ambitious Commission to take the initiative and oversee 
the continuing development of the EU OHS framework.  
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. The Barroso-Commissions went in the 
opposite direction with the Better Regulation Agenda attempting to significantly reduce the 
extensive and well-developed corpus of more than 30 OHS directives to a single directive to 
make “EU law simpler and less costly”.859 A review of  EU OHS Directives proved their 
strength by concluding that reviewing and reducing this corpus of directives would not be an 
improvement. It did, however, set the tone of the Barroso Commissions regarding the OHS 
field. I underlined in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 5 the paradox of the Barroso-Commissions: in 
theory, this Commission focused on the implementation and the enforcement of the existing 
framework; in practice, it signalled a disengagement of the Commission in respect of the 
effectiveness of the law, and a reliance instead on national enforcement even if it means the 
 
 
859 https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/refit-making-eu-
law-simpler-and-less-costly_en 
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existence of significant differences between the MS. Therefore, considering the small 
likelihood of having new directives adopted in the current context, one of the main arguments 
of the thesis was that it is necessary to focus on the existing legal framework to identify points 
of leverage to extend and to challenge the boundaries of EU OHS standards. 
7.1.2. One common European understanding of OHS standards; two different 
national realities.   
The adoption and the implementation of EU OHS Framework Directive 89/391/EEC 
during the 1990s created a theoretical convergence of standards while maintaining a difference 
in the way they are enforced at the MS level. A comparative study of OHS in the UK and France 
emphasised the importance of the national political contexts during the phase of implementation 
of EU Directives, but also underlined the fact that different legal traditions impact the way the 
EU Directives are applied at the national level. Indeed, the potential points of pressure on 
existing standards today can be identified only by examining how the EU OHS legal framework 
has been implemented at the national level. Considering that Directive 89/391/EEC is the 
cornerstone of the EU’s modern legal framework, it can be assumed that an in-depth analysis 
of its implementation might show the overall trends for the rest of EU OHS Directives. 
Similarly, the French and the UK systems represented suitable examples due to their different 
legal ‘families” (i.e. common law and civil law) but also due to their overall different relations 
with the EU.   The comparative study confirmed that the implementation of EU OHS standards 
– even if they are legally binding – does not necessarily mean a standardised application and 
enforcement of these norms across national borders.  
The examination of the impact of the implementation of the Framework Directive in 
France and the UK showed that this implementation brought the British and the French OHS 
national legal frameworks closer together – at least on paper. For example, the UK had to 
implement the right to leave the workstation in case of serious or imminent danger (which has 
been inspired by the French framework) and had to adjust the way of appointing the health and 
safety representatives by adding a second channel of representation. Meanwhile, the French 
legislature had to implement the duty of workers to be responsible for their own health and 
safety and that of people around them, which was against the French tradition and inspired by 
the British legal framework. However, from a practical perspective, the application of EU OHS 
standards continues to diverge, both before the courts and in the hands of the LI. Divergences 
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before the national courts might be due to the fact that the liability system and concept of 
employers’ liability/responsibility are different in these two MS. In the UK, there is 
consideration of what is reasonably practicable, and in France, there is the principle of 
obligation de resultat (faute inexcusable). It confirmed and emphasised the importance of the 
courts in the application of the (EU OHS) legal standards. Moreover, in both countries, there 
have been national reforms on the way to apply and to enforce the OHS standards. The UK has 
changed the access to courts to get compensation, and reduced the number of LIs. France has 
reformed the CHSWC, and the occupational doctors, and the LIs too. The consequences of 
these reforms were that EU OHS standards still exist on paper but are barely applied or enforced 
in practice at the national level.  
By the end of Chapter 4, it appeared that there might be a lack or a gap in the way EU 
OHS concepts are applied before the Courts and enforced by LIs at the national level. I therefore 
argued that an action before the courts and the way in which LIs enforce OHS standards are 
two points of pressure with which it would be possible to revitalise the existing EU OHS legal 
framework. The question was, how? Would this be possible at the European level given the 
existing institutions and competences? What could be achieved?  
7.2. The improvement of the application and enforcement of EU OHS standards 
as a way to counter the disengagement of the Commission  
The second main argument of the thesis was that the development of strategic litigation 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and a European coordination of the 
ways the LIs enforce EU OHS duties and rights can lead to an improvement of the EU OHS 
legal framework: not by the adoption of new standards but by ensuring the application and 
enforcement of existing EU OHS rules. 
7.2.1. Strategic litigation before the CJEU: many birds with one stone  
My main argument here was that it is possible to challenge the current application of 
existing EU OHS provisions before the CJEU with the aim of extending the scope of OHS 
workers’ right to previously ‘uncovered’ situations. To illustrate this idea, I began by examining 
CJEU jurisprudence on OHS in order to identify the factors that might explain the evolution of 
the jurisprudence in that field. Then I addressed the current lack of European protection for the 
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injured or unwell workers when they return to work after a work accident or occupational 
disease, focusing here on the discrimination jurisprudence. Currently the CJEU has a restrictive 
understanding of “disability” and does not take into consideration the origin of the disability. I 
argued that while the jurisprudence on disability at work does not provide workers with 
appropriate protection at the early stage of impairment, by focusing on the occupational origin 
of the impairment, it is possible to develop a complementary litigation strategy based on the 
provisions of Directive 89/391/EEC.  
The detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of the CJEU led to vastly different findings 
in respect of infringement proceedings and the preliminary rulings. First, there was 
confirmation of the political behaviour of the Commission regarding the use of the infringement 
proceedings, as previously highlighted by the existing literature. The implication was that - 
except in the case of ‘easy’ infringements proceedings (such as the non-respect of the time to 
implement a directive) - the Commission might not be willing and/or have the resources to 
examine the conformity of the implementation in a substantive manner. That being the case, 
the thesis also confirmed the shift towards a decentralised enforcement of workers’ rights before 
the CJEU, through the development of preliminary rulings. That said, the analysis also showed 
significant differences between the MS regarding the countries where the request for a 
preliminary ruling came from. These differences might be explained by the different legal 
traditions; however, they might also be due to differing political agendas at the national level, 
which impact the possibility to discuss OHS issues before the national courts.  
Nevertheless, I underlined that some significant improvements in the application of the 
EU OHS standards have been made by the preliminary rulings hold of the CJEU. I identified 
the fact that the argumentation was based on individual rights as the common element of those 
decisions which served to improve the application of the EU OHS standards. For this reason, I 
argued that it might be possible to keep challenging the application of the existing legal 
framework before the CJEU with the development of a new litigation strategy. This idea has 
been illustrated by the existing gap in the EU OHS framework in respect of the right to a 
reasonable accommodation in the workplace for injured or unwell workers after a workplace 
accident or occupation disease. This thesis raised the possibility of arguing for such a right by 
relying on the phrasing of the discrimination framework and basing the main argument on the 
existing legal framework, in particular, Article 6.d of the Framework Directive. The idea would 
be to challenge the understanding of the employers’ responsibility through the Court and to 
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argue that the lack of an obligation in the national legislation to adapt the working conditions 
of an injured or unwell  worker who has been victim of a workplace accident or occupational 
disease would be contrary to the obligation of prevention embodied by the directive. Conscious 
of the time and the resources necessary to bring an action before the CJEU, I suggested that the 
litigation might be supported and led by TUs or worker representatives. Of course, no one can 
predict what the decision of the Court would be. However, in the case where the Court would 
support such an idea, it would have a direct impact on all the national jurisdictions and so the 
workers’ situations, in the EU. It could also be a way to improve the application of EU OHS 
standards.  
7.2.2. The necessity for a coordinated action of the Labour Inspectorates to 
compensate the imbalanced between social rights and economic freedoms.  
I then examined the LIs in the EU confirming the imbalance between social rights and 
economic freedoms, and the gap created between the national methods of enforcement and 
cross-border problems. The main argument here was that there is a need to complete the legal 
enforcement at the national level, and it is the role of the EU to ensure that the administrations 
at the national level are functioning. If coordination of the national systems is not possible, the 
EU needs to act by itself, at least in respect of enforcement (or rather lack thereof) that would 
lead to a distortion of the single market. The creation of the European Labour Authority (ELA) 
can be seen as such an initiative. Unfortunately, I argued that the impact on the enforcement of 
OHS standards in cross-border employment situations will be small, and there will be no impact 
on the problem faced by national LIs. This meant that the problem of the sharing of 
competences still exists, and the institutional limits cannot be overcome by the ELA. It seemed 
that, beyond the case of the ELA, the analysis of different scenarios and the examination of the 
stakeholders’ positions – especially the positions of MS – showed the limits of the current 
settings, not only legally but also politically.  Indeed, this new Authority will develop further 
cooperation with existing agencies in the employment area, ensuring complementarities and 
adapting to their future evolution. 
To justify the need for consistency in the application of OHS rules I began by examining 
the situation of the LIs at the national level. Here there are deep divergences regarding the 
sanctions and the way EU OHS standards are enforced by LIs, especially regarding the nature 
of the sanctions, the degree of the sanctions, and the balance between hard and soft enforcement. 
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These differences at the national level can lead not only to inconsistency but also to a lack of 
effectiveness of EU OHS standards on the ground, and so across the EU. Further studies are 
needed to strengthen and to explore this idea, but from this angle, it might be possible to 
legitimise action at  the EU-level, arguing that such action would fall in the exclusive 
competencies of the EU due to its link with the functioning of the single market.  
The examination of the national LIs showed that despite their differences, there are 
some similar patterns in the challenges that they face. The two main problems are (i) the 
shortcomings of the national organisations and (ii) the more challenging context and work 
settings illustrated by the increasing number of cross-border working relations. The LIs might 
be able to overcome and to address the cross-border situations with the current coordination of 
the SLIC, but the prerequisite conditions for them are to have the appropriate training, time, 
and resources – things that they do not have at the national level. This lack at the national level 
diminished the impact and the effectiveness of the European strategy of coordination.  Indeed, 
all the existing actors with a mandate to work on OHS at the EU level do not have executive 
powers: their contributions support and are considered by the Commission, which is the 
institution with executive powers.860 However, as shown previously, it is currently unlikely that 
the Commission will intervene in the direction of developing the powers of these bodies further.  
The only exception has been the initiative to create the ELA in 2017 – becoming active 
in 2019/2020 and commencing full activity in 2024.861  The purpose of the ELA is to address 
the challenges of the cross-border tensions between national authorities and market disruptions. 
Could the ELA be an illustration of what it is possible at the EU level to improve the 
enforcement of EU OHS standards? Different options as to the potential powers and role of the 
ELA were compared and debated. The supervisory policy option included the possibility to 
launch inspections on the authority’s own initiative and establish the European Inspection 
Corps and standards for the provision of services at the national level based on EU rules. It 
would also contain mandatory requirements for information exchange and develop an inventory 
of user-friendly templates to compare the national procedures. It would have standardised – not 
 
 
860 At the European Union level, there are two agencies and two committees relating to OHS: The Senior Labour 
Inspectors Committee (SLIC), the advisory committee for safety and health at work (ACSH), the European 
Foundation for the improvement of living and working conditions and the European Agency for Safety and 
Health at work.  
861 https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1414&langId=en 
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harmonised – the documents used and might have brought clarity and transparency to the 
national LIs. I am convinced that this option would have led to real improvements at the national 
and European level by helping to shift the share of competencies of enforcing EU OHS 
standards between the two levels, when and where it is necessary. Unfortunately, the 
Commission felt that the preferred option was the establishment of an ELA with an operational 
role building on EU bodies in the area of labour mobility.  
7.3. The contributions and limits of the thesis 
The research and analysis undertaken in this thesis have limits. The focus was limited 
to OHS field. As underlined in the introduction, the development and the rationale that apply 
to OHS are specific and might differ from the rest of the ‘social Europe’.  This study proposed 
hypotheses that would need to be tested and potentially confirmed regarding other of the social 
dimensions. The comparative study in this thesis focused on MS that already had a strong legal 
OHS framework prior to the implementation of the Framework Directive. Therefore, it might 
be necessary to complement this first analysis with countries that did not have a well-developed 
OHS national legal framework before the implementation of the Directive 89/391/EEC.  The 
final limitation of the thesis arose in respect of its examination of the CJEU jurisprudence: only 
decisions of the Court were analysed. However, it might be interesting to investigate the earlier 
stages of the infringement proceedings and action taken by the Commission to ensure the 
implementation of EU OHS standards (e.g., letter of intention). It would also be interesting to 
investigate the requests for preliminary rulings that did not pass the admissibility tests and to 
try to understand why was so. Such studies would complete the first findings of this these.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the thesis makes a significant original contribution 
to the existing literature. By conducting semi-qualitative interviews with those who directly 
helped drafting or negotiating the Framework-Directive 89/391/EEC, it has been possible to 
suggest a hypothesis to explain why the development of EU in the field of OHS might be at 
standstill. The testimonies from Alexandre Berlin, Jean Lapeyre and Marc Sapir helped to build 
the argument that the rationale of consensus and compromise is no longer applicable. It might 
contribute to the overall idea that there is a need to change the European decision-making 
system due to the high number of MS. One way would be to initiate a new institutional change, 
as was the case with the SEA, or to re-examine the idea of a ‘two-speed’ Europe.  
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Additionally, the detailed, schematic analysis of the jurisprudence of the CJEU over a 
period of more than 30 years gave a general overview of the jurisprudential trends and pattern 
in OHS field. Such an overview not only echoed previous research on the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU, but it also constitutes preliminary work for future research. Potential future research 
could, for example, investigate why some MS have referred more questions to the CJEU than 
others. Additionally, the argument of developing a litigation strategy based on individual rights 
before the CJEU to challenge an existing EU legal framework can be extended to fields other 
than the OHS directives.  
Finally, by carefully comparing the LIs across the MS, it has been possible to synthesise 
main differences in the way to enforce OHS standards, but also similarities regarding the 
obstacle the LIs are facing. This overview led to questioning the existing functioning and 
institutional framework by highlighting the limits of the enforcement of EU OHS standards. It 
could contribute to the overall debate on the need to rethink the balance between Social and 
Economic within the Union – either towards a federal Europe (in that respect, further study 
would need to be conducted in comparable countries to see how they are dealing with OHS, 
e.g., Canada), or a New Union.  
This thesis has also made a more practical contribution to legal and policy debates. By 
confirming the theoretical convergence while respecting the national differences, this study can 
provide an argument to adopt new directives in the future to address the OHS challenges. It 
could also counter the argument that directives are too binding for the MS. Finally, the idea of 
challenging the Framework Directive to address the gap of the protection for injured or unwell 
workers could be used by the ETUC as a starting point to mount strategic litigation before the 
CJEU. 
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 Appendices  
Appendix 1 – Consent form (English version)  
 
                              Consent Form 
 
 
Title of Project: Towards a reform of European Union Occupational Health and Safety law in 
a context of crisis 
 
Name of Researcher: Aude Cefaliello supervised by Prof. Ruth Dukes 
 
 
I - _____________ - confirm that I have read and understood the Plain Language 
Statement/Participant Information Sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason. 
 
The interview: Choose one option 
q I consent to be interviewed and, the interview to be audio-recorded 
q I consent to be interviewed, but I do not consent that the interview is audio-recorded 
 
Language: Choose one option 
q I would like the interview to be in English  
q I would like the interview to be in French  
 
After the interview: Choose one option  
q I would like to have the transcript of the interview, and I will proofread it   
q I would like to have the transcript of the interview, and I will send a modified version only 
if I think it is necessary.  
q I don’t want to have the transcript of the interview  
 
I acknowledge that if I decide to proofread /modify it, I engage myself to sign the second version 
of the transcript besides this consent form.   
 
Consent to be interviewed and to be named: Choose one option 
q I consent to be interviewed and to be named 
q I consent to be interviewed but I do not consent to be named. However, I consent to be quoted 
only if my statements are anonymised by a pseudonym. 
     The pseudonym would be: _________________________________ 
q I consent to be interviewed but I do not consent to be named or be quoted. 
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Page 1/2 
Storage & Sharing of the data: Choose one option per section  
 
 Use for future research:  
q I consent that my statement will be used for this PhD project and future journal articles 
and conferences papers 
q I consent that my statement will be used only for this PhD project 
 
 Storage  
q I consent that the interview will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage for 
the period of the PhD (2017-2020), and will be then archived at the University of 
Glasgow for an unlimited period. The access of the data will be access only by individual 
request. 
q I consent that the interview will be treated as confidential and kept in secure storage 
only for the time of the PhD (2017-2020), and will be destroyed after that. 
 
 Personal data  
q I acknowledge that my personal details will be kept confidential all time and would be 
communicated only to the researcher’s supervisors of the University of Glasgow for 
security reasons if I chose a face to face interview. The personal data will be destroyed 
after the PhD. 
 
 Copyright 
q I consent to waive my copyright to any data collected as part of this project 
 
 
 
Name of Participant  ………………………………………  Signature   
…………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
Name of Researcher  …………………………….…          Signature   
…………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2/2 
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Appendix 2 – Consent form (French version)  
 
  
Formulaire de Consentement 
 
Titre du projet: Vers une réforme européenne du droit de la santé et la sécurité au travail dans 
un contexte de crise.  
 
Nom du chercheur : Aude Cefaliello supervisée par le Prof. Ruth Dukes  
 
Je -                    - confirme avoir lu et compris la note d’information qui m’a été communiqué 
pour l’étude mentionnée précédemment, et avoir eu l’opportunité de poser des questions.  
Je comprends que ma participation est volontaire et que je suis libre d’y mettre un terme à 
n’importe quel moment, sans avoir à me justifier.  
 
L’interview : Choisir une option  
q Je consens à être interviewer et, à ce que l’interview soit enregistrée sur support audio 
q Je consens à être interviewer mais, je ne consent pas à ce que l’interview soit enregistrée 
sur support audio. 
 
Langage : Choisir une option  
q Je souhaite que l’interview soit en anglais 
q Je souhaite que l’interview soit en français  
 
Après l’interview : Choisir une option  
q Je souhaiterais avoir la transcription écrite de l’interview et je la relierai  
q Je souhaiterais avoir la transcription écrite de l’interview et je ne la modifierais que si je le 
juge nécessaire 
q Je ne souhaite pas avoir la transcription écrite de l’interview 
 
J’ai conscience que si je décide de relire/modifier la transcription écrite de l’interview, je 
m’engage à signer la seconde version en plus de ce formulaire de consentement.  
 
Consentement d’être interviewé et d’être nommé :  
q Je consens à être interviewé et à être nommé 
q Je consens à être interviewé mais pas à être nommé. Je consens à être cité que à la condition 
que mes déclarations soient anonymisées par l’usage d’un pseudonyme.  
Le pseudonyme sous lequel je souhaite être cité est : ___________________ 
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q Je consens à être interviewé mais je ne consens pas à être nommé, ou à être cité. 
Page 1/2 
 
 
Stockage & Partage des données : Choisir une option par section  
 
Utilisation pour des futures recherches 
q Je consens à ce que mes déclarations soient utilisées pour ce projet de thèse mais 
également pour la publication d’articles de journal et d’articles de conférences. 
q Je consens à ce mes déclarations soient utilisées pour ce projet de thèse uniquement.  
 
Stockage 
q Je consens à ce que l’interview soit considérée et traitée comme confidentielle et 
gardée dans un endroit sécurisé pour la période de la thèse (2017-2020), et qu’elle soit 
par la suite archivée pour une durée illimitée à l’Université de Glasgow. L’accès aux 
données sera soumis à une requête individuelle.  
q Je consens à ce que l’interview soit considérée et traité comme confidentielle et 
gardée dans un endroit sécurisé uniquement pour la période de la thèse (2017-2020) 
et qu’elle soit détruite par la suite.  
 
Données personnelles 
q Je reconnais que mes données personnelles seront gardées confidentielles et ne 
seront communiquées que aux superviseurs du chercheur pour des raisons de sécurité 
si l’interview en face à face est choisie. Les données personnelles seront détruites après 
la thèse.  
 
Droit d’auteur 
q Je consens à renoncer à mon droit d’auteur sur les informations collectées lors de ce 
projet.  
 
 
Nom du Participant  ……………………………………  Signature   …………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
Nom du Chercheur  …………………………….…       Signature   …………………………………………………….. 
 
Date …………………………………… 
 
 
Page 2/2 
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Appendix 3 – Participant Information Sheet (English version)  
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Towards a reform of European Union Occupational Health and Safety law in a context 
of crisis 
 
By Aude Cefaliello – PhD at the University of Glasgow  
Email: a.cefaliello.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
Phone Number: 0(044)7 955 800 842 / 0(033)6 86 77 78 22 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the 
following information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take the time before you decide whether you wish to participate or not. 
Thank you for reading this.  
The research: 
This study aims to examine and suggest reform of the function of the EU in the context of a new 
approach towards European Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). In the end, the PhD student would 
like to suggest a change of direction in the management of better OHS EU regulation. The goal is to 
preserve the balance between efficiency, competitiveness and productivity on the one hand, and 
overall security, sustainable development and social cohesion, on the other.  
 
One part of the study is a comparative and historical study of the socio-legal construction of the rules 
framing the OHS at work, covering the period from the late 60s to the end of the 90s. The context of 
the decision-making process is necessary to a better understanding. Thus, it is fundamental to be able 
to explore the socio-political context and background of the legislation which was adopted. Therefore, 
this part of the research involves interviews with the key players and important witnesses of the 
creation and development of OHS legal framework.  
 
Why am I being invited to take part? 
You are being invited to be part of this study in order to discuss your position of/as __________, from 
_______ to ________.  
 
What will happen if I agree to participate? 
If you decide to be part of this research, I will contact you to plan a semi-structured interview. Ideally, 
the interview will be face to face, at a location which is convenient for you (either at your office or a 
public place). However, if it is not possible, the interview could be by video call via Skype. The duration 
of the meeting will be at least 1hour and up to 2hours depending on your availability and the nature 
of the discussion.  Subject to your agreement, the interview will be audio-recorded. Remember that 
you are free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
 
What will happen after the interview? 
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I will send you a transcript of the interview, and you will be able, if you wish, to proofread it. The 
proofreading is optional. However, if you decide to do it a second signature of the transcript will be 
asked/requested. If you choose not to proofread, the information used for the PhD would be the one 
from the audio-record or the notes took during the meeting. 
 
Confidentiality of personal data 
If you accept to take part of this research you will be asked to communicate your personal details: 
email address, address (working place) and phone number. For security reasons, if you choose the 
face-to-face interview this information would be communicated to the supervisors of the researcher. 
Your personal details will be kept confidential (not published to the public), only your name and your 
current and previous position will be mentioned if you agree on it.  
 
Consent to be interviewed and to be named 
You have to be aware that the data collected might be re-used for future studies and will be share with 
other researchers. Therefore, there are two situations possible: 
 
(1) You consent to be interviewed and to be named: what you have said during the interview and 
transcript can be quoted in the PhD thesis and for further research. It will be possible to name you 
directly.  
 
(2) You consent to be interviewed but not to be named:  
a) The researcher anonymises your statement by using a pseudonym. In that situation, it will 
be possible to quote what you said in the transcript but I won't mentioned your name. You can 
indicate the pseudonym you wish to use in the consent form attached. 
b) The researcher can draw one the substance of the interview but without quoting what has 
been said during the interview and without naming them.  In that case, the interview will be 
transcribed for the purpose of the research and then destroyed at the end of the PhD. 
 
 
You will make this choice in the consent form attached to this information note. Confidentiality will 
be respected unless there are compelling and legitimate reasons for this to be breached. If this is the 
case, we would inform you of any decisions that might limit your confidentiality.   
 
Storage & Sharing of the data 
The data collected will be used for the publication a PhD thesis but also potentially for journal articles 
and conference papers. If you want the data to be used only for the PhD thesis and not further work, 
you can indicate this in the consent form attached. 
 It will be stored and secured on password protected personal electronic devices, and the paper 
versions in a locked office at the University of Glasgow to which only the researcher, Aude Cefaliello, 
will have access for the period of the thesis (from 2017 to 2020).  
Considering the historical value of the interview, the data won’t be destroyed at the end of the 
research project. Both the University and the researcher will keep a sample of it. Indeed, at the end of 
the period of study (after 2020), the entirety of the interview’s transcript will be stored in the archives 
of the University of Glasgow and so accessible to the public if someone requests it. However, this 
won’t apply if you express that you want the data to be use only for the PhD. In that case, you can 
indicate it in the consent form attached.   
The University of Glasgow College of Social Sciences has funded this research. This project has been 
considered and approved by the College Research Ethic Committee. If you need further information 
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or if you have any complaint about how this research is conducted, please contact the College of Social 
Sciences Ethics Officer, Dr Muir Houston, email: Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk 
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Appendix 4– Participant Information Sheet (French version)  
 
 
Note d’information au participant 
Vers une réforme du droit européen de la santé et la sécurité au travail en temps de 
crise.  
 
Par Aude Cefaliello – étudiante en thèse à l’Université de Glasgow  
Email: a.cefaliello.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
Numéro de téléphone: 0(044)7 955 800 842 / 0(033)6 86 77 78 22 
 
Vous êtes invité(e) à prendre part à une étude. Avant de prendre votre décision, il est important que 
vous compreniez pourquoi cette recherche est menée et ce qu’elle implique. Prenez le temps de lire les 
informations qui vont suivre avec attention. N’hésitez pas à nous contacter s’il y a un point 
d’incompréhension ou si vous désirez de plus amples informations. Prenez le temps pour décider si vous 
souhaitez ou non prendre part à cette étude.  
 
En vous remerciant pour votre attention  
 
L’étude :  
Cette recherche a pour but d’examiner et de suggérer une réforme du rôle de l’Union Européenne pour 
une nouvelle approche en matière de santé et de sécurité au travail (SST). A terme, la candidate de 
thèse souhaiterait suggérer un changement dans la direction de la gestion pour une meilleure régulation 
européenne de la SST afin de préserver l’équilibre entre d’un côté efficacité, compétitivité et 
productivité, et de l’autre sécurité, cohésion sociale et développement sur long terme.  
La première partie de la thèse est une étude comparative et historique de la construction socio-juridique 
des normes encadrant la SST. La période étudiée couvre la fin des années 60s jusqu’à la fin des années 
90s. Dans le but d’avoir une meilleure compréhension du contexte de la prise de décision, il est 
fondamental d’être capable d’explorer le contexte socio-politique et l’origine de la législation qui a été 
adoptée. Pour cela, cette partie de la recherche implique des interviews avec les acteurs clefs et les 
témoins importants de la création et du développement du cadre législatif en matière de SST.  
 
Pourquoi suis-je invité(e) à prendre part à cette étude ?  
Vous êtes invité(e) à prendre part à cette étude pour discuter de votre expérience en tant que 
_____________, de ________ à _________.  
 
Que va t-il se passer si j’accepte de participer ?  
Si vous acceptez de participer à prendre part à cette étude je vous contacterais pour organiser 
l’interview qui sera semi directe (avec des questions ouvertes). Idéalement l’interview sera en face à 
face, dans le lieu qui vous conviendra le mieux (soit à votre bureau, ou dans un espace public de votre 
choix). Si cela n’est pas possible, l’interview aura lieu par téléphone ou vidéo conférence (ex : Skype). 
La durée de l’interview peut varier mais sera généralement entre une et deux heures ; cela dépendra 
de vos disponibilités et de la nature de la conversation. L’enregistrement audio de l’interview sera 
  
 
274 
soumis à votre accord. Souvenez-vous que vous êtes libre d’annuler votre participation à n’importe quel 
moment sans avoir à vous en justifier.  
 
Que va-t-il se passer après l’interview ?  
Une transcription de l’interview vous sera envoyée, et vous aurez la possibilité – si vous le désirez – de 
la relire et de la modifier. La relecture est optionnelle. Cependant, si vous décidez de le faire une 
seconde signature de l’interview vous sera demandé. Si vous décidez de ne pas relire, les informations 
utilisées pour la thèse seront celle recueillies pendant l’interview.  
 
Confidentialité des données personnelles  
Si vous acceptez de prendre part à cette étude, il vous sera demander de communiquer vos détails 
personnels : email, adresse postale de votre lieu de travail et numéro de téléphone. Pour des raisons 
de sécurité, si vous choisissez l’interview en face à face, ces informations seront communiquées aux 
superviseurs de la chercheuse. Vos données personnelles seront gardées confidentielles (non accessible 
au public), seulement votre nom et votre fonction seront mentionnées si vous êtes d’accord.  
 
Consentement d’être interviewé(e) et d’être nommé(e) 
Vous devez être conscient que les données collectées pourront être réutilisées à l’avenir et être partagé 
avec d’autres chercheurs. Pour cela plusieurs situations sont possibles :  
 
(1) Vous consentez à être interviewé(e) et à être nommé(e) : ce que vous avez dit pendant l’interview et 
dans la transcription pourront être cité dans le projet de thèse et dans les projets à venir. Il sera possible 
de vous nommer directement.  
 
(2) Vous consentez à être interviewé(e) mais pas à être nommé(e) :  
a) La chercheuse anonymise vos déclarations en utilisant un pseudonyme. Dans cette situation 
il sera possible de citer ce qui a été dit pendant l’interview, ou dans la transcription, mais votre 
nom ne sera pas mentionné. Vous pourrez indiquer le pseudonyme choisi dans le formulaire de 
consentement ci joint.  
 b) La chercheuse peut s’appuyer sur vos déclarations pour avancer des idées mais sans vous ne 
citer ni vous mentionner. Dans ce cas l’interview sera transcrite uniquement pour les besoins 
de la thèse et sera détruite à la fin de la période de recherche. 
 
Vous ferez ce choix dans le formulaire de consentement attaché à cette note d’information. La 
confidentialité sera respectée à moins qu’il y ait une raison légitime et/ou légale de la briser. Si c’est le 
cas nous vous informerons de la décision qui peut limiter votre confidentialité.  
 
Stockage & Partage des données 
Les données collectées seront utilisées pour la publication de la thèse, mais potentiellement pour des 
articles de journaux ou présentation de conférences. Si vous souhaitez que les données soient utilisées 
uniquement pour la thèse vous pourrez l’indiquez dans le formulaire de consentement.  
 
Les données seront stockées et sécurisées pour la période de la thèse (2017-2020) par un mot de passe 
électronique, et la version papier sera dans un office fermé à clef auquel seule la chercheuse à accès. 
 
Considérant la valeur historique que représentent ces interviews, elles ne seront pas détruites à la fin 
de la période de thèse ; l’Université de Glasgow et la chercheuse en garderont une copie. Après la thèse 
l’intégralité des transcriptions seront archivées à l’Université de Glasgow et seront donc accessible au 
public si quelqu’un présente une requête à l’Université. Cependant, ce paragraphe ne s’applique pas si 
vous exprimer le souhait que les données ne soient utilisées que pour la thèse. Dans ce cas-là vous 
pourrez l’indiquer dans le formulaire de consentement attaché ci joint.  
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Le collège de sciences sociales de l’Université de Glasgow finance cette étude. Ce projet a été examiné 
et approuvé par le Comité d’Ethique du Collège de Sciences Sociales. Si vous avez besoin d’information 
supplémentaires ou si vous souhaitez une réclamation à propos de la façon dont cette recherche est 
menée veuillez contacter le responsable éthique du Collège : Dr. Muir Houston. Son email est : 
Muir.Houston@glasgow.ac.uk.  
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Appendix 5- Number of workers/labour inspectorates in the Member States in 2012862  
 
MEMBER STATES  Number of workers /labour inspectorates  
AUSTRIA 9 370 
BELGIUM 26 779 
BULGARIA 4 717 
CYPRUS 15 433 
CZECH REPUBLIC 13 853 
DENMARK 5 677 
ESTONIA 16 431 
FINLAND 6 131 
FRANCE 8 229 
GERMANY 7 164 
GREECE 16 585 
HUNGARY 38 019 
IRELAND 22 541 
ITALY 5 454 
LATVIA 6 929 
LITHUANIA 5 666 
LUXEMBOURG ___ 
MALTA 12 335 
NETHERLAND 27 500 
POLAND 8 000 
PORTUGAL 12 910 
ROMANIA 8 366 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 7 815 
SLOVENIA 28 000 
SPAIN 18 021 
SWEDEN 16 911 
UNITED KINGDOM 12 000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
862 Based on:  Evaluation of the EU Occupational Safety and Health Directives. Country Summary Reports (2015) 
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Appendix 6 – Problems faced by Labour Inspectorates in Member States863 
 
 Lack 
of 
staff 
Lack of 
resources 
and 
support 
Lack of 
Cooperation 
Coordination 
Workload 
Complexity of 
the 
administrative 
paper 
International 
Situations 
Legal 
Problems 
Organisations 
BELGIUM  X  X X X  
FRANCE  X  X   
GERMANY X  X   X 
GREECE X  X   X 
HUNGARY       
ITALY  X X X  X 
POLAND   X X   X 
ROMANIA  X     
SPAIN X X X  X X 
  
 
 
863 Based on « A mapping report on Labour Inspection Services in 15 European countries », a SYNDEX report for the European 
Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) 2012 
